Abusaleh Shariff, Ph. D

A Recent Interview on Status of Muslims

2012-01-30T13:53:00.002+05:30

http://www.islamonline.net/eng/article/1304971030788

Miserable State of India’s Education

2012-01-28T14:57:00.000+05:30

India is today seen as one of the leading economics in the world and counted among the top 5th. The competition is open to occupy the first and second spot by China and India respectively in about 30-40 years. Is this a true and real picture of India while a large portion of our citizens languish under the stress of poverty, deprivation even lack of food and high malnutrition. On a similar count India still has one of the largest illiterate population both in terms of absolute size and in proportionate terms. How and why India should heralds such a puzzling scenario. What is at the root of this puzzle is hope. It is the connect between what we are today and what we can be tomorrow which bridge this gap and explain the disconnect. This article takes the issue of literacy and education as an example and discusses as to what it takes for India to ensure creditable presence in the ‘league of top end nations’ marshaling achievements in the areas of ‘development, democracy and diversity’.
Accomplishments since Independence in 1947 in terms of literacy, spread of institutions, participation and equalization of educational opportunities have been quite significant. There has been phenomenal increase in the number of educational institutions, faculties, in teachers and students. The number of teachers has gone up five-fold and the number of schools three fold. Literacy rate has nearly trebled. The decennial census, 1991, saw India across the 50 per cent mark, and by 2011 the literacy level has reach 74.5%. This is not a mean achievement for India - needs to cherish this feat because literacy has more than tripled while its population also tripled during the same period.
Yet the rural-urban disparities in literacy have remained large, although there is a marginal decline in gender disparity only lately. As a thumb rule there has been around 20%ge point deficit in rural literacy and female literacy respectively. It is also no time to feel good and procrastinate since the level of learning and competence of those considered literate is lot to be desired. Further to understand future progress in literacy and education one needs to analyze the process indicator such as the ‘enrollment’ and quality of education.
PRATHAM a well know civil society organization since last seven years undertakes ‘annual assessment of education’ and brings out a report identified as ASER. The seventh such report with reference year 2011 provides a conflicting scenario – that practically all children 5-14 years are enrolled in the schooling system, over one quarter of them attend private schooling but a substantial proportion of children in government schools have very low levels of learning in terms of language, comprehension and numeracy. While there is something to cheer about in terms of enrollment efforts, with the private sector doing its bit, there are serious problems in the process, impact and outcome of education sector in India. The quality of schools and schooling is of poor quality in government system, although the government appointed teachers are well educated compared with the purely private schools. The private schools excepting in Kerala (actually government aided schools in Kerala) can also be of suspicious quality, as most do not meet the RTE standards and tend to appoint poorly trained and poorly paid teachers. Thus overall the situation is like – one has ‘sowed all her land with seeds, but at the end of the season there is no crop to reap’. This report itself has indicated that what is measured as enrollment does not reflect school attendance which has remained very poor and in states such as Bihar, UP and West Bengal there is a sharp decline in school continuation. Another disturbing factor is an increase in multi-grade class rooms which could be a factor for children shifting away from government to private schools in most of the states.
ASER dichotomize the schooling identities into government and private; although it refers to un-aided schools which can be considered private schools, what is disputable is to consider aided-schools as private, since while community groups manage the primary and elementary school most of the expenditures including teachers’ salaries are met by state budgetary mechanism. Overall, however, the private primary and elementary schools appear to produce relatively better levels of literacy compared with the government schools, although if other factors are controlled for this advantage may disappear. Further, the fact that private tutoring would sustain levels of learning somewhat has been enunciated through this research although generally it is only complimentary to the quality of schooling itself. The worrying fact is that that compared to previous years the learning levels in government school system has declined while the private school have maintained its own quality of education.
ASER-2011should be appreciated for a rare analytical measurement of learning ability and change over the last seven years for with the annual series of data are available. Generally one finds that the percentage of children who can read class 1 level of matter increase as the current grade increase which is but expected. However, the disturbing fact is this percentage in many higher grades has remained low since for example in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka in fact there is sharp decline at grade 3 in Jharkhand, Odhisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and even in Haryana. Many factors can impact this which can be identified as sampling as well as non-sampling errors. The fact recent survey was undertaken about the time census of India 2011 was in operation could impact school education due to absence of teachers from school. Similarly, often the basic literacy programs are implemented in various formats, for example there can be special campaigns when quality of learning can increase al beit temporarily and so on. Analysis on learning abilities in arithmetic has also been evaluated and the scenario is much worse than the one enunciated in case of reading alone.
While ASER’s effort is commendable in exposing the state of literacy in the rural parts of India, I would have wished if a few crucial factors which impact school continuation rates were to be explored further. There is this debate as to what is the impact of mid-day meals on continuation, similarly provision of drinking water and toilets are expected to help improve girls schooling. High cost of education is considered an impediment to schooling, yet one finds large increase in private schooling in India. How can this trend be explained, and in this context it should be stated that during the last 2-3 years there is an emphasis pre- and post-matric scholarships, what is its impact. While it is true that there is a slow increase in literacy, enrollment and continuation rate in India, which is important to note is due to inefficient and asymmetric program implementation, the literacy, enrollment and continuation deficits are likely to be concentered amongst specified population groups or socio-religious groups. It would have been highly timely if information on language of instruction was also analyzed especially with respect to learning ability of English. It is essential that this dimension in the dynamics of literacy and education can also be a separate chapter in ASER at least as a supplementary report of 2011, and certainly as an integral part of its report in 2012.

Email Reply to New York Time Query on the Current Controversy

2012-01-25T15:44:00.001+05:30

1. In your opinion, was the action of the protesters and the threat of violence un-Islamic?

Any act of violence is not permitted by the Indian Laws. The current issue must be dealt with accordingly. I am not an Islamic scholar, but so far as my understanding goes Islam does not promote violence. The issue was made political mostly by media, it is the media which is fanning the current controversy possibly under the influence of political patronage. Further even the Jaipur – Literature Festival platform was misused by media yesterday by organizing a special session on ‘salman rushdie’. salman rushdie has visited number of occasions earlier, but none of those occasions was the information put in media in advance. All reporting was done after he had left India. Why is this different this time – media and political patronage?

2. Have you read The Satanic Verses? What is the most offensive aspect of the book, according to you?

Yes, this is not the best of writings which I appreciated. The government of India did it good to ban it in India. India is made of people with strong religious beliefs and one has to be sensitive to such religious beliefs; in fact one needs to cherish the diversity of India and be sensitive. Freedom of expression should not be used to promote hate writing and pornography in India.

3. Do you think the government handled Salman Rushdie's visit appropriately?

Government response must be in the larger interest of millions of it citizens and their legitimate requirements have to be met. It is also essential to keep peace and orderly behavior across India. The promoters of freedom of speech, English speaking elite are far too few and they live in their own ivory towers and often far removed from the practicality of human lives across the rural and urban parts of India. They can create their own ideological castles and live in their own cocoons. Understanding socio-cultural life styles of Indian is a serious matter.

4. Is the view held by Salim Engineer representative of the view of the mainstream Muslim society?

No single individual can represent the view of millions of Indian citizens. I do not know who this person is. But what matters is the sensitivities and religious sentiments must be respected, but not promoted. The religious believes do change as we educate our citizens.

DEC 11 - JAN 12 Engagements

2012-01-25T15:40:00.003+05:30

13 January 2012
Prime Time Debate – ‘The Big Fight’ - Row over Minority qutoa: Vote bank politics or something that is overdue.’ The NDTV-New Delhi Studio: http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-big-fight/row-over-minority-quota-vote-bank-politics-or-something-thats-overdue/221120

10th January 2012
Prime Time 10pm Live Debate on ‘Minority Reservations-will they be
adequate to improve the conditions of Muslims in India’, CNN-IBN National TV, New Delhi Studio: http://ibnlive.in.com/#hp_player2

6-9th January 2012
‘Gender Empowerment and Indexing: Measurements and Policy’,
Inaugural address at an international conference on ‘Gender Empowerment and Development’ organized by the Institute of Objective Studies and held at Town Hall, Calicut, Kerala State.

2nd January, 2011
'Role of Civil Society in providing affordable quality education in rural and semi-urban areas of Karnataka’, Key note address at the Annual Function of the Al Falah Education Institutions, Magadi, Karnataka State.

27-29th December 2011
How Inclusive are India’s Inclusive Policies? A review of post Sachar initiatives’, presented at 94th Annual Conference of The Indian Economic Association, Organized by Bharati Vidyapeeth, Pune-411 030.

17th December 2011
‘Financial Services and Economic Empowerment : New Opportunities’ presented at an international conference on Participatory Banking for All - A Business Proposition, organized by Two Circles.Net, Hotel Taj, Café Parade, Mumbai.

Nation Building through Inclusive and Equity Policies

2011-12-09T00:24:00.000+05:30

At the outset, it is essential to emphasize the fact that the minorities such as the Muslims, Christians and the Sikhs cherish and maintain aspirations and seek opportunities for development similar to any other community in India. The Sachar Committee report prepared at the instance of the Indian Prime Minister was made public in November 2006, a long five years age. After accepting the report a number of major announcements were also made, the Ministry of Minority Affaires was pressed to undertake minority/Muslim favoring programs. Other committees were formulated and reports submitted to understand the scope and functioning of ‘equal opportunity commission’ and finalize a methodology to prepare ‘diversity index’ in educational, employment, bank credit and urban living spaces. Yet a recent empirical review suggests minorities especially the Muslims lagging practically in all spheres of development including education, employment, income and assets.

Efforts of both the center and state governments to overcome Muslim deprivation across India were picked up in isolation, as opposed to systemic policy shifts which were suggested in the Sacher committee report. For example, funding allocations for post- and pre-matric scholarships were made but the implementation mechanism was not assigned to the ‘human resources’ ministry rather the minority ministry was made to implement the same. The minority ministry does not have the benefit of adequate funding and implementative structure and staff. Similarly, the issue of educational deprivation of Muslims has been reduced to notional program in promotion of Urdu and modernization of madrasas; while the requirement is to establish regular secular schools imparting modern education at elementary and high levels in Muslims dominant mohallas, towns and villages; affirmative action policies to ensure access to higher level education provided by public and private universities across India. Similarly, the credit needs for the businesses and entrepreneurship development is expected to be promoted by ‘minority development corporations’ rather than from the regular banking channels under the priority sector advances schemes. It is the national level regular banking structure which manages development funds and the ‘special purpose vehicles’ are a failure and waste of time and money.

A quick review of programs, new initiatives and the associated outcomes suggest little improvement during the last 5 years since the submission of the Sachar report. There are, therefore, compulsive reasons to strive for durable changes, firstly a recognition that deprivation amongst the minorities exists due to systemic causes which can be set right only through broad based public policy initiatives, not entirely through special purpose vehicles such as the minority/Muslim/Christian oriented programs; rather assisting them to strive to access their share within the mainstream from the regular ministries, departments and programs of government of India and many major states.

India through the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment has made a strong socio-political statement of its arrival as a matured democracy, championing multi-layer decentralized governance, sharing substantial powers and national pool of resources with the States. Further, the enduring cannons of governance and economic development are grounded in principals of socialism, inclusiveness and secularism and fully conscious of regional imbalance given a large expanse of the Indian nation. India probably is a rare example of pluralism, with multi-dimensional cultural and social groupings, language, race, region and not the least religion; in short rich in diversity and decentralized governance is essential to promote inclusiveness. Such efforts are essential, they do create enabling environment and a level playing field, yet the positive results embedded in resource allocation, process and outcome measures are hard to come by.

Like other main communities of India, the deprived minority and social groups should be able to pursue social, economic and educational aspirations within the frame and support of government provided infrastructure, opportunities and political awakening. One should expect ‘diversity’ - the diversity natural to our population get reflected in the public spheres such as in educational institutions, public and organized sector employment, political system and governance structures at all levels. Yet, in spite of the fact that practically all social, educational and economic spheres of living are governed, regulated and implemented by the States; one would find substantial (often unacceptable level) differences between varied social groups and across states. Such differentials are prominent in spite of special constitutional provisions bestowed upon the minorities since the Independence; as discussed above.
Over 230 million citizens, about 20% of all Indians are categorized as minorities and they reside across all parts of India. Muslims are the largest (80%) of all identified minorities and about 14% followed by Christians about 3% of the country’s population. Minorities reside in substantial numbers and proportions in states such as Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, UP and Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra and in the seven sister states of the North-east. In terms of the welfare of the minorities, there are examples and best practices found within India. Consider the states of Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, all have devised policies favoring Muslims at two levels. (a) Along with all others, the Muslims have relatively better access to quality mass education (both elementary and higher level) and employment; and (b) given the history of relative deprivation of the Muslims the state policy have extended the benefit of reservations in a certain measure of fractional-proportions linked to their size and share in population. Such quotas are enabling the Muslim girls and boys to catch up with their peers amongst the Hindus and Christians, both in education and employment. Similar provisions will enable Muslims to participate even in the political spaces; and Andhra Pradesh has made a beginning by promoting a system of ‘co-option’ or ‘nomination’ system to the Mandals (sub-taluka), Zila Parishads and Municipalities/Nagar Panchayets (AP Panchayat Act 2006).

But a number of states especially in the northern part of India, and at the level of the nation not such beneficial policies have yet been formulated, excepting in the guise of Mandal Commission, where the quota system is not well articulated and the benefits to minorities and Muslims are minimal. Maintaining diversity in public spheres is essential. When this does not happen naturally, it has to be made to happen through government intervention. Legislation can be one way; and the mechanism is to remind the government and the institutions that ensuring diversity is their responsibility; the state should have done it in the first place. Diversity can be assured in India by offering incentives/credits to government departments, institutions, universities, panchayats, PSU and so on. The most recent announcement to earmark a 6% quota within the OBC quota for the Muslim community will not yield more than 60,000 jobs at category ‘D’ and ‘C’ (lowly paid) while the requirement is over one million new jobs for Muslims alone across India.

Another mechanism is to provide institutional access to all deprived citizens (including religious minorities) and to ensure ‘Equity’ in public sphere. In spite of a plethora of public institutions in existence, systemic discrimination or bias seems to have occurred in case of the minorities and therefore establishing an ‘Equal Opportunity Commission’ will go a long way both to ensure diversity as a key state objective, and it can also function as an institution to enforce redressal.

The national government has made some efforts during the past 3-4 years to address various aspects of Muslim deprivation; especially after the Sachaer Committee report was presented to the national government. Broadly under the revised 15-point program, a special investment program in about 100 minority (includes substantial Christian and Muslim populations) concentration districts (MCD); exclusive scholarships are announced for the first time to cover minorities both in elementary and higher levels of education. The RBI is consistently sending memos to the public sector banks to increase funding to the applicants from the minorities and so on. However, a review of all the above programs suggest, that the MCD program has not even made presence in many states such as West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand and Gujarat. The overall utilization is less than 20% of the total funds earmarked to this program since inception. Similarly the scholarship program although very popular is able to cover only a fraction of total applicants; and it appears that the public sector banks have not even taken a note of the repeated requests make by the RBI which is a matter of utmost concern.

The larger malice of exclusion has to be fought unitedly by all ‘regular-line departments’ and Ministries at the national and State levels. It also needs collaboration and partnership with civil society and private institutional structures. How will a separate Ministry ensure the implementation of more than 300 programs that aim to alleviate poverty and improve human development which will promote inclusiveness of the excluded, whether they be Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Muslims?

Concluding Remarks:

Empirical evidence is essential to developmental knowledge. It is reassuring that modern empirical and econometric methodologies accurately estimate and identify characteristics of backwardness. Caste and religion stands out as dominant social identities of backwardness along with occupation (source of household income), residential and regional identities. Empirical analysis of process indicators (literacy, higher level education, formal employment, access to banking and credit, political participation etc.) according to religious communities excluding the Hindus confirm Muslim placement below the line of average. If the SCs/STs are singled out and compared with religious groups, one finds Muslims in most of the measures about the same or even lower. With adjustments for initial conditions, the conditions of Muslims relative to the SCs/STs have worsened over years. Such evidence suggests that policies and programs of the national and state governments are less accessible to Muslims, to the extent that they can be labeled as discriminatory.

Applying the standards set by the Indian constitution one can argue existence of systemic bias based on religion. The only way to eliminate such bias is to ensure equal opportunity and access to program which generate benefits proportional to the size of the population. Naming programs specific to the deprived community even if has to be done by caste and religious identity must be the public choice. It is clear, that there is no catch 22 situation as often made out to be and it is not even ‘unconstitutional’. Since the Indian constitution grants the State the responsibility of identifying the ‘backward communities’, it is bounden duty of national and State governments that the caste and religious communities facing exclusion especially the Muslims, are brought into the fold of mainstream policies and programs as recommended by the Sachar committee report. Note that Article 25 while setting the parameters of the right to freedom of religion has named selected religions to bring a certain degree of clarity as to what constitute the Hindus; and this Article does not preclude naming Muslims and Christians (two large religious communities) in public documents and legal enactments. Thus two pronged policies for growth and national interest are essential: (a) an inclusive economic penetration and (b) a social framework which promotes equity and participation.

In the absence of any time-line, program-specific implementative strategy and clarity with respect to monitoring tools and mechanisms, no results will be forthcoming. It is important to mention that a flat policy of earmarking 15 per cent of budgetary allocations to favour the minorities is not implementable. Rather, the service delivery procedures must use population shares at the “program specified operational levels” such as the district, taluka and block levels so as to ensure maximum coverage and provide a sense of equity. The early euphoria and expectations are dying out. The UPA -1 took many initiatives to dissect and diagnose the problem, and UPA -2 must ensure that inclusive policies are actually implemented before the people at large become disappointed. I only hope this does not lead to frustration.

An Interview in GOVERNANCE NOW

2011-10-02T09:21:00.001+05:30

1-15 October Issue of Governance Now
http://governancenow.com/views/interview/upa-considers-muslims-fools

Constitution for Inclusive Policies

2011-09-30T09:34:00.004+05:30

September 29, 2011 00:18 IST | Updated: September 29, 2011 00:21 IST

There is nothing in the Constitution which bars identification of beneficiaries of public programmes based on religion. Of late, there has been a debate on whether public programmes such as school education, scholarships, health-care
delivery and access to microcredit can be targeted at beneficiaries based on religion; some consider this ‘unconstitutional' and argue that it amounts to discrimination. I highlight the constitutional provisions and argue that there is nothing in the Constitution which bars identification of beneficiaries based on religion. Religious identity is listed on a par with race, caste, sex and place of origin, all in the same line, and these other traits are used to identify beneficiaries.

The Constitution, resolves to secure to all citizens .... ‘equality of status and of opportunity,' and directs the government to be proactive to ensure equal opportunity. Equality, equal access and equal opportunity concepts are elaborated in Articles 14 (right to equality), 15 (access to education) and 16 (public employment). The ‘... state shall not discriminate.... on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth ....' . Clause (4) of Article 15, states, “Nothing .... shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.” Interestingly, ‘socially and economically backward classes (SEBC)' precedes mention of the SCs and the STs. Clause (5) directs the state to make a special provision by law for the advancement of the ‘socially and educationally backward classes' ..... through admission to educational institutions including private, aided or unaided.

Article 16 provides for equal opportunity in government employment, and cautions the state not to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, etc..; and clause (4) provides for making provisions for reservation of appointments in favour of ‘any backward class' which .... in the opinion of the state, is not adequately represented in the services under the state. Thus, the onus of identifying a ‘backward group/class' rests with the state. All explanations of Articles 14, 15 and 16 emphasise that the group classifications should not be arbitrary, must be
compatible with the ‘objective of classification' and pre-existing inequality should not be ignored. Therefore, any group of citizens (not arbitrarily formulated), including those named in the Constitution, namely religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, and place of birth/residence should form the basis for backwardness. Backwardness can also be assessed based on occupation, workplace, age, language, etc., which are not arbitrary in nature.

The state is directed by the Constitution “to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life” [Article 38(1)]. An amendment in 1976 states “The state shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations [Article 38(2)].”Generally, the government collects and collates data for the SCs and STs; for example, to measure levels of literacy and higher education, share in state employment, etc. Similarly, multidimensional gender discrimination and regional disparities reflected from the ‘place of birth/origin/residence' are measured. One fails to understand, therefore, as to why an assessment based on ‘religion' is taboo. Therefore, the public policy view that religious comparisons in the levels of achievement in development indicators are ‘unconstitutional' appears due to a lack of understanding of the spirit and intentions of the Constitution. Religion in India is a dominant social identity next only to sex and caste and therefore, it cannot be singularly sidelined or ignored. Further, religious identity lends itself to a double whammy. Studies show unacceptably large compounding effects of sex, age and regional discrimination interacting with those linked to religion. Muslim and Dalit women (children)living in less developed States are the most excluded of all types of socio-religious groups in India.

Empirical evidence is essential to developmental knowledge. It is reassuring that modern empirical and econometric methodologies accurately estimate and identify the characteristics of backwardness. Caste and religion stand out as dominant social identities of backwardness along with occupation (source of household income), residential and regional identities. Empirical analysis of process indicators (literacy, higher level education, formal employment, access to banking and credit, political participation, etc.) according to religious communities excluding Hindus,
confirm Muslim placement below the line of average. If the SCs/STs are singled out and compared with religious groups, one finds Muslims in most of the measures about the same or even lower. With adjustments for initial conditions, the conditions of Muslims relative to the SCs/STs have worsened over the years. Such evidence suggests
that policies and programmes of the national and State governments are less accessible to Muslims, to the extent that they can be labelled as discriminatory.
Applying the standards set by the Constitution, one can argue the existence of a systemic bias based on religion. The only way to eliminate such bias is to ensure equal opportunity and access to programmes which generate benefits proportional to the size of the population. Naming programmes specific to the deprived community even if has to be done by caste and religious identity must be the public choice. It is clear that there is no catch-22 situation as has often been made out to be and it is not even ‘unconstitutional.' Since the Constitution grants the state the responsibility of identifying ‘backward communities,' it is the bounden duty of the national and State governments to bring the caste and religious communities facing exclusion especially the Muslims, into the fold of mainstream policies and programmes as recommended by the Sachar Committee report. Note that Article 25, while setting the parameters of the right to freedom of religion, has named selected religions to bring a certain degree of clarity as to what constitute the Hindus; and this Article does not preclude naming Muslims and Christians (two large religious communities) in public documents and legal enactments.

(The writer is with the Centre for Research and Debates in Development Policy, New Delhi. He was Member-Secretary, ‘Prime Minister's High Level Committee on Muslims in India' — 2005-06, and Adviser, ‘National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution' — 2001-02.)

Economic Times: Primitive tribes: Away from development

2011-09-23T16:17:00.001+05:30

ECONOMIC TIMES | NEW DELHI

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/guest-writer/primitive-tribes-away-from-development/articleshow/10086609.cms

23 SEP, 2011, 07.14AM IST, ABUSALEH SHARIFF,
Primitive tribes: Away from development

About 9% of the country's population comprises scheduled tribes, with over 700 communities, of which 75 are 'primitive tribal groups'. Yet, we found on a number of field trips to Andhra Pradesh, conditions among scheduled and primitive tribes differ according to policy whims, and little else.

In a village in Vijanagaram district, we found two distinct tribes living side by side: Kondavara, a scheduled tribe, and Savara, a primitive tribe. The Kondavara reported some cultivation rights over half an acre to three acres of rain-fed land on hilly terrain but with no clear land title. But all 81 households were covered under the NREGS with Rs 100 as wage, and worked on land improvement on their plantations cooperatively. They worked for wages in the nearby plains and participated in market exchange.

The Savara, being a 'primitive tribe', were under the Integrated Tribal Development Authority (ITDA). They were provided with employment on daily fixed wages to work in the forest, but only for a few days in a year. According to the Savaras, the NREGS wages offered worked out to less than Rs 20 per day and they were disillusioned with that.

The private wage this community got in the village was as low as Rs 70 for men and Rs 40 for women. They reared small ruminants and cattle. Savaras rarely travelled to other areas and their marriage linkages were found to be within a 10-km range amongst their own tribe. Although some land on the hills was assigned to them, they did not report clear ownership and the land could not support cereals. The scheduled tribe also occupied better, plain terrain for their homes. The primitive tribals lived on rocky hill slopes in rudimentary dwellings.

Exactly opposite trends were noted on a visit to a tribal village cluster in Prakasam district, a resettlement of the primitive Chenchus, Yerakala and Sugali, and to another cluster of non-primitive communities. The ITDA could provide one acre of land to about half of the resettled primitive families and also semi-finished single-room residential quarters, but without kitchen and toilet.

The resettlement had drinking water and electricity. Men undertook bamboo-cutting and honey collection under government programmes, women also collected minor forest produce like medicinal herbs and roots. This settlement was serviced by a Girjan Society that purchased the forest produce for a given price, and were also covered under the public distribution system. We also found girls and boys educated and trained to become teachers, but with without any jobs. The neighbouring settlement was occupied by non-primitive inhabitants living there for long. This was bereft of facilities and services available to the resettlement. Women here were not allowed to collect the minor forest produce, therefore they made baskets.

The men got some bamboo on the sly from the forest. Many were in police custody for having done so. Neither state agencies nor the ITDA had covered this settlement for the provisioning of welfare schemes, and programmes like NREGS and SHGs were absent. To my understanding, this bunch of 23 households lived a highly-vulnerable and deprived life.

In the first example, primitive tribes were found to be extremely vulnerable compared to non-primitive groups. In the second case, it was the non-primitive group that was found to be on the verge of penury.

This is due to shortcomings in policy implementation. How, why and who make these differentiations between the communities and for what purpose is not very clear. However, in the first example, the freedom and choice that the non-primitive group had, to travel and visit the plains for work and market had empowered them.

In the second example, since the primitive groups were resettled from within the forest, they were showered with benefits, while the original dwellers in the same location were left to fend for themselves. Overall, the ST areas suffer from a lack of services like education, health and employment. Even tribal hostels for girls did not have running water and adolescent girls were seen using brooks and streams nearby for bathing and washing.

While qualified girls and boys belonging to primitive tribes remain unemployed, all government functionaries including teachers were nontribals, commuting from the plains to work. They were seen travelling daily to work on modern motorcycles. It was also found that many inaccessible locations are bereft of institutions and personnel.

These are areas covered under the 'Schedule 5' policy established in 1950, directly overseen by the Governor of the state with the help of 'tribal advisory councils'. The tribals are easy to identify and live in clusters of their own and policies to effect group equity should be easy to implement.

But the reality is otherwise. The government seems to be running an enterprise with bonded primitive tribal groups that can be subject to 'bonded labour laws'. It also appears that in the name of protecting these communities, opportunities are denied for them to access the fruits of modern development.

(The author is chief economist at the National Council of Applied Economic Research. Views are personal)

Indian Express | Muslims now worse off

2011-09-08T10:16:00.001+05:30

Seema Chishti Posted online: Thu Sep 08 2011, 03:18 hrs
New Delhi : Dr Abu Saleh Shariff is an angry man these days. The economist and former member-secretary of the Prime Minister’s high-level committee on social, educational and economic status of Muslims, which submitted its report five years ago, is annoyed that the government has squandered opportunities provided by Justice Rajinder Sachar Report and not put in place a proper assessment and monitoring system.
He claims to have written to the PM and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission last month on issues ignored by the Centre.

An independent study conducted by Shariff is set to reveal next month that on certain crucial variables Muslims are “worse off compared to other social groups”.

“This holds true for a very key factor like school enrolment ratios. While the number of children in school has gone up for all communities, for Muslims the figure is worryingly lower than when we gave the Sachar report.”

Shariff has been excluded from the Planning Commission’s committee for assessment and monitoring (reconstituted in the year 2010 and headed jointly by Syeda Hameed and Narendra Jadhav).

The previous assessment and monitoring committee had Shariff and M A Basith, both members of the Sachar Committee, on board.

The new committee, says Shariff, “has no one competent to take on the government data and ask questions”.

Reacting to Shariff’s complaints that he has been “unceremoniously” shown the door, Syeda Hameed said: “The changes were made last year and we have met thrice since then. We sent out thank-you letters to all outgoing members.” But Shariff denies this.

Economic Times

2011-09-06T10:20:00.002+05:30

Economic Times | New Delhi | 6 SEP, 2011, 04.42AM IST, ABANTIKA GHOSH,TNN
PM urged to review Sachar panel's recommendations

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/pm-urged-to-review-sachar-panels-recommendations/articleshow/9878361.cms

NEW DELHI: Having been "unceremoniously" removed from the assessment and monitoring authority of the Planning Commission, Abusaleh Shariff, member secretary of the Sachar Committee, has drawn Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's attention to review the Sachar recommendations. The path-breaking report on the state of Muslims in the country was submitted about five years ago.

A miffed Shariff said the authority met only thrice in four years, did not consider implementing the report and has been bereft of any independent technical person despite the recent revamp.

Shariff's note to the PM was sent about 10 days ago. He has since met Planning Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia to discuss the note's content.

Of late, there have been many indictments of mode of implementation of the Sachar report. The parliamentary standing committee on social justice and employment too had found fault with it, and had said that the ministry of minority affairs was not addressing the root of the problems highlighted in the report. It had suggested that the government should bring a law to ensure time-bound implementation.

Sachar member Rakesh Basant had written an article faulting the implementation as had Harsh Mander of the centre for equity studies. Mander had said the government shied away form branding schemes for the Muslims fearing BJP's appeasement slur, but in the process was blunting its intent. The UPA-II had dismissed Mander's report as riddled with factual inaccuracies.

Shariff's note highlighted the government's reluctance in setting up the equal opportunity commission (EOC), estimate share of flows to minority beneficiaries in major flagship programmes with separate data for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Zoroastrians and measure diversity in public institutes of excellence like IIM, IIT, AIIMS etc. Shariff has pointed out that banking and credit, community based polytechnics and enrolment and school continuation are the sectors that are in dire need of assessment and monitoring.

"Most alarming is that the overall shares of Muslims in matric and higher education have improved the least compared with all socio-religious categories between 2004-05 and 2009-10. This has happened along with the lowest base level for Muslims compared with other communities. Urban areas where relatively larger percentage of Muslims lives, the share in higher education has declined during this period," the note says.

Shariff says that in the last two years he wrote several times to the ministry of minority affairs highlighting these issues and the need for a review. "That did not yield any results, which is why I was forced to take the issue up with the Prime Minister and the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission," he says.

On the reconstitution of the Planning Commission body, he says: "I was summarily removed from the assessment and monitoring authority without my knowledge. The authority, which was supposed to monitor implementation of the Sachar recommendations, did not initiate any noteworthy action in the four years that it was in existence. Absence of an independent technical person will seriously impede its working."

Planning Commission member Syeda Hameed is the chairperson of the 29-member authority which, apart from secretaries in various ministries, includes Dr Yogendra Yadav, Soli Sorabjee, Shabnam Hashmi, Akhtarul Wassey etc.

Suggested Amendments to the Communal Violance Bill

2011-09-05T19:03:00.003+05:30

A CRITICAL NOTE ON SECTION 20 OF
THE COMMUNAL & TARGETTED VIOLENCE (PREVENTION Etc.,)DRAFT BILL

http://www.nac.nic.in/communal/com_bill.htm

Section 20 of the Bill sets the rules to set up and constitute a National Authority for Communal Harmony, Justice and Reparation so as to exercise the powers and perform the functions assigned to it under the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 specifies:

20(3): “The National Authority shall consist of a Chairperson, a Vice Chairman and five other members.

Provided that, at all times, not less than four members, including the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson, shall belong to a group as defined under this Act.

Provided further that, at all times, there shall be:

1. One member belonging to Scheduled caste/Scheduled tribes;
2. Four women, whether Chairperson, Vice Chairperson or member;

Provided further that, at all times, one woman, whether Chairperson, Vice Chairperson or member, shall belong to a religious or linguistic minority.

Provided further that, all times, not more than two members, including the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson, shall be retired public servants.”

From the above provisions, it is clear that out of seven members; only one member shall belong to the religious or linguistic minority. Thus, the very constitution of the National Authority is lopsided and imbalanced. Past experiences show that religious minorities like Muslims, Christians and Sikhs have been the victims of the communal and targeted violence. Linguistic minorities have hardly faced communal and targeted violence excepting a few incidences in the southern parts of India. Moreover, linguistic minorities have been identified on the basis of their distinct language and on regional basis.

Though not mentioned, but this ACT is being enacted to protect religious minorities especially the three named above from the wrath of communal violence; but it is surprising that their representation in the National Authority has not been assured. In effect there can be a situation under the current provisions, that none of the seven members belong to any of the major religious minorities such as the Muslims, the Christians and the Sikhs.

It is appropriate to mention that while this law should primarily be meant for the protection of religious minorities, yet there is merit in having representatives from the SCs/STs communities.

However, to remove the anomaly currently inherent in Section 20 of the draft ACT the following suggestion must be incorporated:

Suggestion: In order to make the National Authority a representative and effective body, it is necessary to give due representation to main religious minorities, viz, the Muslims, the Christians and the Sikhs. Section 20 (3) may therefore be amended accordingly to the effect the Muslim, the Christian and the Sikh community is represented with at least one member each on the National Authority. Any of such members can also hold the position as chairperson and as vice chairperson. Such representatives from the minority religious groups must be a woman at least during the alternate functional period of the National Authority.

A Note to the Prime Minister - Post Sachar Policies

2011-08-24T14:13:00.002+05:30

Disappointing Implementation and Monitoring of the
Post-Sachar Inclusive Policies and Programs in India

It is about five years that Sachar Committee report was submitted to the Prime Minister of India and subsequently to the Parliament. The government made a number of announcements during this period about exclusive implementation of policies and programs, such as the PM’s 15 point programs and minority concentration district programs. However, it must be stated that no credible and methodologically sound study have been sponsored or undertaken so as to evaluate and assess the above cited initiatives. Besides, the main philosophy of the Sachar report was to enable minorities including the Muslims find their place in accordance to their population (eligible groups) shares in the nation’s flagship programs and programs aimed to enhance, education and employment; and improve income earning opportunities including access to credit and markets and other poverty alleviation programs.

In this regard, I wish to highlight a few critical issues so that the government and policy makers initiate measures to address the lacuna and strengthen enabling environment for inclusive participation in development of India.

• Estimate share of flows to minority beneficiary in major flagship programs. Specify data and information for each of the minorities separately, for example for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhist and Zoroastrians.

• Measure Diversity in public Spaces- including institutions of higher learning such as universities, IIMs, IITs, AIIMS and so on. Put up a mechanism for each state separately.

• Most alarming is that the Overall shares of Muslims in matric and higher education has improved the least compared with all socio-religious categories between 2004-5 and 2009-10 (see table below). This has happened along with the lowest base level for Muslims compared with other communities. In fact in urban areas where relatively larger percentage of Muslims lives, the share in higher education has in fact declined during this period.

• Review improvement in diversity in public employment across all states, on an annual basis.

• Establish a credible Data Bank which share processed data for easy use by the people at large. Currently only raw data are loaded on NSSO ‘website data bank’ which is not easy to use by the concerned stakeholders.

• The ‘Assessment and Monitoring Agency’ under the Planning Commission must contain technical experts in data management and analytical methods; and academics along with civil society. The revamped AMA has no representation from independent technical and academic communities which must be set right.

• The government is backtracking the establishment of an equal opportunity commission (EOC). All major democracies, especially the developed ones have instituted the EOC with great results and high level of people’s satisfaction.

• The government must also make policy statements as to how the ongoing Caste Census will benefit or will it adversely affect the welfare and affirmative action policies for Muslims and other minorities.

• On the lines of the Andhra Pradesh (2006), amend the panchayati raj act so as to make it mandatory that at least two minorities (including Muslims) are co-opted in the panchayats and municipalities across India (refer Sachar report, page 188).

• Sponsor research studies to evaluate the Minority Concentrated District Program of the MMA. There has been no effort to invite academic institutions to undertake this activity. The civil society alone is not well equipped to undertaken this very difficult task.

Urgent attention is drawn to undertake Assessment and Monitoring in the following areas:

Enrolments and School Continuation: Special Tabulations from the Census data for district level estimates of literacy and school enrolments by religion and rural - urban residence. Introduce Computer education in all elementary schools. Human Resources Ministry GOI has not written a single word on as to how and what policies were initiated so as to improve the school enrolment of the Minority/Muslims community in India. On higher education, the MHRD has not a single word as to how it intends to improve access; through what kind of affirmative actions or through the OBC reservations or otherwise.

Undertake Occupation Based programs: In collaboration with Ministries dealing with: Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME); Employment and Labour | Minimum Wage Act | Child and bonded labour. SIDBI organizes programs for skill development under the MSME Act.

List of business and occupations which deserves immediate attention: Zari, Beedi, Muri, Leather, Garments, Brick kiln, Recycling, Chemicals, Lower mechanical, Foundry and lath machines, Blacksmith and Iron works, Sericulture and Silk extraction, Handicrafts, Wood work and Carpentry. (more such business can be identified using the NSSO 3 digit occupation and 4 digit enterprise codes)

Banking & Credit: Access to bank credit and mass micro-credit programs – RBI. Analyse data compiled by the “State Level Banker’s Committee” for each states of India. These data a compiled according to religion every year and the convener of this committee who generally is the lead bank in a state would maintain these data. The Priority Sector Advances available to be assigned to minorities is Rs. 128382 crores for the year 2010-11. This is 13% of all PSA and the PSA itself is benchmarked to be about 40% of all annual bank credit. The lending to the minorities is mandated to be proportional to their share in population of the region/state/district. Overall at the all India level the proportion is set to be 15%. Thus this source of credit is a growing pool of bank finance available to the minorities under the 15 point program of the GOI. Banks are also mandated to organize entrepreneurial development programs as well. But currently these data are not made public and not analysed to find out the extent of access of bank credit to religious minorities.

Community Based Polytechnics: Community Polytechnic Scheme is run by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India. This is wing attached to the regular polytechnics under direct central assistance scheme. Hardly any review has been done as to how this program is benefiting the masses. This scheme has huge potential to skill development and re-skilling layoff-labour.

Behind Bars

2011-08-08T16:55:00.003+05:30

Illegal Police Action and Arrests of Innocent Citizens
New Delhi | August 4, 2011

During the last five years or so there are a number of events of organized killings, which no sensible Indian citizen will like their recurrence. Some events have become spectacular due to police firing and associated killings as well. In the following is an indicative list of such events since 2006.
1. 8 September 2006 | Malegaon
2. 19 February 2007 | Samjhota Exp:
3. May 18, 2007 | Makkah Masjid: Hyderabad
4. 23 November 2007 | Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad
5. 11 October 2007 | The Ajmir Dargah
6. 19 September 2008 | Batla House, Delhi
7. 29 September 2008 | Malegaon
8. 29 September 2008 | Gujarat
9. Multiple Dates |Ahmadabad
10. Multiple Dates | Bombay
11. 17 April 2010 | Bangalore

It is also important to state that on all the above cited situations, and also on any similar occasion, the police normally rounds-off and arrest a large number of men / boys from the Muslim neighbourhood and on some occasions from all over the state. Often the boys arrested are minors or less than 20 years of age. Such arrests occur almost instantaneously after the episode, with hardly any direct evidence that the boys / men were involved in organized crime.

Further, the problem becomes severe as most of those arrested generally belong to poor and marginalized households and on most of the occasions they cannot arrange for surety and costs to secure a ‘police bail’ or a ‘court bail’. Under such circumstances a large number those arrested are still languishing in jails all over India. But most important point to make is that practically all those arrested have also found not guilty during the police enquiry but still they are not granted bail, as getting bail in India is not easy and costs money.

However, this note is prepared to request the citizens and patriots of India that there is a need to:

1. Restrain arrests of people as a routine, with no direct evidence of involvement in heinous and organized crimes, such as those listed above.

2. That there should be a mechanism to grating of bails within a reasonable time after such arrests and such bails should be free of cost.

3. To promote police - people interaction, build mutual trust and support; as a regular feature in all parts of India, but especially in the hot spots so that the real perpetrators of organized crime are brought to books and the innocent citizens are left alone.

There is therefore an urgent need to collect and collate information surrounding the above listed events. There is need to prepare state wise lists of all those arrested in the aftermath of organized crimes, and those who are still languishing in lockups and jails, those who qualify for bails by still not released due to want of surety and unaffordability to bear the costs of bails. Information thus collected can be used to highlight the size and severity, and pain and anguish faced by such people and respective families and dependents.

This proposal is to undertake the following tasks:

1. Demand to constitute a ‘commission of enquiry’ by the national government.

2. File Public Interest Litigation with the Supreme Court of India.

3. Motivate the Human Rights Activists to initiate appropriate activities in the local areas.

4. Motivate lawyers, legal community and civil society to lend an ear for such issues in future.

The immediate task is to collect the necessary information and data base so as to put forth a PIL in the Supreme Court. Dedicated persons in each of the concerned states / cities will facilitate collecting and collating of required information to build up our case to seek the reliefs listed above. Once the needed data and information is with us, it will be used to put-up a case through the help of some committed layers in Delhi and file a Public Interest Litigation. We can also reach out to the highest level political decision makers to press for the constitution of a ‘commission of enquiry’ by the national government so as to get into the roots of the issues enunciated above.

Talking Points with MMA

2011-07-11T15:46:00.001+05:30

The following issues were raised during a scheduled meeting at the Ministry of Minority Affairs held on 7th July 2011

Enrolments and School Continuation: jointly with Ministry of Human Resources. Special Tabulations from the Census data for district level estimates of literacy and school enrolments by religion and rural – urban residence. Introduce Computer education in all elementary schools. Human Resources Ministry GOI has not a single word on as to how and what policies were initiated so as to improve the school enrolment of the Minority/Muslims community in India. On higher education, the MHRD has not a single word as to how it intends to improve access through the OBC reservations or otherwise.

Occupation Based programs: In collaboration with Ministries dealing with: Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSME); Employment and Labour | Minimum Wage Act | Child and bonded labour. SIDBI organizes programs for skill development under the MSME Act.

Zari, Beedi, Muri, Leather, Garments, Brick kiln, Recycling, Chemicals, Lower mechanical, Foundry and lath machines, Blacksmith and Iron works, Sericulture and Silk extraction, Handicrafts, Wood work and Carpentry.

Banking & Credit: Credit Access to bank credit and mass micro-credit programs – RBI. Analysis data compiled by the “State Level Banker’s Committee” found in each of the states of India. These data a compiled according to religion every year and the convener of this committee who generally is the lead bank in a state would maintain these data. The PSA available to be assigned to minorities is Rs. 128382 crores for the year 2010-11. This is 13% of all PSA and the PSA itself is benchmarked to be about 40% of all annual bank credit. The lending to the minorities is mandated to be proportional to their share in population of the region/state/district. Overall at the all India level the proportion is set to 15%. Thus this source of credit is a growing pool of bank finance available to the minorities under the 15 point program of the GOI. Banks are also mandated to organize entrepreneurial development programs as well.

Community Based Polytechnics: Community Polytechnic Scheme is run by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, New Delhi. It is wing attached to the regular polytechnics under direct central assistance scheme. http://www.wbdtet.gov.in/cpc.htm | this scheme is under review at the moment.

• Estimate share of flows to minority beneficiary in major flagship programs
• Evaluate the Minority Concentrated District Program of the MMA
• Measure Diversity in public Spaces- put up a mechanism for each state
• Establishment of an equal opportunity commission
• Data Bank and Assessment and Monitoring Mechanism
• Policy statements on as to how Caste Census will benefit or will it adversely affect the welfare and affirmative action policies for Muslims and minorities

Sachar Controversy Continues | 1st July 2011

2011-07-01T11:39:00.002+05:30

NDTV-INDIA http://khabar.ndtv.com/LiveVideo.aspx?id=203976

YouTube - Abusaleh Shariff reacts to Salman Khursheed's statement‏
Abusaleh Shariff reacts to Salman Khursheed's statement. twocirclesTV 622 videos . Subscribe Alert icon Subscribed. Sign In or Sign Up now ...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1CjwnI5Syx4

Sachar member hits back at Salman Khursheed, says didn’t advocate ghettoizationSubmitted by admin3 on 30 June 2011 - 6:31pm
http://twocircles.net/2011jun30/sachar_member_hits_back_salman_khursheed_says_didn%E2%80%99t_advocate_ghettoization.html
By Md. Ali, TwoCircles.net,
New Delhi: The statement made by the Minorities Affairs Minister Salman Khursheed last Saturday, calling for critical examination of Sachar report, has evoked a huge response, most of which is critical to Mr. Khursheed. Delivering a lecture, ‘Minorities of India: Issues and Challenges,’ at the Justice Basheer Ahmed Sayeed College for Women, Chennai, Mr. Khursheed had said that, “Sachar Committee Report or aspects of Sachar Committee Report need to be critically examined to ensure that it doesn’t lead to ghettoization,” said Khursheed
He had also questioned Sachar Committee Report saying that the report was not the Quran which cannot be questioned. “The recommendations of Sachar Committee Report are not divine like (the) Quran; they can be wrong also and that’s why one must approach them critically,” he reportedly said.
Abusaleh Shariff, economist and the Secretary of the Sachar Committee, has reacted strongly to the Minister’s assertion linking Sachar with the ghettoization of Muslim community and also to Khursheed’s empirical questioning of the report by talking about the possibility of the report being “wrong.”
Talking exclusively to TwoCircles.net, Shariff said, “Through the Sachar report we tried to mainstream the Muslim community. We have brought to the government’s report, that please formulate policies in such a way as to bring Muslims as part of the mainstream. Create an environment where Muslims become part of public spaces like schools, universities.”

Abusaleh Shariff
Categorically rejecting Khursheed’s view linking Sachar report with the alienation of the community, Shariff said, “Every page of Sachar Report talks about mainstreaming Muslims and now after almost five years, Salman Khursheed thinks that implementation of Sachar report will ghettoize Muslims.”
Explaining his point further Shariff said that every aspect of Sachar committee recommendation was geared towards the fact that the public action should facilitate the mainstreaming of the Muslim community.
“For instance we examined the function and role of Minority Financial Development Corporation (MFDC) and brought to the government’s notice that (MFDC) doesn’t really support the mainstreaming of the minorities. The need of the minority community can’t be met with the institution of (MFDC) because of the meager allocation. The welfare of the minorities lies in going to the nearby bank and get money from there,” added Shariff.
Shariff also criticized Khursheed’s questioning of the report because Sachar report is an empirical compendium of not only Muslims but of other comparable groups like Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes, Christians and others. The data generated by the report was from some of the best sources, most of them are government sources. Like that from banking was provided by the Reserve Bank of India.
“How can an empirical report be wrong? If some body finds an error or thinks that it is wrong, then you will have to go back, reanalyze it and show what it right. You can not use the term wrong for an empirical report,” added Shariff.
Shariff also was skeptical of the relevance of the Ministry for Minorities Affairs. He said that the welfare of Muslims is not in running behind the Minister for Minorities Affairs, Salman Khursheed. The interest of Muslims can’t be addressed by Minorities Affairs Ministry. They have to be addressed by what we call as lined departments.
“For instance the problems related to education will be solved by ministry of HRD. That’s where the money is and that is where the programmes are. Minorities Affairs Ministry doesn’t have any programme for expanding education of the community and removing the deficit through Sarv Siksha Abhiyan and other programmes,” Shariff added.
Shariff also defended Sachar’s recommendation for separate Wakf based cadre of officers because Salman Khursheed had pointed out in his clarification to TCN that the “separate Sachar’s recommendation for separate Wakf cadre is an instance of ghettoization.”
“I categorically reject Mr. Salman Khursheed’s view that the separate Wakf cadre will lead to Muslim ghettoization. We had just suggested that there can be an optional test for the officers related to the matters of Wakf qualifying which the interested officers can work for Wakf boards,” said Shariff.
What made Shariff respond strongly to Khursheed’s appeal to Muslims to be a part of mainstream, was the fact that even after five years of the Sachar report, the government has not taken any strong and concrete step to mainstream the community particularly when there is widespread discrimination against the community.
Shariff said, “The Minister has a lot to answer as to how he will eliminate large deficit in achievement levels which Muslims have encountered during the last 60 years or so. This has occurred mostly due to discriminatory practices followed by successive governments including the Congress governments both at the Centre and the many states. Sachar recommendations are sensitive to mainstreaming and...points to the areas in which discrimination has occurred and Muslims have suffered.”
Not mincing words in the criticism and apparent double standards of the government, Shariff said, “Pl(ease) note I am using the word discriminatory too frequently in this note but the Sachar report ...consciously avoided using this word, just to save the face of the government in power and we used some diplomacy; otherwise this report very clearly highlight the discriminatory practices. My new research is strong in highlighting how mainstreaming is not pursued by governments themselves and how public spaces are denied to minorities. Let the Minister come out with a strategy to bring diversity in public spaces (Schools, Universities, Urban Living spaces, government employment ...) which this ministry is silent about (for the) past five years.”
Smelling a political agenda behind questioning of Sachar by Salman Khursheed who is also a Congress politician from the state of Uttar Pradesh, Shariff said that if the statement was deliberate then it seemed that it was targeted at appeasing the majority community in the hope of getting their votes in the coming assembly elections in the state.

Sachar Controversy

2011-06-30T15:54:00.001+05:30

Waqf Act dispute could be reason for Khurshid's Sachar antipathy
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Waqf-Act-dispute-could-be-reason-for-Khurshids-Sachar-antipathy/articleshow/9043945.cms
Times of India | 30th June, 2011 | Avantika Ghosh

NEW DELHI: Festering differences between the government and some sections of the Muslim community on the Sachar Committee recommendations on Waqf properties — especially the recommendation about a separate Waqf cadre — may have shaped the government's new-found disdain for the report, prompting minority affairs minister Salman Khursheed's provocative statement that Sachar recommendations are not "divine like Quran".

In a conversation with TOI, Khurshid conceded that the main point of divergence between the government and Sachar authors was the management of Waqf. "We have implemented 90% of the report but we're opposed to some recommendations like the Waqf cadre because we do not want to create a different world for the Muslim citizens of our country."

Khursheed's statement in Chennai questioning Sachar has elicited a strident reaction from economist Abusaleh Shariff, who was the secretary of the committee. In his strongly worded retort, Shariff makes no bones about his contention that Khursheed's statement is because of the heat he is facing on the Waqf issue. "Note that many ministers have told me that indeed the Sachar report is used as a bible for charting out pro-poor, pro-deprived and minority empowerment strategies," Shariff has written, scarcely mincing words in holding the Congress responsible for the "discrimination" practised against Muslims in India. He has called for an independent review of the "inclusive development reforms in India which have been undertaken post Sachar".

Shariff is offended that the minister chose to question the entire report merely based on his opposition to a small part of it. "We had said that there is no point in having senior officers with little knowledge of Muslim ways and the religion manage Waqf so there should be a separate cadre selected through a test. Government does not like the idea. But that does not give it any right to question an empirical research based report. Waqf after all is just one-twelfth of the report. What is wrong with making a suggestion?" a peeved Shariff asks.

Appointed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005, the Rajinder Sachar Committee was a high-level committee for preparation of a report on the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community in India. The issue of Waqf has of late assumed greater proportions as there is proposal for amendment of the Waqf Act presently before the Rajya Sabha Select Committee and many Muslim organizations including the All India Muslim Personal Law Board have expressed their reservations on it in various forums.

Khurshid had also said in Chennai that blindly following the Sachar report may lead to short-term gains but in the long term would lead to further ghettoisation of the Muslim community. "Dr Shariff's statement gives away his own confusion. He did not speak to me before issuing it. But there is no disagreement about Sachar's emphasis on mainstreaming. I agree with 90% of the letter. What I do not agree with is his points on discrimination because there are historical and consequential reasons for it. We can sit down and talk about it."

Shariff had written: "The minister has a lot to answer as to how he will eliminate large deficit in achievement levels which Muslims have encountered during the last 60 years or so. This has occurred mostly due to discriminatory practices followed by successive government including Congress governments both at the Centre and in many states."

SACHAR CONTROVERSY

2011-06-28T11:45:00.003+05:30

Dr. Shariff's Comments on a Recent Discourse by Sri. Salman Khursheed on Sachar Report

When a politician is cornered, this is how he will speak - unintelligent and illogical.

He is facing the heat and practically boiled in 100 degree centigrade on the Wakf issue. But his general direction that Muslims should get going on mainstreaming and reaching out to other departments is in fact Sachar Philosophy and directions. Note that many Minsters have told me that indeed Sachar Report is used as a Bible for charting out pro-poor, pro-deprived and minority empowerment strategies.

Note his (Salman Khursheed’s) comment on EQC - this is also Sachar recommendation, then how can he be so critical in the beginning, this is an example of double standards. Salman bhai will have a lot to explain.

The Minister has lot to answer as to how he will eliminate large deficit in achievement levels which Muslims have encountered during the last 60 years or so. This has occurred mostly due to discriminatory practices followed by successive governments including the CONGRESS governments both at the Centre and the many states. Sachar recommendations are sensitive to mainstreaming and as it does that, it points to the areas in which discrimination has occurred and Muslims have suffered.

The reservation practices in India are discriminatory and have almost removed Muslims from its ambit at the national level and most states. So are access to higher education and even primary schools. Public employment, the Centre is the most discriminatory. The banking sector has almost removed the Muslims from its programs. Note that I am using the word discriminatory too frequently in this note, but Sachar report - the committee consciously avoided using this word, just to save the face of the government in power and we used some diplomacy; otherwise this report very clearly highlight the discriminatory practices. My new research is strong in highlighting how mainstreaming is not pursued by governments themselves and how public spaces are denied to minorities. Let the Minister come out with a strategy to being diversity in public spaces (Schools, Universities, Urban Living spaces, government employment ......) which this ministry is silent about since past 5 years.

Note that I am marking a copy of this email to Salman bhai. I hope he will garner enough courage and seek support from his cabinet colleagues so as to officially sponsor a comprehensive evaluation of the 5-years after Sachar which will lay bare the truth. Note also that unintelligent reviews will begin appearing both in media and discourses during the next two years, and they will damage the credibility of the Congress Government. Therefore, it would be in the interest of the people of India, to come out with officially sponsored but independent review of the inclusive development reforms in India which have been undertaken during post Sachar.

I am also making this email to Just. Sachar and other members whose email I have retained in my address book.

*****************************

THE INDIAN EXPRESS FRONT PAGE STORY - June 28, 2011

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Khursheed-says-Sachar-report-not-Quran-sparks-off-war-of-words/809657/

Khursheed says Sachar report not Quran, sparks off war of words
Seema Chishti Posted: Jun 28, 2011 at 0301 hrs

New Delhi Minority Affairs Minister Salman Khursheed’s remarks in Chennai last week questioning the Sachar report’s recommendations and urging Muslims to think of national issues, not just their narrow interests, has set off a raging debate in the community.
Delivering a lecture, ‘Minorities of India: Issues and Challenges,’ at the Justice Basheer Ahmed Sayeed College for Women last Saturday, Khursheed said that the Sachar Committee Report was not the Quran which cannot be questioned. “The recommendations of Sachar Committee Report are not divine like (the) Quran; they can be wrong also and that’s why one must approach them critically,” he reportedly said.

In 2006, the PM’s High Level Committee, led by Justice (retd) Rajinder Sachar, had highlighted how Muslims trailed the rest of the country in almost all social indicators — from education to employment — and had recommended a set of reform measures. Sources said this is now being used as a benchmark by many Muslim advocacy groups and any questioning provokes a barrage of criticism.

No wonder then that the Minister’s remarks in Chennai have led Abu Saleh Shariff, economist and the high-profile Secretary of the Sachar Committee, to write an open letter to Khursheed — posted in an online discussion group, USIPI — ticking off the Congress at the Centre.

He criticizes the Minister for his comments urging Muslims to “mainstream” in an environment where they are discriminated against. He writes: “The Minister has a lot to answer as to how will he eliminate large deficit in achievement levels which Muslims have encountered during the last 60 years or so. This has occurred mostly due to discriminatory practices followed by successive governments including the Congress governments both at the Centre and the many states. Sachar recommendations are sensitive to mainstreaming and...points to the areas in which discrimination has occurred and Muslims have suffered.”

Shariff, who has been critical of the BJP and even Left-ruled states in the past, has written that “reservation” policy in India is discriminatory and keeps Muslims out of its ambit at the national level and in most states. “So are access to higher education and even primary schools. (On) public employment, the Centre is the most discriminatory. The banking sector has almost removed the Muslims from its programs.”

In something which may embarrass the government, he adds: “Pl(ease) note I am using the word discriminatory too frequently in this note but the Sachar report ...consciously avoided using this word, just to save the face of the government in power and we used some diplomacy; otherwise this report very clearly highlight the discriminatory practices. My new research is strong in highlighting how mainstreaming is not pursued by governments themselves and how public spaces are denied to minorities. Let the Minister come out with a strategy to bring diversity in public spaces (Schools, Universities, Urban Living spaces, government employment ...) which this ministry is silent about (for the) past five years.”

Shariff endorses the Minority Ministry’s view on the setting up of the Equal Opportunities Commission and says that it’s an idea based on Sachar’s recommendations.

Speaking to The Indian Express from Ranchi, Khursheed said that “several Sachar recommendations were being followed.” He said the debate is about how to approach the issue of helping Muslims. He underlined that he was against looking at just Muslims as the minority and not others.

“Exclusive delivery to Muslims as against ensuring equitable share amongst all citizens,” was not something he supported, he said. “In that context, I have requested a critical appraisal to ensure these are not used for ghettoization. It’s in this context that I said, for Muslims only the Quran cannot be questioned. All other books and documents are subject to critical scrutiny.”

When contacted, Sachar said: “As a matter of judicial propriety, I don’t comment on my report but Abu Saleh Shariff was a very learned and valued member of the committe

*************************

Salman Khursheed's Controversial Statements

Sachar report may lead to Muslims’ ghettoization, says Salman Khursheed | By Md. Ali, TwoCircles.net, New Delhi:

In an important development, marking a radical shift in the UPA government’s approach, from pre-Sachar to post-Sachar period, the Union Minister of Minorities Affairs Salman Khursheed has questioned, both the credibility of the Sachar report and blind acceptance of its recommendations.
Speaking at a function in Chennai on June 25, Khursheed said that “the recommendations of Sachar Committee Report are not divine like Quran; they can be wrong also and that’s why one must approach them critically.”
Khursheed was delivering a talk on ‘Minorities of India: Issues and Challenges,' at the Justice Basheer Ahmed Sayeed College for Women.
Explaining his point further Khursheed said, by critical approach he meant that the overall impact and benefits of Sachar report on Muslims must be analyzed before accepting the report in letter and spirit.
Cautioning the community from uncritical following of the Sachar report, Khursheed said that it might benefit the community in the short term but it could also lead to its further ghettoization which will be disastrous for the community in the long term as it will prevent the community’s mainstreaming.
The Rajinder Sachar Committee which appointed by the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India in March 2005, was a high level committee for preparation of a report on the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community of India.

Union Minister of Water Resources and Minorities Affairs, Salman Khurshid, speaking at a function, Moosa Raza, Chairman SIET Trust on extreme left
The Minister also advised the community not to expect and approach only the Minorities Affairs Ministry (MMA) because the MMA was supposed to cater to the needs of other minorities as well. He implied that the MMA can’t provide solution to each and every problem of Muslims. For some problems they need to approach other ministries as well. For instance Muslims, Khursheed said, should approach the Ministry of Human Resources and Development (MHRD), which had a budget 10 times bigger than that of his ministry.
“The Minorities Affairs Ministry has only Rs 5,000 crore as its budget. If the community is dependent on only this ministry it will be devoid of funds from other ministries like the Ministry of Human Resources Development which has funds of more than Rs 65,000 crore. Moreover, this ministry doesn’t cater only to Muslims,” he added.
Khursheed wanted the Ministry of Minority Affairs to evolve into Ministry for Equal Opportunities, “Once the Equal Opportunities Commission, which was recommended by Sachar report, is finalized we may actually start thinking of a new structure of the ministry,” he added.
Cautioning the Muslim community of limiting themselves only to the community centered issues, Khursheed also exhorted them to think on larger issues like corruption, human rights and Naxalism.
“Why are Muslims silent on the Lokpal issue or on the issue of freedom for Binayak Sen,” he asked.
Khursheed a politician from the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, praised the works done by the community leaders in South in areas of education. He appealed the Muslims of south India to migrate and bridge the north-south divide by opening up quality institutions in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Assam.
Talking about the performance of the MMA on pre and post-Matric scholarship, Khursheed said that last year the MMA disbursed 44 lakh scholarships in the pre-matric, five lakh in post-matric categories and 750 PhD scholarships. In the coming year, the MMA will issue 60 lakh matric and post matric and 1,400 PhD scholarships in the coming year.
Importantly the Minister said that, the Central government was contemplating on universalisation of the scholarship with every child qualifying for a scholarship getting it.

Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill

2011-05-27T11:09:00.002+05:30

Download a draft copy of - Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011.

http://www.nac.nic.in/communal/com_bill.htm

Any comments, suggestions, revisions, and objections received before June 10, 2011 will be forwarded to the NAC sub group for consideration - send comments directly to the NAC and mark a copy to salehshariff@ymail.com

Indian Caste Census-2011

2011-05-27T10:58:00.003+05:30

How will it affect the Muslims?

A Cabinet press release titled ‘Methodology for conducting the Below Poverty Line Census and Enumeration of Castes’, dated 19-May, 2011 has set December 2011 as the target date to complete the census exercise. This hybrid Census of the BPL and the Caste would be conducted by the Ministry of Rural Development in association with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (HUPA) and the Registrar General of India (RGI) and expected to be completed by December 2011. However, the so called methodology for the caste census is only a single line statement – ‘The enumeration of castes will also be done simultaneously along with the BPL census’.

The announcement about the BPL census is welcome, although there are many methodological controversies in terms of a methodology and variables which will be used to identify the poor. What is underplayed and not adequately highlighted in this cabinet note is the fact that the Caste Census will be undertaken for the first time since the Independence. Such data are likely to be used in determining and revising the cast and class linked quotas in national and state government jobs, admissions in educational institutions such as in colleges and universities and access to targeted social services. The caste census is being conducted without adequate methodological and analytical preparedness and since caste, class and religious identities have complex inter-relationships there will be ramifications which will be difficult to resolve in future. In the following therefore, is a brief discussion as to how will the caste census affect the Muslim community of India.

Muslims in India is a highly diverse community; while adopting the diversity emerging from the Islamic religion such as the Sunni, Shia, Bhora, Agakhani and so on; many also carried along the respective identity from the Hindu caste system even after their conversion. The social structure, therefore, amongst the Muslims is complex, and it further gets accentuated by cultural difference emanating from language and region/state of domical. For example, only about 40% of Muslims report Urdu as mother tongue. There are millions of Muslims who speak Bengali, Malayalam, Telugu, Kannada, Marathi, Gujarati, Punjabi and so on as their mother tongue. Of course due to dominance of Urdu in the northern parts of India especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, Muslims do not report Hindi as their mother tongue and they intend to do so in future as well. Muslims besides being highly diverse are experiencing uniformly deep levels of deprivation in various social, educational and economic facets of life across all the states in India.

The collection of caste data has emerged from certain political corners and is expected to provide structured information so as to allocate or enhance respective shares in reservations for the SCs, the STs and the OBCs. The Indian Caste Census (ICC-2011) is likely to trigger a drive for Indian citizens of all castes and communities to get enrolled into deprived categorizations and this process can be labled as Competitive Backwardness. In case of Muslims there is an inherent complication; in spite of the presence of dalit type identity (being converts from erstwhile Hindu dalits) and their desire to report as such, the census enumerators may not recognize such reporting due to the ‘Census Filtering Procedures’ adopted during the canvassing. Since constitutionally there is a pre-existing- codified list for the SCs and STs, the ICC-2011 will use it. The procedures will authenticate the categorization as the SCs only when the reported religion is Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist. Therefore, all those Muslims who have dalit type identities will be excluded from being identified as the SCs. Similar situation may occur in case of Christians as well. Note also that there is a pending case of judgment in this regard in the Supreme Court of India.

The Census will also collect data on selected economic and education indicators and asset ownership so as to categorize households / people into the ‘below poverty line’ or ‘above poverty line’ status. Such data along with religion and caste are expected to be used to compute the relative backwardness or forwardness of a caste group; which will have ramifications in determining the eligibility to jobs and higher level educational admissions under the quota system. In the following is a discussion as how the misclassified Caste data will not only be detrimental to the social, economic and educational development of the Muslim community in India; but also becomes stumbling block in the efforts of mainstreaming of the Muslims community in Indian economic and social spaces.

As mentioned earlier a pre-determined list will be used to identify the SCs and STs for any given geographic or administrative area; as they have guarantee and authentication under the seal of the Indian constitution since the Independence. The OBC categorisation on the other hand, is a post-Mandal scheme and supported only through government orders. The demands for ICC-2011 were made by caste groups which can be grouped as the OBCs (other backward classes). Will the ICC-2011 be based on Mandal Commission list of OBCs? The Census Commissioner during a meeting recently clarified that the Mandal Commission list will not be used during the ICC-2011. However, it will be helpful if at the outset central and independent state level lists of the OBCs are finalized and used before canvassing the ICC-2011.

Lessons can be drawn from the OBC reporting status during the NSS surveys collected annually. The NSSO 61 round data for the reference year 2004-5 suggests that only about 26% of all Hindus are considered as the High Castes or socio-economically better offs; whereas, about 60% of Muslims fall into the non-OBC and thus socio-economically better off category. This is because none from the Muslims are classified under the SCs/STs category and all such Muslims with the SC / ST identity could actually be listed as the high castes / class. This is a serious problem and an anomaly which must be addressed before any major effort to collect castes data in India.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caste / Class Classification and Proportions of Hindus and Muslims in India
(Estimates from NSS Surveys)

Religion-------SCs+STs-------OBCs-------All Others /(High Caste/Class)
Hindus----------31.3---------42.8---------26
Muslims----------1.3---------39.2---------59.5
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Extracts from the Sachar Report

What should be done?

In view of these facts it is recommended:
1. That the Cast Census should be undertaken only after the pending Supreme Court judgment in the matter of the recognition of the presence of ‘dalit’ type identities amongst the Muslims and Christens in India is decided.

2. Now that the ICC-2011 is announced and a certainty beginning June-2011, the Muslims who intend to report their castes as dalits / SCs / STs, should do as they wish. The ICC-2011 enumerators should be instructed to collect this information as reported and not to filter out caste reporting linked to religion. Note that, practically all Muslims in India are converts and are hardly any original Muslims who migrated from out of erstwhile Indian territory now reside in India. Further, it is historically documented that most of those converted to Islam belong to low castes such as the dalits and the tribes. The ‘Sachar Committee’ (2006) on status of Muslims in India has also clearly revealed the distressing socio-economic and educational conditions of Muslims which are closer to the levels recorded for the SCs and STs belonging to the Hindu Community.

3. It will be almost impossible to prepare a list of Muslim caste/class for classifying them as Muslim-OBCs. Therefore, a ‘list of exclusion’ can be prepared so as to determine the social forwardness or backwardness of a large section of Muslims who are not reported themselves as the SC or ST. Such list of exclusion can be prepared for each state separately after consultations with the state level Muslim intellectuals and religious bodies. Thus, once a list of exclusion is prepared, all other Muslims who do not belong to this list can be identified as the “Muslim OBCs”.

'The Muslims Political Awakening

2011-05-22T22:07:00.005+05:30

'The Muslims have awakened' | Rediff.com » News »
May 21, 2011 01:33 IST

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/the-muslims-have-awakened/20110521.htm

In the recently-concluded state elections, a new alarming trend has come to the fore. In Assam and Kerala, it looks like the Muslim community's votes have polarised towards religious outfits.The All India United Democratic Front in Assam and The Muslim League in Kerala secured good number of votes, leaving analysts to conclude that the Muslim electorate voted towards Muslim-oriented outfits.

In this interview with rediff.com, member-secretary of the Rajinder Sachar Committee on the status of Muslims, Abusaleh Shariff explains the trend, its reasons and ways to reverse it.

Interviewed by Sahim Salim in New Delhi

In the recently concluded elections, Muslims seem to have voted along community lines in two states. Can you elaborate on this developement?
A. Well, it has been happening for a long time in Kerala. The Muslim League has been in existence since independence, so it has a historical legacy. Some political parties may not like the fact that it has the word 'Muslim' in it, but it is a recognised political party.
On the outset, I want to state that I am happy with the fact that the Muslims have awakened. I reiterate, awakened. I am aware through election results analysts that the share of Muslim electorate has been diminishing over the history of elections in India.
This means that Muslims were going out of the mainstream political system. This was not a good sign for the Muslims and the democracy because Muslims are the largest minority.
In these state elections, the emergence of the Muslim electorate is a good sign. I want more and more Muslims to come out in large numbers to exercise their democratic rights. That they are being polarised is another story.

Can this development be categorised as a trend?
Yes, it could be. I will tell you why. Mamta Bannerjee won in West Bengal and she was wholeheartedly supported by the Muslims in the state. Now if Mamta's policies do not include Muslims in it, then another Muslim oriented party can spring up there, which will then polarise on the Muslim vote-bank in the state.

In a secular and heterogeneous democracy such as ours, what is the meaning of such a development?
My democratic vision for this secular country is that Muslims should not be polarised in such a manner. They should be included and they should participate in mainstream politics.
I don't want a separate school, a separate minority development corporation etc. These are all notional; they don't produce any welfare products; it is just a waste of money. The government sustains these kind of institutions because of pressure. They only feed a handful of influential people.

What do you think are the reasons for Muslims to vote in favor of religious parties in Kerala and Assam?
When the mainstream political parties do not ask the Muslim community to be a part of the mainstream political system, then they don't get to exercise their identity. After all, being a Muslim is an identity.
In spite of the Sachar Committee report that came out five years ago, neither the state nor the central governments have taken it seriously. They have not addressed the problem of exclusion of Muslims in public spaces.
That is the reason why there is relatively more polarisation towards Muslim-oriented parties. Muslims think that through these parties, politically at least, they can make a claim in lieu of capacity to influence policies.
When I was in the Sachar Committee, what I noticed was that in most of the public spaces created by the system, Muslims were not getting their share. Every chapter in the committee report says that they are not a part of these spaces as much as they should be. So what is the solution for that?
They created special purpose vehicles for Muslims, which I am not for. I want a share for the Muslims in the mainstream institutions, which has declined over a period of time. The mainstream political parties should make spaces for them within the party. It will be easier for political decision making.

Do you think that the so-called religious political parties will truly represent Muslims' demands in mainstream politics?
Look, this is not a religious-oriented civil society. They are political parties and will have to participate in the nation building. But the point is that India constitutes of 1.3 billion people, out of which 1 billion are Hindus.
Unfortunately, despite the cultural divides amongst the Hindus, the Bharatiya Janata Party has put a seed of divide between Hindus and Muslims. This kind of polarisation is a result of what the BJP did 20 years ago. Although the BJP is trying to mellow down, the Muslim community is reacting.
See, through these religious parties, what the Muslim communities hope to achieve is representation in the mainstream. But unfortunately, in that case, what happens is that these demands will be made in a religious oriented manner, which is not healthy in a democratic setup.
Do you think these religious parties are just banking on religious votes, rather than in reality having a religious agenda?
I am not sure of that. But I think that we Muslims, being from the minority, have a strong desire to protect our identity. I don't call that a Muslim agenda, but rather an agenda to protect our identity. We need a place in nation building too.

Mainstream secular political parties have tried to woo Muslim votes in both states. Does this mean that the current policies and approaches adopted by these parties have failed?
What you have to understand is that the mainstream political parties have worked very hard to win their elections. Whether you like it or not, democracy is about numbers.
I am aware of the compulsion of mainstream parties to bring winning candidates. But my point is that they should use other institutions like delimitation commission.
For example in West Bengal, there will be 100 constituencies where Muslims might have a winning edge. Identity politics also works in secular parties, but these constituencies will also have Hindus, so in a secular party, even if the candidate is a Muslim, you will get Hindu votes as well.
The elected representative is going to be the leader of the Hindus and Muslims in the area. That is where inclusion comes. A Muslim getting elected should not be seen as a Muslim leader, but rather a leader.
Dr Manmohan Singh is seen as a leader and not a Sikh leader. Similarly, Muslims standing up to represent a constituency should not be labeled a religious leader.

This development, in itself, is alarming. How can we reverse such a development keeping the secular idea of the state in mind?
I won't call it alarming. But yes, voting based on identity and community is bad. Mainstream is the answer. Negotiation and partnership should be included.
Do you know why Muslim vote was polarised in Assam? The Congress leaders did not even allow Muslims to come near them for partnership. In Kerala, Muslim League fractions came together, so Muslim vote got consolidated.
My argument is not against the Muslims or Muslim parties. I ask of the government to change policies. They should open up public spaces for Muslims. It is because they have not, that Muslim polarisation is taking place.

What do you think are the key issues that Muslims want represented, which are not being focused on by secularist political parties?
Political empowerment. In 2006, Sachar Committee brought the fact that Muslims are not participating as much as they should in public spaces. The Sachar Committee told the government that more political representation is needed atleast at the grass-root level.
Don't make them members of Parliament and members of legislative assembly. Make them part of the Panchayat and Municipality atleast.
We need these small changes because these are the ways that we interpret what matters. In Sachar Committee report, it is highlighted that in Muslim concentrated areas, schools are less.
So where do they go, other that Madrassas? When we talk of welfare of Muslims, they talk of Madrassa reforms. Why Madrassa reforms, I ask, why not schools?

NDTV Video on Skills and Employment

2011-05-20T13:14:00.002+05:30

Use this link for a Video on Employment and Skill development in India

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/money-mantra/india-s-crying-need-for-skill-development/199058

TOI-report on Recent Elections

2011-05-18T10:31:00.000+05:30

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Muslims-voting-along-community-lines-worrying/articleshow/8404114.cms

Gujarat Shining Story?

2011-05-17T14:07:00.004+05:30

Gujarat is one of the large states in India known for sustained levels of development. ‘Gujarties’ the people of Gujarat so identified - rings a bell! in imagination as enterprising people with an edge to manage and invest money in businesses and enhance savings. These Gujarati attributes are not new, rather age old; and developed over centuries especially due to their easy contact with the travelling business men from all over the world at the Indian west-coast. No wonder then that Gujarat is one of the few states where income earning opportunities have always been better and praiseworthy. Notwithstanding, such a relative advantage in income growth, it is useful to review how Gujarat is faring in other measures of standard of living such as poverty, human development, hunger and so on. Further, it is also instructive to review as to how various socio-religious communities living in Gujarat are placed in a relative perspective and are they getting the benefit of higher growth experience in Gujarat.

Multiple data especially those from the National Accounts (NAS), The Reserve Bank of India, National Sample Survey Organization, the Human Development Survey of the National Council of Applied Economic Research and the Prime Minister’s High Level Committee (Sachar Committee) report are used in this analysis. The FDI information according to main centers of investments is drawn from ministries of Commerce and industry. This review explores, firstly the relative development of Gujarat, followed by the Socio-religious differentials in standard of living within the State.

Per Capita Net State Domestic Product (PCNSDP): Per capita SDP or income is used as an indicator and measure of economic prosperity. Gujarat is a well-off State, figuring among the top ten in terms of per capita State Domestic Product since long. A review of triennium averages in constant prices since the 1970s suggest that Gujarat has been occupying 6th or 7th positions most of the last four decade excepting mid-1996 when it was at the 4th position. For the year 2007-08 and in terms of current prices, Gujarat had an income of Rs. 45, 773, but Haryana with an annual per capita income of Rs. 59,008 tops the list followed by Punjab, Maharashtra and Kerala. Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh are a notch below in the vicinity of Gujarat competing to climb up. Note that the relative ranking can also change with a lacklustre performance of other states as opposed to a better performance of a state under review. Overall the economic status of Gujarat has been stable and relatively on the higher side at least since last four decades. Thus the Gujarat growth story measured in terms of macro economic indicator is not new; rather it is an old one. It is now worthwhile to investigate the state performance in qualitative dimensions such as poverty, hunger, human development and social equity.

Hunger: Gujarat surprisingly emerges as a State with high levels of hunger , while simultaneously boasting high per capita income and consistent income stability. Disturbingly Gujarat's hunger levels are high alongside Orissa and Bihar, with only Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh having higher hunger levels. Punjab, Kerala and Haryana (in whose league Gujarat was placed in terms of per capita NSDP), are very progressive measured by levels of hunger having least hungry population. Even Uttar Pradesh has registered lower levels of hunger compared with Gujarat. This paradox, for example, is explained by the fact that state such as Uttar Pradesh has vast areas under multi-cropping cultivation cycle with the blessing of the perennial supply of water from the mighty river Gaga. This ensures that in spite of UP’s population being poor, they are at least minimally fed. Incomes are more evenly spread in Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Uttar Pradesh in fact fares a notch above even Tamil Nadu and West Bengal in having lower hunger; but Gujarat is much above all these states in having relatively higher incidence of hunger. Further Rajasthan has also recorded lower levels of hunger compared to Gujarat and this appears to be due to pro-poor state policies. Therefore, this analysis gives credence to the fact that Gujarat is a state where the rich-poor disparities are far greater relatively speaking.

Income, Poverty and Human Development Linkages: Generally one finds a positive association between income and poverty (lower poverty), and human development (higher); and that the association with the latter being much stronger. Higher position in human development ranking relative to poverty is an evidence of pro-people welfare state. One finds such an association in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, West Bengal and even Orissa, which has higher HDI ranking compared with respective ranking in per capita income and poverty about the second half of 2000s in the ranking undertaken for 19 major states. On the other hand Gujarat has recorded relatively lower level of human development ranking compared with its poverty ranking – while in latter 2000s it tops at 6th level in income, but is places one level lower in poverty (that is higher poverty relative to income) but ranked 9th in HDI, far too low which is unexpected. The higher income levels must yield better human development, generally speaking as people will be in a better position to make investments in education, health and wellbeing. Orissa which reveals high levels of poverty performs better on the HDI; in fact it shows resilience in improving HDI at its own level of development and poverty. Further, one notice that the relative ranking of Gujarat in incidence of poverty and human development has declined between the mid 1990s and latter part of 2000s.

When the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) was evaluated, Gujarat is found to be the bottom of the list of large Indian states. In fact Rajasthan is at the top, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu.

Levels of Foreign Direct Investments
Recent reports place Gujarat as a favorite destination of the ‘foreign direct investments (FDI). There is a considerable hype about such investments and reports that large amounts of foreign, often NRI linked, investments in Gujarat abound. A review of the past performance of the FDIs does not support such a finding. The region / state specific FDI data provided by the ‘department of industrial policy and development’ suggests that the size of cumulative inflows from January 2000 to March 2010 has been highest in Maharashtra with 1.75 lakh crores, followed by New Delhi at 1.02 lakh crore. Even the state of Karnataka has received 31 thousand crores which is higher than the FDI in Gujarat only with 28 thousand crores. The FDI line up continues with Tamil Nadu, (Rs. 25 thousand crores), Andhra Pradesh (Rs. 21 thousand crores) and Kolkata having received a meager 6 thousand crores.

Thus Gujarat is a game for playing the “the politics of development” and no one is caring to assess if such tall claims have any truth behind them. Hype and hoopla built around foreign direct investment (FDI) in Gujarat is a lie. Gujarat can be considered a hunting ground "for NRI and corporate politics", and that "the FDI hype" is designed to facilitate tax subsidies, cheap licensing, under-priced land and low royalty payments to the investors. Often the politics works in such a way that Gujarat is used as a platform for corporate negotiations and investments in other states. Investments announced in Gujarat appear largely promises, as the real amount invested is found to be a fraction of the amount promised due to practical reasons.
Nonetheless, Gujarat does have some positive features; over 90 percent paved roads to villages, 98 percent electrified villages with 80 percent electrified homes and 18 hours of electricity everyday, 86 percent piped water supply and better phone connections, banks, post offices, bus connection compared to other states. Agricultural extension work, too, is better than in other states. But amid all this, poverty, hunger and lack of sense of security thrive.

The large scale representative sample data available from the NSSO and the NCAER’s human development surveys and information from the Sachar Committee report are used to assess poverty and human development amongst the socio-religious groups within Gujarat with a focus on Muslims. Poverty amongst the urban Muslims is eight times (800%) more than high-caste Hindus, about 50% more than the Hindu-OBCs and the SCs/STs. Note that over 60% of all Gujarati Muslims live in urban areas and they are most deprived social group in Gujarat. On the other hand rural poverty amongst the Muslims is two times (200%) more than high caste Hindus. Gujarat unlike a few other large states has not provided any specified quota in employment and higher education for the Muslims. While Muslims have bank accounts proportionate to the size of population, the bank loan amount outstanding which is an indicator of financial inclusion is only 2.6 percent. Muslims are also found to be soft targets for petty thefts and harassment of girls compared to other communities.

Education: Educationally Muslims are the most deprived community in Gujarat. Despite 75% net enrolment, about similar levels compared with the SCs/STs and other groups; the Muslims are deprived at the level of matriculation and higher levels. A mere 26% reach matriculation whereas this proportion for 'others except SCs/ STs is 41%. The SCs/STs fare about the same on this count. Amongst the Muslims a large dropout takes place at about 5th standard. A disturbing trend was noticed in case of education at the level of graduation. Muslims, who had about the same level of education in the past, are found to have left behind compared with even the SCs/STs who have caught up with higher education. Startling is the fact that the in recent years it is high caste Hindus who have benefitted most from the public provisioning of higher education and the SCs/STs are catching up and the Muslims are left behind. The disparity in access to higher education is increasing over time. This clearly is an evidence of discrimination in provisioning of higher education access, infrastructure and related services.
To overcome the Muslim deficit in different levels of education, the central government has launched a nationwide scholarship scheme with effect from April 1, 2008. All states have responded favorably, with the only exception of Gujarat which has not implemented even the pre-matric scholarships for minorities. There are 55,000 scholarships allocated to Gujarat of which 53,000 are to be given to the deserving Muslims, but Gujarat not even cared to implement this program.

Employment: The work participation rate is a common measure of employment; in Gujarat, this is 10% lower for Muslims at 61% compared to the Hindus who have a ratio of 71%. Gujarat has higher unemployment rates for Muslims compared to say West Bengal. Importantly, the Muslims traditionally are artisan and skilled workers, have relative advantage in handling mechanical and tool work; therefore they are employed as industrial labour in considerable proportion in manufacturing and organized industry. In most States, Muslims form a higher percentage of the workforce in manufacturing and the organised sector compared to Hindus and it is only in Gujarat, the reverse is true.

Manufacturing and organised sector including public employment: There was a time when Muslims dominated the state's textile industry in power loams, textile mills and handlooms; and in diamond cutting and polishing industry not to speak of chemical, pharmaceutical and processing industries. But now Muslims barely make it to the workforce in the manufacturing and organized sector in Gujarat. While at an all-India level, Muslims share in this sector is 21%, in Gujarat it is merely 13, much lesser than Maharashtra at 25 and West Bengal at 21. Note that Muslims generally have better employment amongst the state level public sector enterprises across India. It is only in Gujarat that Muslims not have access to organized and public sector (including PUSs) employment when compared to other communities and other states of India. This finding was counter-checked by a second set of data in a multivariate analysis. The fact that Muslims do not draw income from the formal organized (including public employment) sectors is negative, large and highly significant; this is the only community which records this negative and significant coefficients. Generally, there is a reference to the Sachar report pointing to the fact that Muslims are indeed present in substantial proportion (compared with other states such as West Bengal, UP etc) in government employment in Gujarat. Yes this is so and it may be noted that such employment has taken placed during the last 5 decades or so, these are not recent appointments. Gujarat government must come forward to publish figures as to how many Muslims have been appointed in government employment during the last 5-10 years in employment categories such as group A to group D and in the state PSUs.
Petty Trade and Self-Employment: Gujarat also shows a wider gap between Muslims and Hindus in petty trade and self-employment. Fifty-four per cent of Muslims as opposed to 39 per cent of Hindus are self-employed in the State. The gap is much lower in West Bengal, where 53 per cent of Muslims are self-employed as against 45 per cent of Hindus. Compared to other States and compared to Hindus, larger share of Muslims in Gujarat are self-employed or undertake petty trade. This disparity is compounded by the fact that compared to other sectors; self-employment and petty trade has shown only a marginal income growth during the last two decades in comparison to other sectors of the economy. Further, at least in Gujarat the FDIs and public investments are channelled into the organized sector where Muslims do not get employed - thus metaphorically speaking, Muslims in Gujarat face a situation - ‘between the hard rock and the sea’.

Safety and Security: The human development survey of the NCAER canvassed a few questions which relate to the safety and security of citizens. All respondents were asked to assess the condition of village and neighborhood conflict. Further, any experience and occurrence of ‘theft/burglary’ and ‘harassment of adolescent girls’ was also recorded for the reference year.
It is instructive to note Gujarat is one of those high village/neighborhood conflict states, next only to Uttar Pradesh (82 percent) and Uttrakhand; but on par with West Bengal at 63%. However, since this is a societal level factor, the inter-community differentials were found to be low – which means irrespective of the community one belongs to, they had similar exposure to neighborhood/village conflict which is rather very high in Gujarat.

But one notices considerably large inter-community variation in the household experience in theft/burglary and particularly the Muslim households in rural Gujarat with a very high share of (35%) households reporting such occurrence, while their share of households was only 5%. All other communities have reported lower levels. In urban areas also this share was 13% compared with only 11% households. While information on who are the performers of such crimes is not available, what is important to highlight is the fact that Muslims are easy targets and are vulnerable for such crimes in the rural areas of Gujarat. In case of the occurrence of harassment and threat of girls, 17% urban Muslims households reported such an occurrence which is considerably higher relative to their share in the households. The only other community having higher share of harassment of girls is the SCs in rural areas - with 34% households reporting 39% of such events.

Conclusions: Gujarat indeed is one of the richer states always in league with the top ten state of India in terms of per capita national state domestic product. But if alternative measures are evaluated which reflect hunger, social development and human development, relatively speaking Gujarat is underperformer. Further, within the state, when socio-religious group differentials are assessed one finds deep-rooted poverty and income inequality amongst Gujarat’s lower castes and Muslims relative to other groups. The latter, in particular, fare poorly on parameters of poverty, hunger, education and vulnerability on security issues; nowhere benefiting from the feel good growth story painted by the current governance of the state.
There indeed exists a deep-rooted poverty and income inequality in Gujarat. Putting the Muslim situation in this larger framework, the empirical evidence suggests that relative to other states and relative to other communities, Muslims in Gujarat are facing high levels of discrimination and deprivation.

References

Reserve Bank of India (RBI) online database (http://www.rbi.org.in ).

Government of India (2009), “Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty", Planning Commission, New Delhi.

Abusaleh Shariff (2009),”Hunger and Malnutrition in India: Concepts and Indexing”, IFPRI/NCAER, Mimio.

United Nations Development Programme (2010), “HUMAN Development Report”, UNDP, Palgrave Macmillan.

Sonal Desai, Amaresh Dubey, B.L. Joshi, Mitali Sen, Abusaleh Shariff and Reeve Vannaman, (2010) India Human Development Report: at the Beginning of the Millennium, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Abusaleh Shariff and Maithreyi Krishnaraj eds, (2007), State, Markets and Human Development, New Delhi: Orient Longman Press, PP i-xxiv,784.

Government of India (2006). Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, a report of the Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, New Delhi: Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, November 2006; i-xx, PP 404.

Bina Roy memorial Lecture

2011-05-15T10:13:00.000+05:30

May 14, 2011 : Gave Dr. Bina Roy memorial Lecture on 'Gender Empowerment : Evidence and Policy', organised by University Women's Association of Delhi, Platinum Jubilee hall at 6, Bhagwan Das Road, New Delhi - 110 001.

FRONTLINE : May. 07-20, 2011 on Gujarat

2011-05-04T11:53:00.003+05:30

Volume 28 - Issue 10 :: May. 07-20, 2011
Vol:28 Iss:10 URL: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2810/stories/20110520281000400.htm

Haunted by the past
ON April 22, 2011, the ladies' wing of the Southern Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry organised a women entrepreneurs' exhibition in Surat, where Hindi film actor Sherlyn Chopra was one of the guests. Speaking on the sidelines of the programme, the actor gushed that Chief Minister “Narendra Modi is the most dynamic person” she had “ever met”, and “given a chance” she “would like to be his personal assistant”. Sherlyn Chopra went on to add that Modi spoke with style and confidence and that he spoke all the time about progress and a shining India.
Other Modi fans, including many in the blogosphere, picked up the actor's statement to come up with laudatory comments highlighting how a range of personalities from different strata of society, from anti-corruption activist Anna Hazare to actor Sherlyn Chopra, were endorsing Modi, his politics and his style of functioning. The thematic premise of all this commendation was “Modi's commitment to progress and development”.
However, news that emerged that evening from New Delhi once again drew attention to certain areas of Modi's political personality that go beyond “commitment to progress and development”. The news was about the affidavit filed by a senior Gujarat police officer, Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt, in the Supreme Court, accusing Modi of instigating Hindus in 2002 to “teach a lesson” to Muslims. This instigation, the affidavit asserted, preceded the genocide of Muslims in the State. Naturally, this served to bring down the excitement Chopra's praise generated.

MOBS ON THE rampage in a street in Ahmedabad on February 28, 2002.
This sequence of events, which unfolded over a period of around eight hours, signified a roller coaster of sorts for the Modi image. This is not the first time Modi has found himself in such a situation. Time and again, the Gujarat Chief Minister and his supporters have sought to underplay or even obliterate his association with the 2002 carnage and present him as the “leader who created a new, progress-oriented Gujarat, which is waiting to be replicated at the national level under his consummate leadership”. Such has been the force of the campaign that it packs sustained assertions that even large sections of the Muslim minority community are now Modi supporters on account of his development initiatives.
It is not as though this campaign has not had its successes. It has indeed spread far and wide, particularly among a section of the urban middle class. Despite all that, Modi's role in the 2002 carnage has come back to haunt him and his Hindutva-oriented political organisation repeatedly in one forum or the other. The unambiguous message from each of these episodes has been that Modi and his party will find it impossible to live down the Gujarat carnage however much they may try.
In fact, references to the carnage have come up most forcefully when Modi and his supporters have sought to advance the “development man” image aggressively. The BJP's National Executive meeting held in Patna in June 2010 is a case in point. A number of his close supporters had earmarked this conclave as the starting point of an aggressive campaign to project him as the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA). As part of this campaign, advertisements were placed in several newspapers in Bihar extolling Modi's governance skills and personal virtues. These hailed him as a model administrator whose record in Gujarat was worthy of emulation in Bihar and the rest of the country. The message was clear: here is your future Prime Minister.
One advertisement made a special reference to Gujarat's contribution towards relief work for the victims of the floods in the Kosi river and went on to suggest that Modi had taken care to wipe Bihar's tears too when the State suffered.
Another full page advertisement had the picture of Muslim girls in burqas working on computers and the slogan that the Muslim community in Gujarat was advancing much faster than in other parts of India. Barely a day after the publication of the advertisement, it was revealed that the picture was actually taken from a college in Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh.
IN A REFUGEE camp at Bapu Nagar in Ahmedabad in March 2002.
Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar made his displeasure clear at what was going on. He perceived the advertisement relating to the Kosi floods as a direct affront and a challenge to his own administrative skills. As regards the advertisement with the picture of Muslim girls, he lampooned it as a third-rate gimmick. The Janata Dal (United) leader even went to the extent of cancelling the dinner he had planned in honour of his NDA ally's leadership. A couple of days later Nitish Kumar also returned to the Gujarat government the Rs.5 crore grant it had given for flood relief.
Nitish Kumar followed this up with instructions that Modi should not come to campaign in Bihar during the Assembly elections, which were held in October-November 2010. His contention was that Modi's presence would alienate the considerable Muslim support base that the JD(U) had in the State. He also highlighted the advertisement trick using a photograph of Muslim girls to buttress his argument. Ultimately, Modi and the BJP were forced to comply with this direction.
Modi's anti-minority image once again came into sharp focus during the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry into the Sohrabuddin Sheikh Murder case and particularly after the July 2010 arrest of Amit Shah, his trusted associate and the then Minister of State for Home. Shah was the first Minister to be arrested in the country in a case of fake encounter.
Revelations that a senior Minister of Modi's Cabinet had allegedly taken part in organising an encounter killing of a small-time criminal and his wife, who had no role in any crime, brought back memories of the 2002 carnage and Modi's alleged complicity in it.
All these developments, which signified the return of the 2002 carnage as a major point of discussion in the polity, did cause problems and place impediments in the assiduous image-building exercise that Modi and his associates undertook.
The latest in this series, Sanjiv Bhatt's affidavit, delineates Modi's alleged complicity in the 2002 carnage in concrete terms. Social activists who have tried to bring justice to the victims and survivors of the carnage over the past nine years believe that Bhatt's affidavit will impart greater strength to the legal points against Modi with regard to his alleged involvement in the carnage.
Call of conscience
Social activist Teesta Setalvad, who has been in the forefront of efforts to bring justice to the riot victims and survivors, points out that from time to time conscientious people have decided to end their silence on the carnage and come out with what they know. “Bhatt's action also needs to be seen in this light, she told Frontline (see interview).

At a broader level, the revelations that have harked back to the 2002 carnage have also underlined the general anti-Muslim thrust of the politics and policies of Narendra Modi and his government. Bhatt's affidavit has brought into sharp focus this thrust. An important point of discussion has been a recent study on “Relative Development of Gujarat and Socio-Religious Differentials” carried out by Dr Abusaleh Shariff, Chief Economist of the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and member-secretary of the Sachar Committee, which prepared a comprehensive report on the state of Muslims in the country.
Shariff's study points out that Gujarat's Muslims fare badly on parameters of poverty, hunger, education and vulnerability on security issues. According to the study, levels of hunger are as high in Gujarat as they are in Orissa and Bihar. It also points out that the poverty of Gujarat's Muslims is eight times more than that of high-caste Hindus and 50 per cent more than that of Other Backward Class (OBC) communities. Twelve per cent of the Muslims have bank accounts, but only 2.6 per cent get bank loans.
Discrimination
The study also states that Muslims in Gujarat face high levels of discrimination, even in their enrolment for the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). In the context of this study, questions have also been raised about Gujarat's claims about vibrant growth in other areas such as infrastructure development and industrialisation.

In the midst of all this, Modi and his associates have sought to launch a strong counter-attack against Bhatt, highlighting the senior police officer's alleged misdemeanours in service. Central to this counter-attack are certain official proceedings against Sanjiv Bhatt, which allege a recruitment scam while he was chairman of a district police recruitment board.
It is pointed out that Bhatt was charge-sheeted on December 12, 2010, as part of a departmental inquiry into police recruitment that took place in May 1996. It is also pointed out that through a “Confidential” Memorandum, the Home Department had served a show-cause notice on Bhatt on December 29, 2010. A case that came up against him in Rajasthan is also highlighted as part of the counter-attack. It involves allegations by a section of lawyers of Rajasthan that Bhatt had falsely implicated one of their colleagues in a narcotics case in 1996. Bhatt was charge-sheeted in this case by the Rajasthan Police's Crime Branch before a trial court in Jodhpur on April 13, 2000. The IPS officer's appeal against the charges is pending before the Supreme Court.
The argument of the BJP leadership, as also Modi's supporters, is that Bhatt has sought to implicate Modi in the 2002 carnage only to cover up his own culpability in many cases and escape punishment. “In any case, an officer who has been thus implicated and charge-sheeted has no moral authority to raise charges against the Chief Minister. We are sure that his affidavit will not stand up to a good judicial scrutiny,” Prakash Javadekar, BJP spokesperson, told Frontline.
Notwithstanding such assertions, the fact remains that the return of the ghost of the 2002 Gujarat carnage signifies yet another round of political battles and legal wrangling for the BJP, and particularly for Narendra Modi, who continues to cherish an elevation to the top leadership in national politics before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
This article was written by VENKITESH RAMAKRISHNAN in New Delhi
For Frontline Magazine

FRONTLINE May 2011 On Gujarat

2011-05-04T11:38:00.004+05:30

Vol:28 Iss:10 URL: http://www.flonnet.com/fl2810/stories/20110520281001800.htm
FRONTLINE| COVER STORY

Marketing a myth

WHEN Anna Hazare praised Chief Minister Narendra Modi for his achievements in rural development in Gujarat, it resulted in a slew of messages to the veteran Gandhian from outraged non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists.
Rohit Prajapati and Trupti Shah, both social activists in Gujarat, said they had spent five days drafting their reply to Annaji but felt it was worth it because it had to be said. They said in their message to Hazare: “The statement of Annaji creates a wrong impression. It endorses Modi's authoritarian, fascist government, which is anti-farmer, anti-women, anti-working class, anti-Dalit, anti-tribal, anti-minorities, anti-environment, and against all the marginalised groups.”
A response also came from social activist and danseuse Mallika Sarabhai, who called Hazare's endorsement “appalling” and threatened to distance herself from the Lokpal movement unless Hazare “irrevocably retracted” his statement. Quick to point out the irony of the situation was the social activist Teesta Setalvad, who said there had been no Lokayukta in Gujarat for almost seven years.
Prajapati and Shah invited Hazare to Gujarat to see the so-called development work of a “Chief Minister who turned his back on scores of farmers who demand their right to farming as in the case of the Mahuva agitation; on tribal people who seek forest land”, and turned a “blind eye to pollution in towns and villages like Ankleshwar, Vapi, Nandesari, Vatva, Saurashtra and Kutch” and “fishing communities being deprived of their livelihood in Kutch”.
Gujarat is a State divided. At one end there is progress: 90 per cent of the village roads are paved; 98 per cent of the villages are electrified, with 80 per cent of them having electrified homes and 18 hours of electricity every day; and 86 per cent have piped water supply and good phone connections, banks, post offices and bus services. But amid all this, there are falling human development and social indices and rising corruption, which is all the more unacceptable because of the clean and progressive image that is being projected of the State.
Three big scams in two years have done little to promote Modi's Vibrant Gujarat. There was the Rs.1,700 crore Sujalam Sufalam scam in 2009: labourers who were to be given wheat in exchange for digging ponds in fields were given rice instead by local fair price traders although they had been paid wheat prices by the government. Many of the ponds were ‘dug' only on paper and large stocks of the rice were sent to Maharashtra and sold there at a profit. Also in 2009 came the Rs.260 crore scam pertaining to the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme: non-existent traders sold boris (sacks) to set up sandbag check dams, non-existent labourers were registered, and NREGA funds were misappropriated. In 2010, it was found that the Fisheries Minister had been awarding contracts for fishing in 58 reservoirs across the State. Reservoir fishing is awarded on the basis of tenders. It was alleged that the irregularity cost the State exchequer Rs.600 crore.
In 2003, Modi initiated the Vibrant Gujarat Summit to attract investors to the State. The first time he attracted proposals worth Rs.69 crore. In 2005, he got Rs.1 lakh crore. Then Rs.4 lakh crore in 2007, Rs.12 lakh crore in 2009 and almost Rs.21 lakh crore in 2011.
So what is it that the investors get in return for this undoubted confidence they have placed in Modi? In a nutshell, they get easy access to land and water wherever they want it. They also get tax exemptions for five years in which they are also exempt from labour laws. In this easy scheme of things, agricultural land is easily turned into non-agricultural land and tribal land is handed over to industries. Companies that have been polluters and have been hauled up by courts and ordered to clean up their act respond by simply moving out to new areas.
Vibrant Gujarat operates on a straightforward principle – roll out the red carpet for big money and ensure that everything is placed at its disposal. Social indices such as health, especially of women and children; education; the status of minorities; the economic health of the middle class and the poor; jobs, livelihoods and environmental concerns are all taking a back seat in what people are beginning to call the race to help the already rich.
Exclusive club
The beneficiaries seem to be a small and exclusive club. Employment generation has not kept up with that in other States. Teesta Setalvad, in an article entitled “Vibrant Gujarat summit – 2011 – Ridiculous show-off of Power”, has compared the investment and employment opportunities of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. She concludes that from 2006 to 2010, Maharashtra had Rs.4,20,546 crore in investment and employment opportunities worth Rs.8,63,395; and Tamil Nadu had investments worth Rs.1,63,280 crore and employment opportunities worth Rs.13,09,613, whereas Gujarat had investments worth Rs.5,35,873 crore and employment opportunities worth Rs.6,47,631.
Teesta Setalvad's analysis says: “At the end of the year 2009-10 in Gujarat there were 8,32,000 educated unemployed people. Number of educated unemployed people was 9,64,000 in 2004, 9,00,000 in 2005, 8,30,000 in 2006, 7,78,000 in 2007, 8,25,000 in 2008 and in 2009 also it was 8,25,000. Now if in the year 2003, 2005, 2007 there has been capital investment as per [what the] Chief Minister says, then why there has not been any significant decrease in the number of these unemployed people?”
Prajapati and Shah say that the “growth” in Gujarat is of a “job killing” kind: “The success story of the two-digit growth has masked the several-digit realities of loss of livelihood, land acquisition, displacement and permanent loss of natural resources, which are treated as free goods in this process. The investment figure without the displacement and depletion of natural resources figure, and the employment figure without loss of livelihood does not make sense,” they said in their message to Hazare.

Dr Abusaleh Shariff, Chief Economist, National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) and member-secretary of the Sachar Committee, said: “Gujarat fares better on direct income measures, but this apparent prosperity masks higher poverty levels and a much lower ranking in human development.” According to a study carried out by Shariff, Gujarat's share is only 5 per cent in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, reflecting the State's inadequate commitment to income generation for the poor. He also said levels of hunger in Gujarat were high and comparable to those in Orissa and Bihar. Only Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh had higher hunger levels, he said.

The Reserve Bank of India's 10-year report from January 2000 to March 2010 on foreign direct investment put paid to the notion that Gujarat attracted high FDI. Maharashtra attracted FDI worth Rs.17 lakh crore during this period; New Delhi Rs.10 lakh crore; Tamil Nadu Rs.2.4 lakh crore; Andhra Pradesh Rs.2 lakh crore; and Gujarat Rs.2.8 lakh crore.
The easy availability of land and resources is perhaps the biggest challenge before new industry today, and this is what Modi offers. The Mahuva and Orpat Limited cases highlight how people (especially farmers) are ridden roughshod over by the government in the rush to give land to industries. In the Mahuva case, the local Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) legislator objected to a project that Modi had cleared. In 1999, the then Chief Minister, Keshubhai Patel of the BJP, had ordered the building of four CDTRS (check dam cum tidal regulatory structure) at a cost of over Rs.60 crore. Located in a stretch of 40 km, these were supposed to turn thousands of hectares of land arable. Local farmers were delighted, but their joy was short-lived because the land was handed over to a washing soap company that was diversifying into cement. The land perfectly suited the company's purpose because it had the limestone deposits essential for cement production. But the mining of limestone would spell doom for the natural barrier against salinisation of arable lands. Local resistance to the idea was quashed by goons.
The 214-hectare plant coming up at a cost of Rs.1,400 crore will require a mining lease for over 3,200 hectares. This will displace about 5,000 families, that is, over 30,000 people. Agriculture has been the backbone of Mahuva, which is relatively prosperous and dependent on 20 cotton gins and 50 onion dehydration units.
In February 2010, local MLA Dr Kanubhai Kalsariya organised a rally of the people of the dozen affected villages. Modi rejected the petition of the 5,000 Mahuva residents who walked to Gandhinagar to ask him to cancel the land lease for the plant.
In Saurashtra, a similar land acquisition plan was unfolding. As part of the Vibrant Gujarat scheme, Orpat industries was granted 40 ha of land in Wankaner district to construct a tourist resort. Wankaner is in a drought-prone area. Two shocking concessions were made for Orpat. It was given land at Rs.40 per square metre and sole access to the Garida pond, the lone waterbody in the area that was used for drinking water and irrigation. It was walled off by Orpat.
Angry farmers approached the High Court, which stayed all activity on the site and in March this year ordered that water be released into irrigation canals. Local residents have also challenged the all-too-speedy allotment of land and the price at which it was given. The High Court is expected to give its order on both soon.
Fr Lancy Lobo of the Centre for Culture and Development in Vadodara has been studying development and displacement in Gujarat since Independence. His report entitled “Development-Induced Displacement in Gujarat 1947-2004”, co-authored with Shashikant Kumar, shows 4,00,000 households displaced in 57 years of Independence; this means that 5 per cent of the State's population was affected by developmental projects. Lobo says that a study of 80,000 Gazette notifications of the Government of Gujarat and files from Land Acquisition Departments from 25 Collectorates shows that 33,00,000 hectares of land was acquired in this period.
Shadow of 2002 riots
The communal killings of 2002 still haunt Gujarat. Not only were the camps for the riot-affected closed down with unseemly haste but the ghettoisation of the minority community continues because of the general sense of insecurity. Though it is common to hear it being said that “Muslims have moved on”, the scars are still fresh for the community. If they have “moved on”, it is because they have had to, not because they were assisted or encouraged to. There are huge advertisements and posters of Modi's meeting with Muslim leaders, but within the community this is seen for what it is – buying of peace.

In a study titled “Relative Development of Gujarat and Socio-Religious Differentials”, Shariff says, “Empirical evidence suggests that relative to other States and relative to other communities, Muslims in Gujarat are facing high levels of discrimination and deprivation.” Indeed, the discrimination extends beyond Muslims to all those who opposed Modi at the time of the riots. Serving Indian Police Service (IPS) officer Sanjiv Bhatt, who has brought on record certain crucial aspects relating to cases from 2002, is Modi's latest victim. The special police protection given to him has been withdrawn, presumably because he did not fall in line.
Lobo says that despite all his bravado, 2002 “still haunts” Modi. He believes Modi “has passed from Hindutva to Gujarati asmita (self-respect) to development. He is trying to offset 2002. I'm not saying he has forgotten the past. It is just dormant for the time being because his focus is development, and development for him means industry right now. And so agriculture is suffering. Tribal people are suffering. Sixty per cent of the land that has been acquired for water resources is in tribal areas. Not only is water being taken away from the tribal people, but the places where it is being sent are already prosperous areas. After globalisation this is the dominant paradigm of development. He is laying the foundation for himself in Delhi in 2020.”
Modi is able to steamroll his way in the State because the bureaucracy is scared and the opposition is ineffective. Lobo feels there is “a strange understanding” between Modi and the Congress, and this seems to be helping Modi consolidate his position further.
However, in March, State Congress president Arjun Modhwadia released some telling statistics. Citing figures from the report of the Suresh P. Tendulkar Committee appointed by the Planning Commission, Modhwadia said 31.8 per cent of the State's population lived below the poverty line. This meant that Gujarat had the highest percentage of poor people in the country. Claiming government statistics as his source, Modhwadia announced that 9,829 workers, 5,447 farmers and 919 farm labourers had committed suicide in the State during Narendra Modi's tenure as Chief Minister.
Undercurrents
So, will Modi's one-sided growth alienate large sections of society? Are his actions creating a gulf between him and his assured voters? There seem to be small rumblings, undercurrents that indicate that his hard-core voters are slightly disgruntled.
They are hesitant to consider the Congress because the party quite obviously lacks a presence. Also, the dominant feeling is still that Modi has restored Gujarati asmita. Speaking plainly, this gives validation to the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Asmita is a thinly veiled term implying that the minority community has been “taught a lesson” and “put in its place”.
Those who are the new victims of Modi's development goals are in a state of confusion. The man they saw as their hero is now creating policies that are affecting them adversely. There is a feeling of being let down and a reluctance to admit it.
In Luna village near Vadodara, farmers who voted for the BJP are still hesitant to speak against the party though they admit that the party's policies are destroying their livelihoods. They see the BJP as a Hindu party and as Hindus they want to support it. In return they expect favourable policies. That this is not happening is causing some turmoil and they are unwilling to express it openly.
The realisation that Modi has set aside his Hindutva plan, albeit temporarily, and is now set on a course that discriminates on economic grounds is an idea that is yet to sink in among Luna's farmers. Once it does, there is every possibility that the tables may be turned, and Modi may need to change his game plan.

This article was wriiten by LYLA BAVADAM in Vadodara Frontline Magazine

Times of India: 2nd May 2011 on West Bengal

2011-05-04T11:28:00.005+05:30

Economist contests Bengal govt's claim of 10% quota to Muslims
TNN | May 2, 2011, 02.14am IST

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Economist-contests-Bengal-govts-claim-of-10-quota-to-Muslims/articleshow/8138241.cms

NEW DELHI: As Bengal elections enter a critical phase with serious challenge to Left's Muslim vote base, economist Abusaleh Shariff questioned the claims that the state had given 10% reservation to Muslims under the OBC category.

Shariff said the talk of exclusive religious quota was erroneous since the state's notification did not mention any religion but only the categories – backwards and most backwards.

While a chunk of Muslim groups have been added to most backward category with OBC quota too hiked from 7% to 17%, Shariff argued, "Muslims cannot form the entire 10% of OBCs as is being claimed." He said the claim that it would benefit 85% of Muslim population was misleading in the absence of caste census.

A paper by Shariff on the neglect of Muslims in the state, released ahead of Bengal polls in March, gave ammunition to Trinamool Congress and invited objections from the Left. His fresh attack on Left's claims can only trigger more controversy.

Shariff called Bengal's sudden rush for Mandal philosophy as crass politics, asking why did the state neglect OBC reservation for so many years. "Even now, Left's discomfiture with caste-based OBC reservation is evident... it remains shy of exhausting the full quota of 27% despite having now enlisted more than 100 caste groups as OBCs. The OBC quota in the state is only 17%," he said

Renewing his attack on the Left over the minority question, the economist cited the recruitment figures in Kolkata to rebuff the Left. During 2009-11, he claimed, Kolkata Police appointed 11 Muslim sergeants out of 511, Fire service appointed nine Muslims out of 605, the Food Corporation of India 12 out of 564 and Home Guards 35 out of 1,607.

He said per capita average landholding among Muslims was the lowest at 0.2 hectare, quoting the 61st round of NSSO report prepared in 2008.

Beyond the Bluster: Equity and Justice in West Bengal

2011-04-20T11:49:00.003+05:30

Abusaleh Shariff and Tanweer Fazal
19 April, 2011
One doesn’t need to be a registered student at an Oxford College to understand the difference between sops, assurances and promises made in an election year and the actual performance of a regime that has ruled a state for more than 30 years. Muslims constitute 25 per cent of West Bengal’s population. Despite such high concentration, the near absence of Muslims from the public arena - art, culture, literature, public service, education—is alarming and should cause consternation in any polity. However, any suggestion that Muslims are marginalized in West Bengal is taken as an affront to the so- called ‘exceptional’ record of the Left Front.

In an ‘editorial article’ in The Hindu (dated 14th April 2011) - a straight lift from the CPI (M)’s election campaign material titled, Left Front Government and the development of Muslim minorities in West Bengal, supplemented occasionally by the state finance minister’s budget speeches (mind you, not reports about the utilization of funds promised or audits of welfare schemes introduced) - the errors are sought to be rectified on the basis of ostensibly ‘new data’ and figures. Note that the evaluation and assessment of mass welfare and development programme is at best left to the experts such as the Indian Statistical Institute which is located in the heart of Kolkata or better still with the National Council for Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, where one of the authors of this article works.

There is an accusation that 2001 census figures are misleading and that one should instead rely on the NUEPA state report cards, which show the Left Front rule in a rather positive light. But how reliable are these report cards, based on data provided by the state governments? The report card itself comes with the statutory warning that “in no way it (NUEPA) is involved in data collection as such and therefore the accuracy and truthfulness of the data rests with the states/ UTs” (State Report Cards, 2008-09, p. xxv). What is most striking about these NUEPA report cards is that in several states, the proportion of Muslim children at the primary level is much higher than the share of Muslims in the state population. For the recent year 2009-10; West Bengal boasts that 32.3 of every 100 school children were Muslims, in Assam where Muslims comprise 31 per cent of the population, 40 percent of children enrolled in primary schools are Muslims; in Karnataka, where Muslims are only 12.2 per cent, enrollment is a whopping 35.5 percent at the primary level. It should be obvious that these State report cards cannot be used to trash the figures and trends generated through the census. Note that the Annual Status of Education Report (Rural) for the 2010 brought out by a well know civil society organization PRATHAM reports that only 60-70 % (page 41- Map of India, it is in the red band) of all the enrolled children continue to attend the first 4/5 years of schooling in West Bengal and this proportion is expected to be much lower for the Muslim community. Another analysis by Rakesh Basant and Gitanjali Sen suggests that overall, the share of eligible 20 years old and above Muslims in higher education is a meager 3 per cent, compared this with about 2.5% for the SCs (as expected) and a staggering 15 per cent share amongst the upper caste Hindus (Economic and Political Weekly, 25th September, 2010).

The Census of India and the household surveys are dependable sources for such data. Since Census is undertaken once in ten years, the NSSO (GOI) surveys are good source for assessment during the intermittent period. It is clear from the data below that there has been some improvement in enrollments at the primary and elementary levels but there is stagnation at the levels of matriculation and higher levels in West Bengal. But the startling fact is the discrepancy between various communities continues to be large, especially so at higher levels. Even in the year 2007-8, Muslims had the lowest enrollment at the primary level at 85 per cent followed by 50 per cent at middle level, which is the least and even lower than the SCs/STs. But the disparity is many folds higher at matriculation and higher levels: at only 15 per cent (note a 3 per cent point increase over the 2001 level of 12 per cent) for Muslims compared with 39 per cent amongst the group other than the Muslims and the SCs/STs.

Educational Level Differentials in West Bengal, 2001 and 2007-8
Share of Eligible Children in respective Caste-Religious Groups
Muslim SCs/STs All Others
2007-08 2001 2007-08 2001 2007-08 2001

Matriculation & above 15 12 17 13 39 38
Middle 50 26 52 30 62 58
Primary 85 50 90 54 93 80

Source: Estimated by Dr. Abusaleh Shariff from the unit level records of the 64th Round NSSO Survey for the reference year 2007-08; and Census of India, 2001

The West Bengal state government today gloats over the huge expansion in budgetary allocation for madarsa education - up from Rs 5.6 lakhs in 1976-77 to Rs 574 crores in the current budget. But this is precisely the problem. Madarsa education been the typical response of governments across the board towards Muslim educational needs and reflects the utter refusal of the political mainstream to see beyond madarsas. Note that just about 2 per cent of the school-going Muslim children attend Madarsa educational institutions in West Bengal - the remaining go to government, aided and increasingly unaided schools. There is a suggestion that employment of Muslims in the education sector should include the 20,000 teachers employed in the madarsas. It is ignored however; that the data cited in the Sachar Report was based on the data provided by the state governments—that too after much persuasion; obviously, the West Bengal government did not deem the madarsa teachers as government employees in 2005. Moreover, the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission was established only in 2008, when the Party, smarting from the peasant resistance in Nandigram, and the urban unrest over Rizwanur’s death, was already in salvage mode. Does it really think that this gesture can be seen as anything but an election ploy—given especially the chief minister’s statement in 2002 that madarsas in Bengal were hotbeds of anti-national activities (but of course following an uproar he claimed that he had only been asking for modernization of madarsas).

Among its flagship measures, the Left Front government claims to have extended the benefits of reservation to 85 per cent of the Muslims through an expansion in the list of backward classes. Indeed a hurriedly promulgated government notification (no.6309-BCW/MR-84/10) has been produced in this regard. But it is here that the Left has much more to answer than it can rejoice over. Crass electoral calculations is clearly the motivation rather than any commitment towards advancing equity and deepening citizenship, for the same regime had kept the OBC question in West Bengal more or less at bay by mischievously understating the presence of OBCs, particularly Muslim OBCs in the state. As a result of such a prejudicial politics, a large number of backward groups in Bengal were denied of reservation benefits for decades. Now suddenly, when faced with an imminent erosion of popular base, the government came to realize the existence of this large chunk of Muslims - some 50 odd caste groups - as backwards. The Left Front apologists would prefer to hide behind the recently submitted Ranganath Misra Commission report to explain away the delay, but can they answer why the Left Front failed to implement the Mandal Commission report since 1990? Apart from Mandal Commission, various state governments instituted their own state backward classes commissions such as the Mungeri Lal Commission (1975) in neighbouring Bihar, the Havanur Commission (1972) in Karnataka or the Ambasankar Commission (1982) in Tamil Nadu - only the Left in Bengal remained unfazed by these currents. Even now, the Left Front’s discomfiture with the caste-based OBC reservation is evident by the fact that it still remains shy of exhausting the full quota of 27 per cent despite having now enlisted more than 100 caste groups as OBCs. The quantum of OBC reservation in West Bengal rests at 17 per cent despite the recent enhancement.

The claims of reserving 10 per cent quota exclusively for Muslim groups is erroneous as the actual government notification stays clear of any religion-specific quota, and the only sub-categorisation is that between backward and more backward groups. Muslim groups tend to populate both the sub-categories; yet they cannot form the entire 10 %. The reason for this obfuscation is simple. Since a caste reservation is purported to bring little political dividends, the Left propagandists rush to flag it as ‘Muslim reservation’. Further, in the absence of any caste census, the claim that the 10 per cent enhancement in OBC reservation would cover 85 per cent of the Muslim population is at best speculative, and at worse, deceptive. The seriousness of the exercise also comes to be questioned as after this notification, West Bengal for all intents and purposes, remains the only state in the country where the number of Muslim OBC groups is more than those from the majority community.

Now let us take a look at a few popular appointments made in the state of West Bengal during 2009-11. Kolkata Police has appointed eleven Muslim sergeants from out of a total recruitment of 511, a mere 2.2 per cent. Similarly, Fire service appointed nine Muslims from out of 605 (1.5 per cent), the Food Corporation of India twelve out of 564 (2.1 per cent) and Home Guards 35 out of 1607 (2.2 per cent). These appointments are close to the share of Muslims in the total state government employees in West Bengal—which is a paltry 3-4 per cent.

The authors of the article cite the state government’s successful implementation of land reforms as an instance of Muslim amelioration. However a 2008 study based on NSSO 61st round and prepared for the Department of Minority Affairs and Madrasah Education, Govt. of West Bengal (‘Employment and Economic Status of Socio-Religious Communities in West Bengal’, by Zakir Husain, Institute of Development Studies, Kolkata, 2008:p.24) expose the emptiness of such claims by drawing attention to the fact that the average size of land holdings continues to be the lowest among Muslims when compared with other socio-religious categories such as Hindu upper castes, backward classes and other minorities. The difference is particularly glaring when compared with Hindu upper castes who own and posses nearly 0.4 hectare per capita while for Muslims it is slightly more than 0.2 hectare per capita. For Hindu backward classes the average landholding was close to 0.3 hectare per capita. The yield from agriculture is also registered as least for the Muslims (Rs. 141 per hectare as against Rs. 183 per hectare for Hindu upper castes) thus suggesting inferior quality of land holding. This persisting agrarian inequity seems to have hurt them the most as more than 80 per cent of Bengal’s Muslims live in the villages and the state’s land acquisition policy too, whether in Singur or Nandigram, remained insensitive to their felt-needs.

The protagonists may revel in the ‘impressive track record’ of the West Bengal government in implementing various welfare measures—reports from the ground do not seem to share their optimism though. A study conducted by the Centre for Equity Studies, New Delhi, found that in the district “24 Parganas…only 2.2% minority BPL households have been covered by the self-employment SGSY scheme, and less than 1% of the households have actually received bank credit. In the year 2010, right up to November, not a single Muslim SHG received bank credit. Likewise, in MGNREGA, although Muslims constitute 36% of the population and 45% of the job card holders, they account for only 13% of the wage employment generated under the programme.” (Promises to Keep: Investigating Government’s response to Sachar Committee recommendations, p. viii). Further, the “utilisation of MsDP funds for 2010-11, was a mere 22 % by the middle of third quarter for the whole country. Expenditures were as low as 18 % in Bihar, and a little higher at 30% in West Bengal.” (ibid., p. vi) Sure, West Bengal performed better than Bihar or many other states in terms of expenditure, but with 70 per cent of funds still unspent, it’s hardly the sterling example of welfarism that it’s trying to project itself as now.

West Bengal Development & Equity Controversy

2011-04-20T11:40:00.003+05:30

There is a raging controversy with respect to a review of West Bengal development and equity which was undertaken by me. The following links and news reports will put this controversy in perspective. There is a rejoinder filed for publiction with the Hindu daily news paper.

The Hindu |14th April 2011: tp://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article1695260.ece
The India Today | April 11, 2011: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story/134062/up-front/minority-report-on-condition-of-muslims-in-west-bengal.html
The Hindu| March 23, 2011 : http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/other-states/article1564075.ece
Times of India| Mar 23, 2011: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Bengal-worse-than-Gujarat-for-Muslims/articleshow/7767763.cms

THE HINDU : Published: March 23, 2011 12:01 IST | Updated: March 23, 2011 12:01 IST New Delhi, March 23, 2011
http://www.thehindu.com/news/states/other-states/article1564075.eceMuslims and the OBC tangle in West Bengal ahead of the elections
The Left's prospects in the forthcoming elections will hinge in large measure on the Muslim vote. Post-Nandigram and post-Singur, a big chunk of Muslims moved to the Trinamool Congress and the Congress, making the Left Front vulnerable.
The West Bengal government’s promise to set aside 10 per cent of government jobs for Muslims, by including a majority among them in the Other Backward Castes list last year, and increasing the OBC quota in the state from 7 per cent to 17 per cent has sparked off a controversy ahead of next month’s assembly elections.
Dr. Abusaleh Shariff, Chief Economist at the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) - who was also Member, Secretary of the Sachar Committee, which had mapped the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in the country - has challenged the authenticity of this assurance.
Senior CPI-M leader and former MP Mohammed Salim, explaining the new scheme, said the state government’s new OBC list had ensured that about 85 per cent of Muslims in the state would now be categorised as OBC, and that with the old 7 per cent OBC quota, increasing to 17 per cent, and then divided into backward and most backward categories, OBCs, who are Muslim, would soon be entitled to 10 per cent of state government jobs.
Dr. Shariff told The Hindu that this promise was typical of the Left Front’s lack of “transparency when it comes to numbers and issues”. He disputed the Left Front government’s claim that 85 per cent of Muslims in West Bengal had been categorised as OBC: “Where is the population count?” He also wanted to know how in a state, “where Hindus are 75 per cent of the population, and Muslims 25 per cent, any government can possibly give 10 out of 17 per cent to Muslims?” Dr. Shariff added that if it did so, it would be “totally disastrous for integrating Muslims into the mainstream”.
Interestingly, before the West Bengal government increased the OBC quota and the number of Muslim communities in the OBC list, 8.4 per cent of Hindus in the state and 2.4 per cent of Muslims were categorised as OBCs, figures that Dr. Shariff also disputes: he believes that these numbers were deliberately kept low by the state government for political reasons. He points out that Muslims in other states were able to make advances using the OBC quotas.
In West Bengal, the condition of Muslims has always been abysmal, whether one looks at their educational levels or at the sort of loans they get from public sector banks or, in the implementation of the minority concentration district scheme, or as Dr. Shariff pointed out, their representation in the state government: while Muslims account for a quarter of the state’s population, they currently only hold 2.1 per cent of state government jobs. It is a figure, he says, that compares unfavourably with virtually all others states in the country: in Kerala, for instance, 10.4 per cent of state government jobs are held by Muslims who account for 24.7 per cent of the population.
Indeed, the Left Front’s prospects in the forthcoming West Bengal elections will hinge in large measure on the Muslim vote. Traditionally, till the assembly polls of 2006, the Left Front could depend on securing about 18 out of the 25 per cent Muslim vote in the state. Post-Nandigram and post-Singur, the situation changed radically, with a big chunk of Muslims - who dominate Nandigram and Singur - moving to the Trinamool Congress and the Congress, making the Left Front vulnerable. This has been observed in the elections since 2006, whether they were local polls or the Lok Sabha elections in 2009.
The Left Front is, therefore, leaving no stone unturned: not only has it promised state government jobs, it has fielded 57 Muslim candidates, up from 44 in the last election. Muslim voters are disenchanted with the Left Front government not merely because of the land acquisition drive to set up industries, but also because the Sachar Committee report had revealed the pathetic state of Muslims in the state. Finally, there was the mysterious death of Rizwanur Rahman, a computer graphics teacher, in Kolkata, and the alleged complicity of the police in the matter.

The Times of India : Mar 23, 2011
Bengal worse than Gujarat for Muslims?
Abantika Ghosh, TNN |, 03.39am IST
West Bengal government|Left Front|Bengal worse than Gujarat for Muslims|Abu Saleh Sheriff
Of the 25.2% Muslim population, only 2.1% have government jobs and 50% children are out of school at the primary level.

NEW DELHI: These are figures the Left Front should be wary of as it prepares to defend its citadel of 34 years in West Bengal.

An analysis of data on the Muslim community released by the chief economist of the National Council of Applied Economic Research, Abu Saleh Sheriff, reveals that the state's minority has benefited little from development measures. In terms of human development indices, the Muslims have fared very poorly.

Of the 25.2% Muslim population, only 2.1% have government jobs and 50% children are out of school at the primary level. Only 12% go on to complete matriculation. These numbers are all the more astonishing given the fact that Left swears by its secular credentials and positions itself as a protector of minority rights.

Alarm bells have already started ringing, especially after a postmortem of the Left's poor showing in the civic elections last year. An important factor which could have resulted in the dismal performance was Muslim disenchantment. In what may be viewed as the party's efforts to make amends, there is a steep 33% hike in the number of Muslim candidates fielded by Left Front. It has gone up from 42 in 2006 to 56 this time in the 292-member Assembly.

Throughout his lecture, Sheriff — who has also been the member secretary of the Sachar panel — spoke of Gujarat and West Bengal in the same breath. In fact, he used the data to project the Left-ruled state in a far worse light than the state ruled by Narendra Modi, not regarded by many as a benefactor of the minorities. And this comparison appeared all the more relevant because the West Bengal government had gone out of its way to provide shelter to Qutubuddin Ansari, the man who became the face of the post-Godhra riots with his folded hands and tearful eyes.

"If a substantial fraction of the state's 25% Muslim population have traditionally voted for the alliance it could be because of the projected gains of the land reforms even though if you look at the figures, it shows that these reforms do not seem to have made any significant difference to the living standards of the community. With the elections coming, it is time this reality is brought to the knowledge of the public," Sheriff said. He was addressing a seminar on "Relative development of West Bengal and Socio-Religious Differentials" organized by the Institute of Objective Studies at the India Islamic Cultural Cultural Centre.

Shariff's figures on education, sourced, according to him from the census database and the Planning Commission, show 50% Muslim children attend school at the primary level, 26% remain in middle school and only 12% complete matriculation against 54%, 30% and 13% respectively for SC/STs and 80%, 58% and 38% for others.

Of the 90 minority-concentrated districts in the country, West Bengal has 12. "The worst are the state government employment figures where even Gujarat with its 9.1% Muslim population and with a 5.4% share in jobs is way ahead of West Bengal which is by far the worst in the country. We had to try very hard to get these figures out from the state government because, for obvious reasons, they are very secretive about this," Shariff said.

A look at OBC statistics in Bengal shows only 2.4% of its Muslims belong to that category. This, Sheriff says, is not the real picture and simply exposes the state government's reluctance to undertake the enumeration exercise.

K.R. Narayanan Memorial Lecture

2011-03-23T10:59:00.000+05:30

4th K.R. Narayanan Memorial Lecture by Dr. Abusaleh Shariff at ...

http://www.indiaeducationreview.com/industry-updates/4th-kr-narayanan-memorial-lecture-dr-abusaleh-shariff-jamia

The 4th Dr KR Narayanan Memorial lecture, organized by the Dr. K.R. Narayanan Centre for Dalit and Minorities Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia was delivered on ...
www.indiaeducationreview.com/.../4th-kr-narayanan-memoria...

How Developed is West Bengal?

2011-03-23T10:56:00.001+05:30

Bengal worse than Gujarat for Muslims?
Times of India |March 23, 2011

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Bengal-worse-than-Gujarat-for-Muslims/articleshow/7767763.cms

An analysis of data on the Muslim community released by the chief economist of the National Council of Applied Economic Research, Abu Saleh Sheriff, ...

New York Times March 20, 2011

2011-03-21T10:15:00.002+05:30

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/asia/21cleric.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1

Recent News Items

2011-02-18T12:15:00.001+05:30

TOI 18th February 2011 |http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Muslims-left-behind-in-Gujarats-growth-story/articleshow/7518871.cms

The Hindu: 13th February 2011 |http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1448215.ece

New York Times [Related story] |http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/business/global/12food.html?pagewanted=2&_r=2&ref=global-home

Failure of the Group Specific Equity Policy: - the case of the Scheduled Tribes

2011-01-31T14:23:00.001+05:30

An opportunity to get a ring side view and observe, assess and evaluate public polices is rare. I was fortunate, as a member of a Committee to assess the situation in Andhra Pradesh, visited many tribal and primitive communities during 2010. Overall, close to 9% of India’s population are the STs, over 700 - highly diverse communities are notified under Article 342 of the constitution of India; of these 75 are ‘primitive tribal groups (PTGs)’.

Consider a village in Vijanagaram district with two distinct tribes living side-by-side - Kondavara, a non-primitive tribe and Savara, a primitive tribe. The Kondavara reported some cultivation rights over half an acre to three acres of rain fed land on the hilly terrain but with no clear land title. Fortunately all 81 households were covered under the MG-NREGS with Rs.100 as wage, and worked on land improvement on their plantations in a cooperative basis. It was common to find Kondavara’s seek wage employment in the nearby plains as well and also participated in market exchange.

Whereas the Savara being a PTG were under the control of ‘integrated tribal development authority’ ITDA. They were provided with employment on daily fixed wages to work in the forest, but only for limited number of days in a year. According to the Savara’s the MG-NREGS wages offered worked out to be less than Rs. 20 per day and therefore they were disillusioned this work offer. The private wage this community got in the village was as low as Rs. 70 for males and Rs. 40 for females. They rear small ruminants and cattle. Savara’s rarely traveled to outside areas and their marriage linkages were found to be within a 10 Kms range and amongst their own tribe. Although some land on the hills was assigned to them, they did not report a clear ownership and land was unfit for cultivation of cereals.

A contrasting differentiation of these communities was physical location of their living quarters. The non-primitive tribes occupied a street horizontally with relatively better housing. The Savara’s, on the other hand lived in homes built vertically, climbing up on the rocky terrain towards the hills. This street was full of rocks exposed due to the rain water gushing vertically through the street. It was not easy to climb up to homes on the higher end even for well built men let alone women and children. There was hardly a dwelling which looked neat and tidy as was the case in the horizontal street.

Another visit was to a tribal village cluster in Prakasam district - a resettlement of the Chenchu’s, Yerakala and Sugali, all primitive tribe from within the forest; and the other a cluster of non-primitive communities. The ITDA could provide one acre of land to about half of the resettled primitive families and also semi-finished single room residential quarters, but without a kitchen and toilet in them. The resettlement had drinking water facility and also electricity. Men undertook bamboo cutting and honey collection under the government program, women also collected minor forest produce such as medicinal herbs and roots. This settlement was serviced by a Girjan Society (GCC) which purchased the forest produce for a predetermined price, and were also covered under the PDS. We also found girls and boys educated and trained to become teachers but with without any jobs.

The neighborhood settlement was occupied by non-primitive inhabitants living there since long. This settlement was bereft of facilities and services available to the resettlement. Women from this settlement were not allowed to collect the minor forest produce therefore they were in basket making; while men ventured getting bamboo on the sly from the forest. Most of men were reported to be under lockup for having taken bamboo from the forest. Neither the state government agencies nor the ITDA have covered this settlement for the provisioning of welfare schemes, nor were programs such as the MG-NREGA and SHG. To my understanding this bunch of 23 households had in fact no identity and lived a highly vulnerable and deprived life.

The above examples present highly contrasting scenarios. The primitive tribes in spite of the presence of ITDA were found to be extremely vulnerable compared with the non-primitive groups in first example; where as in the latter case it was the non-primitive group which was found to be at the verge of penury. The origin of such differentiation is due to policy as well implimentative shortcomings with respect to the primitive and non-primitive tribes residing in the same location. How, why and who make these sharper differentiation between the communities and for what purpose is not very clear. However, in the first example, the freedom and choice that the non-primitive group had, so as to travel and visit the plain areas for work and market appears to have empowered them. In the second example, since the primitive groups were resettled from within the forest they were showered with a number of benefits while the original dwellers in the same location were left to fend for themselves and in fact found to be victimized.

Overall, the ST areas suffer from provisioning of basic services such as education, health and employment. Even the ST hostels for girls were found not having running water and the adolescent girls were seen using brooks and streams nearby for their daily routine, bathing and washing. While qualified girls and boys belonging to primitive tribes remain unemployed, all government functionaries including the teachers were non-STs commuting from plain areas on work. They were seen travelling on a daily basis to the work place on their ultramodern expensive motorcycles; and many inaccessible locations are bereft of institutions and personnel.

It is important to state that these are the areas covered under the ‘Schedule 5’ policy established in 1950 which is directly overseen by the Governor of the state with the help of the ‘tribal advisory councils.’ The STs are easy to identify and live in clusters of their own and policies to effect group equity should be easy to implement. But the reality is otherwise; it gives an impression that government is running an enterprise, with bonded PTGs which can be subject to ‘bonded labor laws’. It also appears, in the name of protecting these communities; opportunities are denied for them to access the fruits of the modern development.

Poverty a Mystery in the Land of the Poor!

2011-01-21T14:41:00.000+05:30

A number of controversies are raging concurrently on size and nature of poverty and the ongoing unprecedented (food) inflation is adding fuel to this fury.
The official poverty estimate has gone through change due to change in methodology and cut offs for the second time in last 12 years or so. Be aware, therefore, it not now easy to compare poverty estimates over time and therefore all are in dark as to how many of we Indians are poor and who are they? Should one continue with the original definitions of poverty and methodology set in mid-1970s, there would not be many poor left in India! Therefore, the recent revision of the poverty line aligned with the urban levels of consumption is the saving grace; and rural poverty is estimated to be about 37.2% for the year 2004-5. The official poverty line is the rupee value which can purchase the minimum benchmarked amount of calories needed for sustenance which is in fact higher for rural and lower for urban areas. However, the anomaly is that it takes relatively more amount of rupees to buy the same amount of calories in urban area possibly due to price difference. It is not clear if any adjustments for these differences are made in the new poverty line suggested by Tendulkar Committee. Yet when the food intake (which is the primary basis for fixing the poverty line) and associated calories are measured using the same data source (NSSO) up to 70% of the population is estimated to be vulnerable and in a number states such as Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand and so on this proportion can be as high as 90%. Thus it is not only difficult but impossible to understand the objective criteria used to benchmark the poverty estimates without an empirical multi-vulnerability analysis.
A as a matter of routine the state governments in association with the national ministry of rural development undertake ‘below poverty line’ (BPL) surveys at about 5 years of interval to identify deserving households for service delivery. Earlier these surveys used a list of 13 characteristics which highlight vulnerability and arrived at estimates comparable to those based on calorie intake deficiencies.
Currently, efforts are on through a committee to refine these variables using the ‘exclusionary’ and ‘inclusionary’ criteria. This refinement seems necessary firstly to remove the deficiency of the13 variable surveys and secondly to arrive at a compromise level of poverty estimates between the official national and state estimates. While a refinement in this method is essential what is debatable is the subjective elements inherent in identifying a set of variables for exclusion and another set for inclusion. Further score values are assigned to the variables of inclusion with little empirical basis however. Unlike in the past now the local level functionaries have to grapple with not one but two lists, one of exclusion and another of inclusion and then assigned scores, all at the local level. Further, during direct questioning for the sake of BPL identification will be highly politicised, contentious and problematic. For example, it will not be easy to find out who are the income tax payers are as this information not public knowledge; similarly identifying ‘person owning a fire arm’ will be as difficult as facing one who owns it. It is argued that many of the variables listed including the two mentioned above are not expected to be statistically significant and therefore empirically irrelevant relevant should the identification of the variables is undertaken using time tested and transparent methods. The subjective variable scoring scheme will be politically not acceptable either.
There is another factors relevant in this methodology is capping of poverty level, arbitrarily at 50% level. As is well known a cap at the policy level is always taken forward upto the block, panchayat and even village levels and thus whole communities will be at risk of being eliminated from being identified as the poor; not because of any defect but just by a sheer application of quota and the overriding execution of local community level politics which can easily exclude the marginal groups such as the SCs, STs, Muslims and other minorities. The proposed methods also ignore the fact that the variation in poverty extends upto the village and even sub-village levels due to unique residential pattern in which the marginalized are forced to live in peripheral locations around the village. Often such localities are entirely excluded from the ambit of program implementation on various pretexts by the local functionaries and supportive political system.
Is it possible to put forth an empirical methods which can identify dispassionately using location (geographic identity) specific factors that can be used a check list. A larger survey data can be used to identify a list of factors and this list can be used as a check list during the village level surveys. This method removes subjectivity at another level; at the level of identifying the target household. Since the check list is predetermined at say each district or taluka level, the identification errors will be minimal.
A multi-vulnerability identification exercise for rural India provides the following list of variables which exhibit source of opulence or vulnerability accordingly. These variables are empirically identified as the dominant factors with various degree of vulnerability. Using this as a check list one can with a high degree of certainty and in a dispassionate manner estimate a value to each household, and also arrange in an order of priority. Thus all such households within in a defined area can be stacked one over another depending upon the total severity of vulnerability and thus easy to identify who of the two households deserve social services, a very important attribute if limited resources are to be distributed. This kind of assigning of intensity of vulnerability is impossible in the method currently being considered. However, the alternate empirical approach in fact helps in placing a given household at an appropriate location in the ‘economic ladder’ and helps clearly identify who are the at the bottom, middle and at the top end of the economic wellbeing. Thus it eliminates an important defect in present system of categorising households only in two groups namely the poor and the rich.
The functionaries, therefore, can prepare location specific common list for practically all such programs which are intend to help the deprived and poor households, and programs can be aligned with commonly accepted benchmarks in terms of the quantum of services either in cash or in kind. In fact one can also conceive a gradation of such services depending upon the severity of the household as expressed in the value of vulnerability estimated in this method. Given a baseline survey, such as the NSSO, the NFHS and Human Development Surveys, it is easy to give the list of these variables upto the district and even lower administrative levels.
Exclusionary Attributes:
HH who receive income from regular salaried and organised sector employment;
Residential Living Density – more than 0.5 room per person (excluding kitchen)
HH Owning any of these items : – tube well, electric/diesel pump / tractor / biogas plant
HH owing a diesel / petrol driven vehicles such as car, motor cycle, scooter
HH who owns a Refrigerator or Colour Television

Inclusionary Attributes:
Household Head not educated upto 8th standard
SCs, STs and BC-Muslim households
HHs not using LPG, Kerosene, Cooking coal for cooking
Households having MG-NREGA job cards
HH with a sick person as indicated in a pre-approved list

Download GOI Committee Reports

2011-01-21T13:00:00.003+05:30

Government of India Committee Reports:
On Andhra Pradesh: http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/CCSAP-REPORT-060111.pdf
On Muslims in India: http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/newsite/sachar/sachar_comm.pdf

The Economic Paradigm and National Integration

2011-01-10T17:29:00.000+05:30

The paradigm of economic and social development in India has evolved from the socialistic pattern to the one of openness and private-public partnership. Ideologically socialistic performance of the government soon after the Independence ensured that private corporate and other vested interest could not appropriate national resources such that the masses could have been adversely affected. Although the trigger happy economic evangelists do abuse the older economic system, what should be recognized at the time of the Independence, fresh with the influence of Gandhian thought and preaching, there could not have been any other choice to socialistic thought, at that time promoting a sense of equality although the sense of ownership was non-existent; excepting the relief that the Government has control over them, and that they are safe and not looted. The Nehurivian concerns therefore during the first few decades after Independence in my view were not only relevant but necessary.

However, a reminiscence of the process of development in India, invokes a considerable amount of satisfaction that India indeed has gone through a process of transformation from the license raj to opening up towards promoting private initiatives to exploit resources, in a way at the right time although such a change was forced upon due to the technocratic and purely fiscal prudence. Thus the recognition and promotion of the private initiative in development as a policy response to fast growth is commendable. Yet it is necessary to ponder upon as what kind of lopsided development and growth can occur should the government begin to absolve the role of the ‘trustee’ of the national and natural resources, while the private sector engulfed with the forces of free economy and competition penetrates to such economic dominions which were thus far insulated from exploitation, mostly due to lack of demand and largely due to lack of investments which governments could not bring.

Therefore, the economic process which are private but in principle endorsed by the public systems which also claim to be the so called ‘inclusive’ can damage the very fabric of nation hood and nation building. The economy and markets must operate and indeed promote the concept of nation hood and promote national integration, while making profits through exploiting local natural and human resources and adding value to the GDP.
Two pronged policies for growth and national interest are suggested, (a) an inclusive economic penetration and (b) a social framework which promotes equity and participation.

1. Integration inernally not outwardly: It is common to find that in the name of national integration one finds mass movements of people from mainstream areas in India to the periphery. This can happen in organized manner such as through government employment, movement of security forces to peripheral states; or this can happen due to market forces where both people and products penetrate into the periphery regions such as hill areas, north eastern states and so on.

Development orientation must ensure that the people and products from the periphery find a place in the mainland public, private and market spaces. This approach will not only bring progress in the deprived peripheral areas but also a high degree of national integration.

2. Identify and Cherish Cultural Values: Another strong mechanism through which national integration can take place is by identifying (cataloging) and promoting through recognition and appreciation social values, customs and practices from amongst the deprived and peripheral geographic areas and communities which can do beneficial to the mainland geography and communities. Such an approach may even be necessary to address a number of MDG goals such as child bearing and raring practices, gender relations (for example widow remarriage, woman’s inheritance and ownership rights and so on),

3. Promotion of Multiple Language Education: It is essential that along with the national and regional languages, mother tongue and international languages such as English are promoted through formal schooling. Currently there is hardly any importance give to provide primary education in mother tongue. Besides, access to English language is not found in publically provided schools and taking advantage this is done of private schooling but at a high cost and that too for a poor quality education. This anomaly in medium of instructions must be eliminated on an urgent basis. Arguments such as children will be burdened with too many languages are not adequate enough; to deny primary education in mother tongue and also English (other foreign languages) education.

4. Fund Translation of Literature in a New Language: Another strategy which can bind the nation together is to undertake massive efforts, to translate major compendiums of socio-cultural, historical and literary value into to multiple languages. This should not be from only one or two languages, rather from all other languages (including peripheral) to mainstream languages. This will be an excellent way to promote mutual respect to pluralistic value systems which prevail in India.

India Vision 2050

2010-10-10T12:46:00.001+05:30

The world is experiencing unprecedented technologically aided changes leading to broad based growth and development. How will India benefit from these changes to improve its economic and social progress; say by the middle of the 21st century is worth pondering over.
The structure of global competitive economy was such that India was the seventh largest in terms of volume of output at the time of its Independence. The British popularly identified India as the ‘jewel in the crown’. India during the medieval period was one of the largest economics and in league with China and Europe. The desire to exploit the riches from India was so great that Christopher Columbus’s voyage in an effort to find an easy sea route for trade moved westerly and discovered the Americas instead. Yet at the time India became Independent, not only two-thirds Indians were unable to fend for two square meals a day, but also that it hosted the world’s largest pool of poor and illiterate population. Although, India still hosts the world’s largest pool of the poor, proportionately poverty has declined substantially. Using a standard methodology for comparisons over time, one can argue that proportion of the poor in India is around 30%, in spite of the population almost doubling to doubling to 1130 million since the Independence. In absolute numbers however, about 350 million citizens are still poor, comparable to those existed during 1950s.
Since the mid-1980s, especially after 1991 India reformed its economic policies and striving to achieve new benchmarks, recording a robust GDP growth rate averaging close to 7.5 % over the last decade and even touching 10% during the recent quarters. Further, there are noteworthy improvements in literacy, life expectancy, infant and child mortality and other human development parameters; broad based public policies are in place so as to reach out to the deprived and hitherto excluded communities such as the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and religious minorities.
But the puzzle remains in the structure of the economy and sectoral shares of GDP. Early after the Independence over 60% of labor force was generating more than 50% of GDP from Agricultural and allied activities; but by about 2010 only 17% of GDP is generated with over 55% of labor force trapped in it. In recent years less than 20% of labor force is generating closer to 60% of GDP from services suggesting a technology intensive but labor replacing growth. The Industrial sector has grown in absolute terms but unable to improve its share in GDP of around a quarter and absorbing a similar share of labor. Such a growth trajectory can be devastating, since demographically by 2050, India will be the largest country in the world with a population of over 1.6 billion and a billion labor force. Compare this with China’s projected population at 1.4 billion and the next largest USA with just over 400 million by 2050.
The key is in the ‘capital stock’ a country would own, which is broadly referred to as that part of national wealth which is reproducible consisting of all resources contributing to the production of goods and services. This is an indicator of the capacity for investments determining future growth prospects. India is striving to ensure that real net capital stock is sustained which is about 252 per cent of the GDP, but this ratio is just about 50% in the US and 120% in Japan. In terms of per capita capital stock, in 2009, Japan tops with US$47711 followed by the USA at US$18708 and a meager amount of just about US$1500 in India. Thus India, while exhibits strength of the emerging economy so far as the capital stock is measured relative to its GDP, but in per capita terms it is far too low. Therefore, India’s future economic growth depends upon the investments made by developed economies around the globe through the FDI and FII channels.
One of the distinctive achievements for India is that it has evolved as a robust electoral democracy that too with a considerable devolution of powers to the second- (States) and third- (local bodies) tier both in its rural and urban areas. This enabling environment will empower communities, women and the deprived groups and help a secular and equitable development. Yet India has to ensure considerable investments in mass education, skill formation, technical education and improvement of quality education. This alone will help the bulging working age population of future years so as to increase labor productivity. This will also help realize the demographic dividends through improved household consumption as well as enhanced public consumption, triggering accelerating effects. Further, a better educated and qualified workforce will be welcome world over especially by the ‘graying economies’ such as the western Europe, Japan and even to a limited extent China. Indeed, India has potential to be become a manufacturing hub rivaling China, and excel in exports in goods and services especially the IT based services, besides becoming the supplier of the skilled manpower to the world during next 30-40 years.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuAFkdz-bSU

2010-09-17T11:28:00.002+05:30

Employment and the Youth

Recent Articles/Book Review

2010-09-10T14:36:00.000+05:30

OPED in Indian Express: 23rd August 2010
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/casting-the-caste-net/663820/

Invited Article in Outlook Magazine: 28th August 2010
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266661

Economic and Political Weekly, Book Review
http://beta.epw.in/newsItem/comment/188683/

Big League India! Should we Celebrate?

2010-08-30T09:54:00.001+05:30

Yes and NO !
The world is jubilant after a recovery, albeit meek, from the global gloom of economic meltdown of 2008-10 rivaling only the depression of the 1930’s. This recovery seems to have occurred by resilient growth in China and India and large bailout and economic restructuring packages offered by the US and European economies. While China has pushed down Japan to take second place next only to the US, India has also found a place in the top ten or trillion dollar economies and poised to take 5th position much before 2030.

India indeed has come a long way to create a niche for itself in the global economic space. The world foresee a demographic advantage that India can harness, given young age structure and a fast and consistent pace of income growth in GDP which is propelling shifts in consumption classes generating huge domestic demand for practically all types of modern goods and services. The markets for such products in the west are close to saturation and at the most meager. The investors world over, look into India as the power house to manufacture and export goods and services at cost effective contracts as well. There is also an expectation that India during the next 20-30 years will continue to provide trained manpower to the firms and business in the western world due to its relatively higher fertility levels and larger young age population.

There are credible predictions of large shifts in consumption behavior from the basic necessities to discretionary items and services. Indians are now being recognized as being the “maharajas of the technological type across the world”! Yet the fallacy of the growing economy gets highlighted only when one looks in to disparities of income. Although as measured by Gini coefficients the disparity of income/ consumption in India is about one half the level of China; it is interesting to watch the income disparities across the emerging markets during the next decade or so especially in India and China.

India produces close to 200 million tons of food grains including pulses and is self-sufficient so far as agricultural output is concerned. Yet one finds extremely high levels of malnutrition amongst the children and even the expectant and lactating mothers in India. The puzzling fact is that the level of malnourishment is even more than a number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa which is so well known as the poorest part of the world.

The demographic dividends are expected out of labour supply potential that India has over other emerging economics of the world. However, it is also important to note that India’s population will also generates domestic demand in such a way that a substantial labour and skill pool is required to sustain domestic markets thus thrusting a considerable pressure on the global demand for labour either through fewer leaving India for other greener pastures; or though increase in exports of manufactured goods and services.

Both India and China are already facing shortage in a number of high skilled professions. The income growth is fueling air travel, while capital is aplenty to purchase/lease carriers both are facing serious shortage of aircraft pilots. Similarly, physicians, doctors, surgeons will be short of demand in both the economics especially when medical tourism is booming already in India. India so well known in having supplied software engineers all over the world will itself face serious shortage at home. While India is not at the verge of declining workforce as is the case with China; India has huge demerit in having a low educated and unskilled manpower which will be of hardly any use in the growing sectors of the economy. This means it is surely meant to increase wage bills not far from now in which case the labour and wage advantage that India had in the globalizing competitive environment will be lost, thus exposing the economy to risk of stagnation. Growing mismatch between the type of education skilled manpower that these countries have and the demand in the markets by the newly established companies and industries are going to cause a serious challenge within the next decade or so.

The structure of global competitive economy is such that India was the seventh largest in terms of volume of output at the time of its Independence; but in spite of the apparent high growth trajectory it is no where closer to that ranking presently. However, at the beginning of the 21st century the world is taking India seriously, mostly due to the imminent demographic advantage that this country is demonstrating to the world. India has always been a brain trust and exporter of highly educated manpower especially to the western world and to undertake business to countries such as the south-east Asia. Besides, considerable number of skilled (even at lower levels) labour force was attracted towards the west Asian economies right from the 1970s and this trend not yet reversed. While it would be fare that India would made all efforts to ensure that the newly developed production and distribution markets are sustained using the available labour and skills; it would be somewhat over ambitious to say that the Indian labour force will indeed be available to meet the requirement of the outside economies. On the contrary however, a noticeable number of professionals are returning back to India to seek employment in high growth sectors such as the Information Technology, Research and Development in pharmaceuticals and medicine and other high technology sectors. India needs large investments in education and technological training so as to skill growing labour force and meet the expectations at least partially.

India has many puzzles and dualisms: for example the debates over ‘India’ versus ‘Bharat’ or the urban rural divide; the unorganized versus organized workforce; continuance of abject poverty and hunger when the growth rates are best in the world; and issues revolving around social and income poverty. These debates will be explored in the subsequent chunks of articles to follow.

Four Years after Sachar? Are Muslims better off in India?

2010-08-30T09:46:00.002+05:30

An article published in OUTLOOK INDIA Magazine, Special Independice day Issue, 23rd August 2010. http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266661

The Lamb's Share

It is essential to begin this essay by emphasizing the fact that the minorities including the Muslims maintain aspirations and seek opportunities for development similar to any other community in India. Yet an empirical review suggests Muslims lagging practically in all spheres of development including education, employment, income and assets and so on. There are some efforts from both the centre and state governments to overcome deprivation amongst the Muslims across India, but a quick review of outcomes suggest little improvements. There is a need for durable changes, firstly a recognition that deprivation amongst the minorities /
Muslims exists due to systemic causes which can be set right only through broad based public policy initiatives, not entirely through special purpose vehicles such as the minority/Muslim oriented programs; rather assisting them to strive to access their share within the mainstream line ministries, departments and programs.

India through the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendment has made a strong socio-political statement of its arrival as a matured democracy, championing multi-layer decentralized governance, sharing substantial powers and national pool of resources with the States. Further, the enduring cannons of governance and economic development are grounded in principals of socialism, inclusiveness and secularism and fully conscious of regional imbalance given a large expanse of the Indian nation. India probably is a rare example of pluralism, with multi-dimensional cultural and social groupings, language, race, region and not the least religion; in short rich in diversity.

Like other main communities of India, the Muslims should be able to pursue social, economic and educational aspirations within the frame and support of government provided infrastructure, opportunities and political awakening. Thus one expect ‘diversity’ - the diversity natural to our population should get reflected in the public spheres such as in educational institutions, public and organized sector employment, political system and governance structures at all levels. Yet, in spite of the fact that practically all social, educational and economic spheres of living are governed, regulated and implemented by the States; one would find substantial (often unacceptable level) differences between varied social groups and across states. Such differentials are prominent in spite of special constitutional provisions bestowed upon the minorities since the Independence.

Over 150 million citizens, just about 14% of all Indians profess Islam as their religion and reside across all parts of India. Muslims are the largest (80%) of all identified minorities of India. They reside in substantial numbers and proportions in states such as Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, UP and Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra and so on. There are examples and best practices found within India. Consider the states of Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, all have devised policies favoring Muslims at two levels. (a) Along with all others, the Muslims have relatively better access to quality mass education (both elementary and higher level) and employment; and (b) given the history of relative deprivation of the Muslims the state policy have extended the benefit of reservations in a certain measure of fractional-proportions linked to their size and share in population. Such quotas are enabling the Muslim girls and boys to catch up with their peers amongst the Hindus and Christians, both in education and employment. Similar provisions will enable Muslims to participate even in the political spaces; and Andhra Pradesh has made a beginning by promoting a system of ‘co-option’ or ‘nomination’ system to the Mandals (sub-taluka), Zila Parishads and Municipalities/Naga Panchayets (AP Panchayat Act 2006).

Thus maintaining diversity in public spheres is essential. When this does not happen naturally, it has to be made to happen through government intervention. Legislation can be one way; and the mechanism is to remind the government and the institutions that ensuring diversity is their responsibility; the state should have done it in the first place. Diversity can be assured in India by offering incentives/credits to government departments, institutions, universities, panchayats, PSU and so on.

Another mechanism is to provide institutional access to any one of the citizens (including religious minorities) to ensure ‘Equity’ in public sphere. An ‘Equal Opportunity Commission’ will go a long way both to ensure diversity as a key state objective, and it can also function as an institution to enforce redressal.

The national government has made some efforts during the past 3-4 years to address various aspects of Muslim deprivation. Broadly under the revised 15-point programme, a special investment program in about 100 minority (includes substantial Christian and Muslim populations) concentration districts (MCD); exclusive scholarships are announced for the first time to cover minorities both in elementary and higher levels of education. The RBI is consistently sending memos to the public sector banks to increase funding to the applicants from the minorities and so on. However, a review of all the above programs suggest, that the MCD program has not even made presence in many states such as West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand and Gujarat. The overall utilization is less than 20% of the total funds earmarked to this program since inception. Similarly the scholarship program although very popular is able to cover only a fraction of total applicants; and it appears that the public sector banks have not even taken a note of the repeated requests make by the RBI which is a matter to utmost concern.

The larger malice of exclusion has to be fought unitedly by all ‘regular-line departments’ and Ministries at the national and State levels. It also needs collaboration and partnership with civil society and private institutional structures. How will a separate Ministry ensure the implementation of more than 300 programs that aim to alleviate poverty and improve human development which will promote inclusiveness of the excluded, whether they be Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Muslims?

In the absence of any time-line, program-specific implementative strategy and clarity with respect to monitoring tools and mechanisms, no results will be forthcoming. It is important to mention that a flat policy of earmarking 15 per cent of budgetary allocations to favor the minorities is not implementable. Rather, the service delivery procedures must use population shares at the “program specified operational levels” such as the district, taluka and block levels so as to ensure maximum coverage and provide a sense of equity. The early euphoria and expectations are dying out. The UPA -1 took many initiatives to dissect and diagnose the problem, and UPA -2 must ensure that inclusive policies are actually implemented before the people at large become disappointed. I only hope this does not lead to frustration.

How will Caste Census affect the Muslims in India?

2010-08-30T09:40:00.003+05:30

Published as an editorial article in the Indian Express, 23rd August, 2010
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/casting-the-caste-net/663820/

Casting the Caste Net

The GoM under Shri Pranab Mukherjee’s chairmanship has approved collecting Caste information in Census 2011. Although Muslims are considered a casteless community, it is a diverse society and practically all are experiencing deep levels of deprivation in various social, educational and economic facets of life. In the following I discuss alternatives for collecting caste data and also highlight implications to the Muslim community within the context of inclusive development agenda of the UPA government.

Open ended question method: Given a large number of castes and caste like identities in India; whatever ‘caste name’ the informants’ report can be filled-in and codified later. A pre-coded list of castes that enumerators normally carry to ascertain the SC/ST identity will continue; and for all others it can be open ended caste reporting. Such a method will reveal the actual numbers, but from these numbers it is not possible to declare a particular caste as backward or forward. The information on socio, economic and educational indicators which will be collected in the Census 2011may not be adequate to compute the backwardness or forwardness of castes. The Muslim community will participate in this process of data collection of the open ended caste identities along with all other community groups in India. But it appears that such an open method will not be used in the 2011 census operation although the demand of cast collection of data is of this nature.

Matching of reported caste with the pre-coded Caste/Class Lists: As mentioned above the SCs and STs are so identified using a pre-coded list which is matched at the time of census taking itself. Thus, only two coded categories are extracted from the Census which are used to estimate the SCs and STs for any geographic or administrative area. Now since the demand for the caste census has been made mostly by the castes which can be grouped as the OBCs (other backward classes); it is but expected that similar procedure is used to collect the share of OBCs in the 2011 census.
Unlike in case for the SCs/STs for whom the respective lists are being compiled and updated since last six censuses in Independent India; the case for OBCs is to be undertaken for the first time in 2011. The most likely benchmark will be a list of OBCs from the Mandal Commission. It is puzzling to note that as per the Mandal Commission, ‘OBC list’ is considered a ‘class category with little sociological, cultural or economic basis to designate as such. Besides, the OBC list was prepared almost 30 years ago and that too in the absence of any dependable data. The communities were identified using some sketchy data from 1931 census of India and in many cases even by the Mandal Commission’s own view are ‘best guesses’. I am of the opinion that using the OBC list during the 2011 census to identify the size and share of OBC will be highly problematic, and it will make devising inclusive policies difficult both at the national and state level.

The Mandal Commission has guessed the percentages of both the Hindu and non-Hindu OBCs based on assumptions. For example, one notices wide variation in identifying the ‘castes’ and their shares to qualify as OBCs both in State and Central lists. For example, in case of Muslims, while almost all Muslims in Kerala are listed as OBCs, almost none (very small proportion) in West Bengal are listed as such in the Mandal Commission document. About 40% of Muslims are counted as the OBCs in Uttar Pradesh and such OBCs in Karnataka are about 5-7%. The OBC listing for the Muslims for all the respective states is just ‘guestimates’ and are not true estimates. Using such lists will do more harm to the cause of Muslims especially because a large number or proportion of Muslims will be counted as those belonging to the ‘high castes/class’ and therefore will be excluded from any scheme of affirmative action (for example, if government considers implementation of Ranganath Mishra Commission recommendations or other similar inclusive policies).

It could be seen from the statement below that only about 25% of all Hindus are considered as the High Castes or socio-economically better offs; whereas, about 50% of Muslims are classified as High Castes or socio-economically better offs. This is because none from the Muslims are classified under the SCs/STs category and all such Muslims with the SC / ST identity are actually listed as the High Castes/Class which is unacceptable. This is a serious anomaly in estimates of OBCs by Mandal commission in case of Muslim community.

Mandal Commission Caste/Class Classification and Proportions of
Hindus and Muslims in India
Religion SCs+STs OBCs All Others (High Caste/Class)
Hindus 23 52 25
Muslims 0 52 48
Source: Extracts from the Mandal Commission

In view of these facts it is essential that correct estimates with respect to (a) ‘SCs/STs type Muslims’, (b) ‘OBC Muslims’ and (c) ‘all other Muslims’ are undertaken with care and sensitivity. Even if the SC/ST type of Muslims are not so listed due to certain procedural hurdles even when legally and constitutionally appropriate; such Muslims must be listed as OBCs in which case upto 80% of all Muslims will be so classified. Note that, practically all Muslims in India are converts and hardly any original Muslims who migrated from out of erstwhile Indian territory now reside in India. Further, it is historically documented that most of those converted to Islam belong to low castes such as the dalits and the tribes. The ‘Sachar Committee’ (2006) on status of Muslims in India has also clearly revealed the distressing socio-economic and educational conditions of Muslims of India.

I will be almost impossible to prepare a list of Muslim caste/class for classifying them as Muslim-OBCs. Therefore, I suggest that ‘list of exclusion’ can be prepared so as to determine the social forwardness or backwardness of a large section of Muslims in India. Such list of exclusion can be prepared for each state separately after consultations with the state level Muslim intellectuals and religious bodies. Thus, once a list of exclusion is prepared, all other Muslims who do not match with the list of exclusion can be identified as the “Muslim OBCs”.

Given the UPA governments resolve to ensure inclusive development of India, it is necessary a serious anomaly with respect to identification of the Muslims OBCs is removed before the conduct of the 2011 census, lest the discrimination so far faced by the Muslims continue for ever after.

[A rejoinder to this article can be found in this link: http://www.pasmandamuslims.com/2010/08/caste-census-and-indian-muslims_28.html]

Proposed Caste Census 2011 in India

2010-05-27T14:18:00.002+05:30

There is a renewed demand from many corners, especially a segment of political leadership to collect a citizen’s caste affiliation during the 2011 census of India. The GOI in principle has agreed to collect information on caste in 2011 census; but what is not clear is as to what kind of information on caste will be collected; will it be collected during the house listing operation or during the population census. It appears the whole process of ‘upward social mobility’ will get up-side-down to ‘downward social mobility’ or what we can call as Competitive Backwardness. In the following, however, I identify the difficulties in collecting caste data through the ongoing operations relating to census 2011.

1. Operational Difficulties in Collecting Caste in Census 2011:

Census Operation
The census is undertaken in two phases. A house listing operation (Phase 1) precedes the population enumeration (phase 2) usually scheduled during months of February and March of the census years. The house listing for census 2011 is already in progress.

House Listing Operation collects information on SCs & STs (see item 15 in the attached proforma):

Item 15: If SC* (1) or ST* (2) Other (3)
* Note: Scheduled Caste can be only from Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists and not from other religion. Schedule Tribe can be from any religion.

However, information on Religion is not collected during house listing operations. Since information on the SCs and STs are collected using a list provided by the government as a check list similar arrangement can be made to collect information on other castes but all clubbed in an additional category OBC (other backward classes). There is some logical problem in such an effort as it is the caste identity (not class) which will be used to classify them as ‘Other Backward Class’. Yet this is an easier process to compile OBC information provided there is a checklist of OBC castes provided by government of India.

OPTION 1:
Suggested format of the new Item 15 in the ‘house listing proforma:
if SC* (1) or ST* (2) OBC (3) Other (4)

However, this is not feasible now; due to the fact that the phase 1 or the house listing operation is already on all over India and it is too late to incorporate this information. Further according to news paper announcements, the caste data will be collected as an additional question – “what is your cast”. This question now can be asked only in phase 2 which is known as Population Enumeration Operation undertaken during March-April 2011. Since there is no ready list of OBCs for cross checking during the data collection stage itself, it has to be an open question asked immediacy after the questions on religion (Q. 7), SC (Q.8) and ST (Q.9) as follows:

Phase II : Population Enumeration| February –March 2011
Q. 7: Religion (Write name of the religion in full)
Q. 8: If Scheduled Caste, Write name of the SC from the list supplied
Q .9: If Scheduled Tribe, write name of the ST from the list supplied

OPTION 2:
Proposed Q.10: What is your Caste? _____________________

Such a question will generate a lot of caste reporting exclusive to each state and regions within state. Often the same caste is identified/pronounced and spelled differently and also the same caste has different status in different states. Collating such information subsequent to conclusion of Census will be a herculean effort and can be the basis for controversies. Therefore one needs to be clear and careful as to what kind of caste data have to be collected in Q.10 of the population enumeration proforma using the currently proposed question ‘what is your caste?’.

OPTION 3:
Another option is to consider collecting information only on ‘as to whether the individual belongs to a OBC category? As discussed earlier (see Option 1above) this can be done only if there is an approved list of OBCs provided apriori by Government of India. In the absence of approved OBC list, self-reported categorization will generate huge errors. Since, eliciting OBC information during enumeration will have to be done as an additional question after the question on religion there can be errors due to misreporting and confounding effects. Thus self-reporting of the OBC status will be affected considerably by the religious affiliation. Note that if the OBC information is collected during the house listing such errors would be low as no question on religion precedes. The recent debates on extension of ‘reservation’ benefits to individuals belonging to religions other than Hindus have indeed generated anxiety and also expectations especially amongst the minorities.

2. Possible Contamination of Census Information

India has a long uninterrupted history of undertaking census every 10 years since the late 19th century and certainly a regular pan-Indian census since the Independence. Indian Census is respected across the world for its quality and academic content. A lot of debates and research has fed the number and type of question to be included in the ‘house listing’ and ‘population enumeration’ exercises. It is useful to note that the last time caste information was collected was during census 1931.

Further, the concepts, definitions and questions are standardized in such a way that the inter-censal comparisons are possible. Such comparisons are the basis to evaluate a number of economic, social, educational and work/employment parameters for India and its many states and even districts. Therefore, any addition or alteration and even change in placement of a question, both in the listing and enumeration proforme can cause changes in the quality of data in other words can contaminate census information.

(a) For example, the errors in self-reported SCs/STs and OBCs category can be enormous by boosting the respective population shares which can prompt increase in the quota shares. This can happen because – those not SCs/STs may get motivated to report themselves as such; so will be the case for OBCs. Since the OBC reservation debate is in its peak one can expect an extra caution amongst the OBCs to ensure reporting; while there can also be misreporting thus boosting the share of OBCs in the population. Even communities with no caste identities may innovate or identify a caste for themselves.

(b) Distorted Occupations: It is likely that caste question can affect the reporting of occupations. The possibility is large due to expected gains offered by the government based on caste/occupation linked targeting such as programs for ‘weavers’ and so on. There can many other distortions or contamination of data.

3. What we know about OBC Identity? What can be Done?

‘Mid-Term Census’ (MTC)

There are two types of demands in the recent past with respect to additional data to be collected from the Indian decennial census. (a) The caste data with a focus on identifying correct share of OBCs since the Mandal commission linked reservations are based on old data from 1931 and not so valid local level surveys. (b) Another demand has been to collect information so as to assess the accessibility to the human capital enhancing government investments and provisioning of social services/safety nets.

It is therefore conceived that time is ripe for a ‘Mid-Term Census (MTC)’ say every five years after the main Census which can collected data on caste as well as on social parameters and other qualitative variables. The mega programs such as the MG-NREGA, PDS and ICDS have not been evaluated so as to find out the efficacy of the program and undertake cost benefit estimates. Further delinking such data collection through a MTC will help in keeping the comprehensive nature of the main census that too with no contamination which is essential in inter-censal comparisons. There are many other countries around the world who conduct census with 5 year interval. However, cost considerations will be important aspects in such a decision making, which is not enunciated in this note.

Special Surveys by Independent Agencies / National Sample Surveys

The other possibility is to commission special surveys and improve the scope and coverage of the National Sample Surveys. The current sample size in the NSSO is around two hundred thousand if both the central and state samples are merged. The NSSO in its 55th and 61st round have collected OBC data, so are a few other independent surveys such as the National Council of Applied Economic Research’s (NCAER) human development surveys, and the National Health and Family Surveys. The state specific distribution of population according to broad caste categories are presented in the following table and graphs. One notices a large disparity between states especially Kerala and West Bengal which needs further discussion.

Ways to accurately estimate the OBCs in India

2010-05-27T14:12:00.000+05:30

There is a renewed demand from many corners, especially a segment of political leadership to collect a citizen’s caste affiliation during the 2011 census of India. The GOI in principle has agreed to collect information on caste in 2011 census; but what is not clear is as to what kind of information on caste will be collected; will it be collected during the house listing operation or during the population census.
Operational Difficulties in Collecting Caste in Census 2011: The census is undertaken in two phases. A house listing operation (Phase 1) precedes the population enumeration (phase 2) usually scheduled during months of February and March of the census years. The house listing for census 2011 is already in progress. House Listing Operation collects information on SCs & STs - item 15 in the proforma. Once can expand this question by providing an addition option ‘OBC (3) and changing code of ‘Other’ to (4). Note also that information on Scheduled Caste is collected only from Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists and not from other religion; whereas Schedule Tribe can be from any religion. Since religion is not collected in this phase the OBC reporting will be free of divergent influences and overall this approach can work if the OBC check list is provided to enumerators in advance. But since the listing operation is already on all over India and it is too to collect caste/OBC information during the house listing operation.

According to news paper reports, it appears, that data on caste will be collected by asking a simple question “what is your cast?” during the census operations. This now can be done only in phase 2 known as Population Enumeration undertaken during March-April 2011. This kind of open question can be asked immediacy after the following questions:
Q. 7: Religion (Write name of the religion in full)
Q. 8: If Scheduled Caste, Write name of the SC from the list supplied
Q .9: If Scheduled Tribe, write name of the ST from the list supplied
Proposed Q.10: What is your Caste? _____________________

Such a question will generate a lot of caste reporting exclusive to each state and regions within state. Often a given caste is identified, pronounced and spelled differently; and sometimes same cast can assume differential status in other states. Collating such information subsequent to conclusion of Census will be a herculean effort and also cause for controversies. Therefore one needs to be clear and careful as to what kind of caste data to be collected during the population enumeration.

Therefore it is suggested that the Proposed Q.10 during enumeration phase should collect information only on ‘as to whether the individual belongs to a OBC category? This is best done if an approved list of OBCs is provided in advance. In the absence of approved OBC list, self-reported post enumeration categorization will be controversial. Yet eliciting OBC information during enumeration will have to be done as an additional question after the question on religion there can be errors due to misreporting and confounding effects. Recent debates on extension of ‘reservation’ benefits to individuals belonging to religions other than Hindus have generated anxiety and also expectations especially amongst the minorities.

Possible Contamination of Census Information : India has a long uninterrupted history of undertaking census every 10 years since the late 19th century and certainly a regular pan-Indian census since the Independence. Indian Census is respected across the world for its quality and academic content. A lot of debates and research has fed the number and type of question to be included in the ‘house listing’ and ‘population enumeration’ exercises. It is useful to note that the last time caste information was collected was during census 1931.

The concepts, definitions and questions are standardized in such a way that the inter-censal comparisons are possible. Such comparisons are the basis to evaluate a number of economic, social, educational and work/employment parameters for India and its many states and even districts. Therefore, any addition or alteration and even change in placement of a question, both in the listing and enumeration proforme can cause changes in the quality of data in other words can contaminate census information. For example, (a) the errors in self-reported SCs/STs and OBCs category can be enormous by boosting the respective population shares which can prompt increase in the quota shares. This can happen because – those not SCs/STs may get motivated to report themselves as such; so will be the case for OBCs. Since the OBC reservation debate is in its peak one can expect an extra caution amongst the OBCs to ensure reporting; while there can also be misreporting thus boosting the share of OBCs in the population. Even communities with no caste identities may innovate or identify a caste for themselves. (b) It is likely that caste question can affect the reporting of occupations. The possibility is large due to expected gains offered by the government based on caste/occupation linked targeting such as programs for ‘weavers’ and so on. There can many other distortions or contamination of data.

What can be Done? It appears the demand for caste census emerges from the need to know the accurate size of the OBC communities. Since data on the SCs and STs are regularly collected since 1951 census, there is no issue relating to these categories. Thus the focus should be on identifying correct size and share of OBCs, since the Mandal commission linked reservations are based on old data from 1931 and not so valid local level surveys. The quinnqunnel National Sample Surveys are undertaken about five years apart and they are most respected for quality and consistency of data. Current sample size is over one hundred and fifty thousand households rural and urban households. Fortunately, India also hosts independent survey research organizations such as the National Council of Applied Economic Research which can execute such surveys with ease and accuracy. Should there is a need one can devise a multi-level multi-stratum sample sizes so as to provide the estimates of the religion specific size and share of OBCs in each of the Indian state and regions within the larger states of India. Such estimates will keep the chastity of the Indian census intact while proving accurate data for devising pro-poor social policies in India.

LATEST PUBLICATION: Human Development in India

2010-04-06T15:16:00.002+05:30

NEWS Report | http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/article381832.ece

2010-04-05T11:18:00.000+05:30

Sachar member laments low spending on Muslims' welfare
Vidya Subrahmaniam | The Hindu | April 3, 2010

Keywords: Sachar Committee, Muslims, Ministry of Minority Affairs

Abusaleh Shariff, member-secretary of the Rajinder Sachar Committee on the status of Muslims, is angry and upset. He thinks the United Progressive Alliance government has not done enough to push the cause of Muslims' welfare.

Talking to The Hindu, Dr. Shariff said: “It is more than three years since the Committee's report established the pitiable socio-economic status of Indian Muslims. I am saddened and depressed that in all this time there has been more talk about Sachar than action.”

As a case in point, he refers to the Ministry of Minority Affairs' Minority Concentration Districts (MCDs) programme. The largest of the Ministry's schemes, the MCD programme gets the lion's share of the Ministry's budgetary allocation. In the current budget, the Ministry's overall allocation went up from Rs. 1,740 crore to Rs. 2,600 crore. The MCD programme's share correspondingly went up from Rs. 889.50 crore to Rs. 1,204.20 crore.

Dr. Shariff maintains that this increase is eyewash. “This is deceiving people” he says, because so far hardly any of the MCD amount has been spent by the States. The Ministry's own figures establish “the dismal state of affairs.” Only five States reported spending any of the MCD money. The rest did not even bother to send a progress report.

The five States in turn picked up only tiny amounts, averaging an expenditure of just 8 per cent of the funding approved for them. The total cost of MCD projects approved by the Ministry as of December 31, 2009 was Rs.1,821.50 crore. Against this, the Ministry's account books show an expenditure of only Rs. 142.40 crore. The highest MCD spender was Uttar Pradesh which lifted 14.3 per cent of the total approved cost of Rs. 582.30 crore. Haryana followed with 12.8 per cent and West Bengal with 6 per cent.

Initiated in 2007, the MCD programme identified 90 districts in 20 States for targeted focus, based on parameters of backwardness and a minority population criterion of at least 25 per cent. Most MCDs are expectedly Muslim-dominated.

Mr. Shariff accepts that a lot of government schemes suffer from underutilisation of funds. However, when underutilisation touches 92 per cent, then “I would think that the lapse is intentional.” He gives the counter example of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, where the fund utilisation averages around 70 per cent.

In an interview to The Hindu in September 2009, Minority Affairs Minister Salman Khursheed lamented that his Ministry was not able to touch the lives of ordinary Muslims. To be effective, the Ministry needed to have greater powers, he said.

Structure of Food Crisis in Rural India

2010-04-01T14:28:00.000+05:30

It is generally believed that since cultivation is undertaken in rural areas, the rural households do not face food stress and food price increase is not any issue. Surely, food production is a rural phenomenon but since upto one half of rural households are either land less or hold small and unproductive land, such households are subjected to sever food shortages. During the visits to rural areas in three states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, it was possible to find out the barest minimum amount of income needed for a typical family to ensure food consumption (the kind of food which is normally consumed in rural areas) and meet other expenditures on minimum needs. This amount works out to be Rs. 31, 600 per annum; but a large number of rural households are unable to earn this sum, and there is a shortage ranging from Rs. 7,400 in MP, 6,400 in UP and 4,300 in Karnataka. The shortfall of Rs. 7,400 for a family of 5 members, for example, in MP is despite income accruing to the family from agriculture of Rs. 5,600, from wages of Rs. 7,500, sale of agricultural by products worth Rs. 2,000, from cattle Rs. 4,000, a total of 4,220 subsidy / cash transfers received from a number of public programs such as PDS, NREGA, ICDS, MMD and pension schemes, and also Rs.900 on average received in remittances. The multiplicity in source of income itself is a strategy to ensure adequate income receipts but the cost of living even rural areas is higher for over one third of households, if not more.

We also measured food eaten by all the family members a day before the date of visit to the households. Overall all the daily consumption of cereal per person is estimated to be 540 gm in urban and 462 gm in rural areas. As expected individuals in the working ages of 15-49 years large amounts with the exception of urban areas in UP and MP where those aged 50 + consume largest quantities. In urban areas, older men and women consume 219 grams of vegetable per capita and in rural areas all adults consume just about 162 grams. Although milk consumption is relatively high in urban areas, and amongst the older ages the amount consumed is a meagerly 75-85 ml and the average is around 55 ml in rural areas. It is only in Karnataka we found that children less than 14 year old are give relatively larger amounts of milk compared to adults which is encouraging. Further, we found that adult males who consume more, but female children consume relatively more than the boys is all states. There is no differential in consumption of food items amongst men and women in the working age group. However, again female children are found to consume more vegetables compared to the boys. It is only in case of milk that boys have better consumption compared with girls, and this can also be a reason for relatively lower intake of cereals and vegetables amongst boys.

Food Consumption a day previous to interview
by place of residence and age of individual

State All cereals (gm) All Vegetables (gm) Milk (ml)
0 to 14 15 to 49 50 + 0 to 14 15 to 49 50 + 0 to 14 15 to 49 50 +
Rural
All 347 493 462 117 163 162 61 53 71
UP 335 478 477 103 144 153 63 40 67
MP 376 587 548 111 159 151 55 56 77
Karnataka 310 396 392 155 188 178 71 64 71
Urban
All 314 487 540 137 190 219 85 75 77
UP 367 562 750 124 163 166 56 67 86
MP 373 580 635 135 176 209 60 78 78
Karnataka 292 420 407 158 218 261 98 55 55
Delhi 260 460 458 132 184 194 111 105 127
Source: Author’s estimates - food quantities are measured from 559 deprived households of UP, MP, Karnataka and Delhi
during September to November 2009.

In the following we narrate typologies which help in explaining behavioral differentials and other characteristics of residents with respect of response to food price increase. Broadly, people’s responses can be differentiated based on ‘perceptions’, ‘opportunities’, idiosyncratic shocks’, ‘social networks’ and ‘safety nets’ one experiences with.

Perception: The way quality of life is understood differ considerably between rural and urban areas, reflecting the exposure to the level of modernization, for example in urban areas which broadly vary according to size of town, and intensity and quality of public infrastructure and governance. Rural life style is sedentary and the one anchored upon contentment with limited demands if any. Such behavioral variation is both a virtue and a curse. ‘Virtue’ to the extent that it makes their limited life style manageable and perceptible desire to lead a content life; where as a ‘Curse’ when households are unable to benchmark or even understand the mechanisms to improve standard of life at a minimum or comfortable level as recognized by modern standards; for example minimum levels of schooling, basic levels of nutrition, health and hygienic conditions, housing and so on. Therefore, the food price response differs considerably as to variation in food habits and extent to which communities and households depend upon non-local markets to access culturally appropriate food products when not self-produced.

Opportunities: Large variations are noticed in terms of opportunities that the communities and households have not only for earning income but also to interact with markets. Rudimentary nature of local labor market often sustained based one exchange labor and non-monetized considerations at least in rural areas is causing labor mobility which can be characterized as migrant labor. One finds a considerable economic prosperity amongst households having at least one member as a labor migrant, but often one finds the whole families migrating out for short periods of 4-8 months, but also for much longer time periods. Most of the households in the urban periphery are migrants from rural out backs, and it appears they are pushed out of rural life both by expectations as well as economic stress, while some are able to capitalize upon their skills and education, most have fallen deeper in to poverty trap due to confrontation with urban monetized and somewhat standardized life and their inability to meet those expectations. What is clearly evident is a complex urban sociology and economy which in some places provides for a living and for a few others opportunities do not exist. Such situations are highly local but it would be possible to profile urban living standards through further research which is not common in the context of south Asia, especially India. Generally the poor both in rural and urban areas are afraid of market dependence to ensure supply of cereals and other basic food products.

Amongst the poorer rural households, average land holding is very low so is the land productivity; further they own few productive assets and lack irrigation. Over and above the drought caused during July-August 2009 have made all of such households vulnerable to food stress. The SC-families have smaller land holdings and land owned is of lower productivity which in fact was allotted by government agencies under different schemes. The net (of seeds) yield of the main crops of paddy and wheat was found to be around 6 quintals per acre, but due to draught paddy got damaged. The local wage work opportunities are far too low and wage rates range between Rs. 50 and Rs. 60/- per day of work.

Idiosyncratic Shocks: Households with deep food stress do have highly specified situations which differ as per the household situations, for example inability to sustain livestock due to sheer poverty, or inaccessibility to common property resource such as grazing lands or even lack of a member who can take care of cattle and so on. Female headed households do face difficulty in undertaking cultivation and therefore lease out land with low home grown food access which increase vulnerability. In both rural and urban areas ill-health causes extreme degree of idiosyncratic shocks causing conditions of food deficit and malnutrition. Strict adherence to cultural values in case of marriage, birth and death related ceremonies can push households into penury and in many cases irreversible thus exposing such households for extreme food stress.

Social Networks: Informal social networks are some of the most durable extensions of India family values which provide considerable amounts of safety nets. Rural areas across India are in advantageous situations where social networks do work in support to sustain food smoothening; but the situation in the urban peripheries is different due to unclear linkages, rather a breakdown of social networks. Lack of social environment in towns can be attributed to peripheral societies build upon migration often from rural areas. But another fact which accentuates the urban-anonymity and lack of networks is the fact that households in specified urban localities face situations which are equally stressful thus making social networks redundant. Such differential social typologies are crucial for withstanding extreme food related stress in India.

Safety nets: Often it is argued that since urban areas by definition have higher concentration of social, economic and market institutions the urban households do not require targeted safety nets. We do find that the rural areas have a relatively better coverage of safety nets of various kinds although; the efficacy and utilization vary between villages and also different types of households. But one finds absence of such safety net schemes in urban locales. On the other hand urban areas do have concentration of both social and physical infrastructure managed both by the public and private initiatives; but the poor living in fringes in towns and cities have limited access to them due to lack of their integration into the urban system. Often such families do not hold for example PDS cards, nor will they be listed as eligible beneficiaries for social protection schemes due to unclear domiciliary conditions. Such a situation was clearly noticeable in case of Delhi, but also in other larger towns/cities such as Kanpur in UP and Kolar in Karnataka.

Any reform in the public polices in India are affected not so much as to what and why but HOW to identify the right household, group of households, villages and communities. The above profiling of the poor will help policy makers to devise better methodologies for targeting the poverty alleviation programs.

Food prices and coping mechanism in India

2010-02-27T20:19:00.000+05:30

Debates abound, in the recent months, as to the steep increase in inflation in India and a substantial contribution from the primary food articles. This obviously is a matter of great concern to the government, the civil society and consumers alike. Since food is consumed on a daily basis and most households undertake daily purchases, it is imperative to find out how poorer households cope with high food inflation and sustain their food consumption.

In the following we investigate: (1) whether the food inflation is accurately captured through the WPI- inflation monitoring; and (2) how do the households in rural and urban areas cope, so as to smoothen food consumption.

Prices: Inflation which is benchmarked on the wholesale price index underestimates the impact of food prices due to low weightage attached to the group of food products, for example, the food group as a whole has a weight of just over a quarter, and food grains have only a 5 % weight. In reality (estimated from household survey) these proportions are 51% and 19.2% in rural and 41% and 16% in urban areas. Therefore, food price increase is not adequately factored in inflation figures provided by government agencies. Given this situation, if the government claims that food price increase indeed is one of the factors for high inflation, it should mean an unprecedented and very high price increase in food articles indeed.

Further citizens normally take newspaper reporting seriously to make judgments about the food inflation. Often the retail market prices collected from urban neighborhoods do not correctly reflect prices due to large discrepancy with the wholesale market prices of the same food items. Further, for food items other than vegetables and fruits it is essential to take a short to medium (as opposed to immediate) term view by tracking prices say on a weekly, monthly and seasonal basis. This article gleams over monthly data for over 25 food items from 78 towns and cities spread all over India since April 2006 to October 2009 period. The size of the town/city is a good proxy for size of market as well as proximity to the source of supply, normally the rural areas. An interesting pattern emerges. Small town having less than one lakh population are the cheapest for unprocessed food items such as whole wheat, paddy and rice, unprocessed milk and so on. The processed food items such as wheat atta, polished rice and packed milk are found to be priced high in large towns above 25 lakh population. But the contrast is in wheat and atta. While wheat prices are least in small towns, wheat atta is priced highest in small towns compared with the larger ones. The wheat flour is priced between 40% to 50% higher than the whole wheat prices in small towns. Other processed food items also cost exorbitantly high in small towns and rural areas. However, towns with 1-5 lakh population are the cheapest for both rice and wheat in India suggesting that they maximize gains from nearness to source of supply, as well as possible scale economics in business and also because of location of processing industries. Rice price increases as size of town/city increase and thus affects the poor living in larger towns and cities the most. The price of pulses and sugar has recorded unprecedented increase during the 2009-10 periods and affects both rural and urban areas equally. There is a broad based increase in prices of food items in India and the momentum of this increase has built up during 2007-8 and is continuing during the 2010.

Coping Mechanisms: There are noteworthy rural-urban consumption differentials in India – rural households consume more of cereals so is the case for poorer households. Consumption of quality and value added foods are high in urban areas and amongst the richer households. Price wield large and dominant impact even on consumption of rice and wheat, generally considered price inelastic. Therefore, self production of these cereals has considerably strong impact on sustaining consumption. It is instructive to note that 36 % of wheat and 32% of rice requirement are met through self-grown agriculture. Another 11% of wheat and 14% of rice requirement is met by the Public Distribution System. Thus even in the rural areas one half of the all wheat and rice requirement is met by open market purchases. As expected 92% of wheat and 84 per cent of rice requirement of urban households is met by open markets, and only about 5 % wheat and 11% rice requirement is met of PDS in urban area.

Relatively poorer households try to depend less on markets but they fall short of home grown food at least in rural areas, consequently their dependence upon the PDS supply is large. One finds that PDS has reached rural areas and there is also a great demand for supplies. However, the PDS supply is irregular and insufficient due to state specific bureaucratic failure, leakage and large exclusion and inclusion errors in targeting. Urban areas show unfair distribution of BPL cards compared with rural parts although the mismatch is considerable in both place of residences. Further the targeted PDS program is poor in states where poverty is high such as Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Chhattisgarh.

It is essential to find out the share of expenditure on cereals to total food so as to find out how relative prices impact the poor. Cereal shares are about 35% in rural and 27 % in urban areas; but a disturbing fact is that relatively poor spend substantial higher shares on cereals compared to relatively richer. Therefore, any cereal price increase is going to impact the poor the most. Therefore, it is absolutely essential to keep a check on unusually high price rise of cereals from the consumers’ point of view, yet it is imperative that incentives are built so as to directly benefit the farmers who will sustain cultivation of cereals. Another aspect which provides deeper understanding is the fact that bottom 20 % (poorest) households spend almost all their disposable income in urban and 72 % higher than the disposable income in rural areas on food. This suggests that there is an urgent need to build food security for the rural poor much more than the urban poor although at the outset it appears that it is the urban poor who gets affected by the food price inflation.

In conclusion, it is essential to emphasize, that there has to be a prudent price management scheme for both wheat and rice in India. Further it is imperative that appropriate amount of income transfer is effected either through the PDS or food / cash vouchers schemes. The key is in the ability of the state to identify the poor dispassionately and through a systematic methodology. Keeping a close watch on market price of food items must become inherent part of public policy. It appears India is not yet amenable for free market in food products although experiments in crafting exclusive agricultural markets for exports and strengthening supply chains to organized and supermarkets can continue.

Economic Times OPED

2010-01-25T10:45:00.000+05:30

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5496832.cms

Poverty Reduction and Poverty Creation in India

2010-01-15T20:40:00.000+05:30

Do they happen concurrently and for what reason?

Summary of a recent paper entitled 'The Irrelevance of National Strategies:
Rural Poverty Creation and Reduction in States of India' jointly written with
Anirudh Krishna of the Duke University, USA

There are only a few controversial and somewhat puzzling economic dimensions which are academically unresolved and subject to serious debates. While there is recognition about the speed and direction of growth scenario suggesting India’s arrival on the global economic scene, what is puzzling at the same time is not only the continued prevalence of poverty but also a possible increase over the past decade, at least in the rural hinterland. Poverty measurement is an unsettled issue, both conceptually and methodologically. In fact, since poverty is a process as well as an outcome; many come out of it while others may be falling into it. The net effect of these two parallel processes is a proportion commonly identified as the ’head count ratio’, but these ratios hide the fundamental dynamism that characterizes poverty in practice. Note that the most recent poverty re-estimates using a supposedly refined methodology by a Government of India expert group has also missed this crucial dynamism (Report of the Expert Group to Review the Methodology for Estimation of Poverty, 2009. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission). Studies carried out by one of the authors of this article, in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Rajasthan have, however, helped bring to light the essential fact of poverty dynamics: which is simultaneously both created and reduced. Some households fall into poverty, becoming the new poor; other households concurrently escape from poverty.

Following up on these insights, we examined, for the first time in India, a nationally-representative panel data set for more than 13,000 households studied in 1993-94 and re-interviewed in 2004-05. We found that while 18.2 percent of the rural population moved out of poverty, another 22.1 per cent fell into it over this twelve-year period. This net increase of four percentage points was found to have a considerable variation across states and regions. In states, such as Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Rajasthan and West Bengal, where more people moved out of poverty than fell into poverty, there has been an overall decline in rural poverty. Conversely, rural poverty increased in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh, where descents into poverty were more numerous than escapes from poverty.

States – as well as regions within states – differ from one another. Some have high descent rates but low escape rates; in a few other states, both descent and escape rates are low. Different combinations of poverty policies will be required in states that are characterized by different patterns of escaping poverty and falling into poverty. A typology emerging from our analysis is presented below:

Consider the upper-left cell which lists regions that have most successfully reduced poverty over the 12-year reference period, because a high escape rate went together with a low descent rate. Two small states, Kerala and Himachal Pradesh, and another group of states (Assam and the Northeast) fall within this high-performing group. A poor person in India is best-off living within some region of this cell: the probability is highest that her circumstances will improve over time. For a contrasting situation, consider the bottom-right cell, characterized by low escape rates and high descent rates. Compared to other regions in India, the prospect for poor people in these regions is bleak; chances for further impoverishment are the highest. Future efforts in this region will do well to concentrate, first, on lowering the high rate of descent, and second, on ramping up the low escape rate.

A more nuanced prognosis emerges for regions included within the off-diagonal cells. Consider, for example, the two regions belonging to the bottom-left cell (Karnataka- Inland Southern, and Madhya Pradesh-Vindhya). A high escape rate within these regions has been compromised by a concurrently high descent rate. Future poverty reduction efforts in these regions should focus primarily on reducing the high rate of descent into poverty. It makes greater sense to raise the escape rate only after the high risk of falling into poverty has been brought under control. The opposite policy prescription seems appropriate for regions of the top-right cell. In Maharashtra-Eastern and Haryana-Western, additional resources should be deployed primarily for raising poor people’s chances of escape.

Thus, different policy mixes, combining different elements of prevention (against descents into poverty) and support (for escaping poverty), are required in diverse regions and states. A uniform national poverty policy will not be effective for entire states, far less for the entire country.

A Typology of Poverty of States and Regions in India
Escape Rate
High (43.0-21.3) Medium (21.2-15.9) Low (15.8-4.4)
Descent Rate Low (18.7-9.1) Assam & Northeast AP-Coastal Maharashtra -Eastern
Karnataka - Coastal, Ghats, & Inland Eastern Punjab-Northern Haryana-Western
Kerala AP-Inland Southern
WB-Himalayan
WB-Central Plains
Himachal Pradesh
Rajasthan-Western
Rajasthan-North-Eastern
Bihar-Jharkhand
West Bengal-Eastern Plains
Medium (24.7-18.8) Gujarat-Plains Northern UP-Western MP-South Western
TN-Coastal & Coastal Northern TN-Southern Orissa-Coastal & Southern
Rajasthan-Southern & South-Eastern UP-Uttaranchal Gujarat-Saurashtra & Dry areas
Bihar-Central Maharashtra-Inland Western & Coastal
MP-Chhattisgarh
Punjab-Southern
MP-South
Gujarat-Eastern & Plains Southern
Haryana-Eastern
High (47.4-24.8) Karnataka -Inland Southern UP-Eastern & Central Orissa-Northern
MP-Vindhya Maharashtra-Inland Eastern Maharashtra-Inland Central
Bihar-Northern TN-Inland
Karnataka-Inland Northern AP-Inland Northern
MP-Malwa
Maharashtra-Inland Northern
MP-Northern
AP-South Western
MP-Central

What kinds of policies and programs will help prevent descents into poverty? And what kinds of programs and policies are required to promote escapes from poverty? We examined the escapes and the descents that have occurred in rural India between 1993 and 2005, and we identified the factors that mattered for each of these trends. A few factors are involved with both escapes and descents, but there is also another group of factors that affect only escape or only descent.

Factors significantly associated both with escape and descent : Age of household head, household size, household composition (reflected by the variable “male advantage”), households with telephones (land lines or mobile), change in the share of rural non-farm income (RNFY), remittances, women’s media exposure, and loan taken in last five years.
Factors associated with escape but not with descent: A few other factors influence escapes but do not matter much for descents. These factors include being a member of ‘minority other than Muslim’, presence of adult son during the previous period (1993), and that the household was located within 5 km of nearest town with the availability of bus stop. Sickness within households had an adverse effect.
Factors associated with descent but not with escape: A household belonging to SC, ST or OBC faced a significantly greater risk of descent into poverty, whereas having the head of the household educated to secondary level or higher reduced the risk of descent. Possession of land and other assets reduced the risk of descent. Significantly, such rural assets were not germane to escapes from poverty.

States with high and low growth rates have variously experienced high and low rates of escape and descent. No clear correlation exists at the level of states and regions between high growth rates and higher poverty reduction. Thus, to claim that “growth of aggregate consumption/income is a sufficient condition for poverty reduction,” as one influential government document does, is hardly an appropriate or adequate policy prescription. Rather than waiting for growth to occur and work its putative magic, direct actions to reduce poverty are necessary.

Action along two fronts is simultaneously required: descents into poverty must be prevented using context-specific measures even as escapes from poverty are promoted vigorously. Different escape and descent rates characterize diverse states and separate regions within states. The reasons that matter for escape and descent also differ considerably across and within states. Considering only the aggregate results obscures these important differences. Diverse policy designs are required in order to deal with these different trends. Any uniform national policy does not, therefore, represent the best use of resources. State- and region-specific threats and opportunities must be separately identified and directly addressed.

Publications of Interest

2009-12-15T11:25:00.000+05:30

Recent Publications:
‘Assessment of Outreach and Benefits of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme of India’ accepted for publication in Indian Journal of Labor Economics, 52 (2): June 2009.

On Shelves

Handbook of Muslims in India: Empirical and Policy Perspectives; Edited jointly with Rakesh Basant; New Delhi: Oxford University Press (ISBN13: 9780198062059 | ISBN10: 0198062052) December 2009.

Rural Income and Employment Diversity in India during 1994 and 2005

2009-12-15T11:20:00.000+05:30

‘Rural Income and Employment Diversity in India during 1994 and 2005’, Journal of Developing Societies, 25(2): June 2009.

Summary: – This paper assesses the structure of rural income and employment according to source in India. It probes the size and role of ‘rural nonfarm employment’ in poverty alleviation. Data from two nationally representative rural sample surveys (33230 and 27010 households respectively) with reference years 1993-4 and 2004-5 are subjected to multinomial logit and CLAD regressions to explore importance of diversity of income sources across states and regions. These are rare data on direct household income estimates in the multi-model survey context having advantage of many household and village level determinants suitable for advanced analysis. Evidence suggests considerable income diversification over the reference decade, but distribution of shares suggests that top most quintile draw almost all of the benefits of recent economic growth in India. The economic linkage between the RNFE and rural wage rates has reduced and almost not existent during the later reference year in analysis.

Key Words: rural nonfarm employment (RNFE), Labor shares, changeover 1993-4 and 2004-5, income productivity, wage determination, Rural India

The Future Shock Revisited: India should Lead not Plead Climate Change Negotiations

2009-12-08T12:21:00.001+05:30

It was 1970 when Alvin Toffler’s book Future Shock shook the imagination of millions in developing countries as to how the western way of life and markets threatened the future of humanity. His shock was emanated not only from the western ‘waste’ or ‘greed’ but also from the ‘pace of change that took place’ since the second war and great depression – in other words the miracle of the free market. It is the same free market that we are now after to seek solutions for mitigating the impact of climate change; while the same western economies are contemplating ‘punitive’ carbon tariffs and taxes which can threaten the very development of the developing societies. Market disorientation and not just a psychological one, is round the corner which threatens the very development of emerging India.

At the turn of 21st century we are at the verge of another ‘Shock’ that will be felt directly not by us but our progeny. The scientists say that the current CO_2 emission concentration has reached 430 parts per million in 2008 which is 17% higher than 280 ppm before the industrial revolution. Such a fast change and given much larger and faster industrialization process it is likely to cross over 1200 ppm by the end of this century which can lead to 50C increase in global temperature. Note that the world have experienced about as much, 50C increase in temperature since the ice age which was long-long ago. Thus we are at the verge of another ‘Future Shock’ that too with ‘the pace of change that we have never ever experienced in the past’.

India’s position in global climate change can be gauged through two well researched numbers:

Comparative Energy Use Criteria: It is estimated that in 2005 India needed 201 Kgs per capita of coal equivalent to sustain its overall economy. Compare this with the USA which expended 60 time more coal equivalent energy per capita than India; The UK, Germany and USSR did about 30 times more; and , Brazil, China and Turkey about 3 time more compared with what India used.

The second comparison is of the direct CO_2 Emissions: India contributes just about 2 tonnes of CO_2 equivalent per person, compared with Australia and USA which contributes over 12 times more; Japan and the EU about 5 times, and China and Brazil about 3 times more than India. Even in such an outcome measure India stands out to be inconsequential. A good comparison however is between China and USA. While China, being most populous in the world, adds a total of 7.2 billion tonnes of CO_2 in absolute terms, and the USA adds 7.1 billion tonnes due to very high per capita use. India with least amount of percapita emissions does add 1.9 billion tonnes of CO_2 in absolute measure due to the second highest population size. On the other hand Australia which has the highest per capita amount contributes just about one half of a billion tonnes.

The evidence that India is not a delinquent yet and its contribution to the global pollution is probably the least measured through both the ‘use’ and ‘outcome per capita’ terms gets somewhat dented when absolute contribution is looked into. This absolute contribution is what makes India an important player in the game of climate change, and it should use this as an opportunity. Although India is an economy which is trapped between the first wave (agricultural revolution) and the second wave (industrial revolution); it has shown its mark even in the third wave (IT based super industrialization) of economic growth. India appears unique where two-thirds labor force is trapped in farming and unorganized sector employment; but has fairly large industrial and manufacturing base (notwithstanding cars and steel) yet also in the forefront of services sector growth which now contributes closer to 60 % of GDP. No country on the earth faces all these three different economic growth phases that too at the same time! Large number of households follows sedentary agrarian lifestyle, burning wood, consumption of barely processed cereals; self produced food and other local items and so on; while at the same time India is now considered one of the largest market for modern goods and services. Indian enigma and puzzle continue in this modern age as well.

Now the Dharma Sankat is who should share the burden of global warming. It appears fair and logical that the per capita basis should be the benchmark; but there is danger lurking that Lord Brahma can get annihilated sooner than later. Since the Copenhagen Summit is more likely to put some acceptable benchmarks for the future policies, it is important for India to be leading rather than pleading. It is neither a matter of national shame nor will it mean abrogating national sovereignty to take a proactive role in international negotiations by announcing a willingness to do our bit to the World unilaterally. While doing so it is common and often needed to seek partners and promote coalitions and in this case it appears it is India, China, Brazil, USA and possibly Russia. Note that India has done well by partnering with both erstwhile superpowers – (USA and Russia notwithstanding continuing rivalry between the two) through respective nuclear deals which are complimentary and benefitting India. In my view it is the farsightedness and firmness of Dr. Manmohan Singh that has prevailed in these missions not only to withstand the domestic opposition, but also negotiating with the outside world while keeping the interest of the poor and industry at the same time. If this is not a cleaver tight rope walking success then what else can it be? It would be fair to ask the opposition voices within the Indian Parliament not to behave like sulking kids while unaware of the pressures of future energy needs and responsible global partnerships in issues as sensitive as climate change.

Note that not far ago, it was India who took a firm stand against opening of the Indian Agriculture almost stalling the relevance of Doha round of WTO negotiations. It is difficult to judge whether this stand is good or bad, but a stand was taken which has maintained the statusquo with respect to the subsistence agriculture. But the weakness of India is in its ignorance - we have little if at all research and knowledge about our own way of life including way of production, consumption and sustenance of life. This can also be said about as to how we are drawing upon resources to meet the energy needs. India must take a lead in generating knowledge through research on as to how to mitigate and arrest the adverse impacts of global warming. India indeed can be a laboratory for assessing climate change impact on a range of agro-climatic and geographical regions since it is one of most diverse country on earth so far as natural formations are concerned.

There is a growing debate that large climate changes are already underway through global warming, and that it adversely affects agriculture, food security and sustainability of long term growth in India and other parts of South Asia. The evidence is an increase in levels of temperatures which could cause havoc in physical systems for example, by disappearing glaciers in the Himalayan mountain range which could flood large tracks of cultivable lands in the foot hills and indo-gangetic plains of northern India. The warming on the other hand can be increasing the occurrence of drought and depletion of arable land in the Deccan plateau. Besides, the global causes which are increasing average temperatures even in South Asia, common practices such as increasing use of fossil fuels, burning of wood and biomass for domestic use, and also fast pace of deforestation is enhancing adverse effect of climate change in both physical and biological systems in this region. Indiscriminate overexploitation of ground water for cultivation has become one of the major problems facing Indian agriculture during the recent years. It is therefore important to find out if there are processes or programs which are intended to mitigate the impact of climate change or identify parameters which will help devise adaptation strategies to overcome adverse impact of climate change.

There is a need to conceptualize and devise a comprehensive ‘natural resources framework (NRF)’ which will encompass both exogenous and endogenous relationships and facilitate assessment of the net effects between economic activities and climate change. The literature consists of a number of approaches to measure the forward link namely economic impacts of climate change but not the endogenous association of climate change due to enhanced economic activity. Climate change resulting from human causes has been increasing during the past few decades (United Nations Environment Program, 2007), especially due to human and animal activity, and change in land use patterns such as multiple cropping, alternative use of land such as deforestation for crop cultivation, and urbanization and so on. Further, there are factors known as ‘feedbacks’ that amplify or reduce effects on climate change; for example conflicting role of ‘water vapor’ on agricultural production. It would be appropriate in this context to assess the role of mega government work program namely the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The nregs linked manual labor inputs are being used to sustain and create for example small water bodies, undertake rain water harvesting and appropriately mend the water flow of streams and brooks so as to improve the micro-water sheds across rural India.
In this connection we can further explore if we have a record of practices that promote pollution and ill health; either due to our cultural practices or sheer poverty, and lack of modern knowledge including limited infrastructure and so on. Practically all our energy (electricity) needs are met by burning cheap and bad quality coal, our hearths are warmed up burning wood and agricultural residue, inefficient technologies are used to drain the ground water table causing desertification of large tracks of farming land and also causing salination in the coastal areas. We already are experiencing pressures on access to potable water even in such places which hitherto considered easy sources in our forest areas. Whether, all these cause and effects are due to climate change or not is not what we need to be debating about, but as to how to address these issues for our own good, lest climate change accentuates already prevailing adverse effects.

It is important also to know that we are not alone in this world of 7 billion and growing. The El Nino/La Nina effect of southern Pacific can reach as far as India and this natural phenomenon has been scientifically validated. There is no reason to suspect that ‘climate change’ is not going to affect us Indians in a global context. Then let us build upon the national pride and economic might that India has acquired during last two decades, and be a change agent and leader in the context of Copenhagen not be apologetic about it.

Gender Empowerment in India: Concepts and Measurements

2009-09-20T11:22:00.000+05:30

I: INTRODUCTION

A lot is now spoken and written about the need for gender sensitive inclusive development in developing economies such as India (GOI, 11th plan document, GOI, 2009). The gender sensitivity was heralded to be essential in assessing social and economic development by the UNDP which computes a ‘human’ and another ‘gender (adjusted) development’ index, and presents a conceptual scheme on ‘gender empowerment measure’ (HDR 1995). In the following we present a set of variables which integrate both the ‘gender adjustment’ and ‘empowerment measures’ and compute a single ‘gender empowerment index (GEI)’. The GEI further eliminates three constraints the UNDP concepts face, firstly that the GEI aggregates multi-dimensional concepts and dimensions of empowerment; secondly the variables are socio-culturally sensitive to India; and that the new index can be estimated not only at the level of a nation but also at the level of states and lower level of geographic units within a country.

Practically all countries in the world that are identified as ‘developed’ are in unison for having provided equality of opportunity and access to women in all spheres of economy, society and polity. Such inclusiveness was possible not only through formal legal provisions but also as a matter of democratization of political system. Further, the process of inclusiveness of women in development was concurrent to increase in real incomes of households which was controlled and managed by women themselves; often such income was individually earned by them. In the context of developing societies such as the democratic India, where patriarchal social values are still in vogue, understanding women’s empowerment is somewhat complicated. Given a large canvas of social, economic, political and household level dimensions, empirically measuring women’s contributions across India and many States is not easy. This paper identifies the core concepts that are socio-culturally relevant and uses the empirical measures to compute a Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) for the mid-period of first decade in 21st century. The variables identified are those which capture the essence of the six main dimensions which together define gender empowerment efficiently, namely; (i) women’s level of human capital formation, (ii) women work participation, (iii) women’s capacity for household decision making, (iv) women’s control over resource and self assertion, (v) women’s control over reproduction, and (vi) woman’s political participation.

What follows in section 2 is a description of the generic concepts relating to empowerment found in literature; the gender relevance in the Indian context or a conceptual framework within which gender empowerment is articulated in section 3. Section 4 introduces the dimensions which encompass gender empowerment and the variables which help measure them; and estimates of the index values and state ranks as well as ranks according to social and economic characteristics are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications.

II: GENERIC CONCEPTS AND EMPOWERMENT

International literature on gender often highlights an important facet of societal decision making namely agency which is a desire and ability of the society and households to delegate responsibility to woman so that they take decisions independent of men and traditional- institutional support. The role of women's agency in the expansion of social opportunities for both women and men is considered to eliminate gender inequality (Dreze and Sen, 1999, 2000). Empirical research has found out that household decision attributed to women especially when interacted with education yield better human capital formation through investments in children’s education and health and also reduce gender bias (Schultz 1995, Shariff 1995. Another evidence has been feminization of agriculture, in the Indian context the skeptics use this as an evidence of distress but one can look at this phenomenon as empowerment of women instead (see Duvvury 1998, Shariff 2009). A related issue is of control - over resources (http://www.un.org/womenwatch/); for example, women normally use number of resources but they do not own or have control over them. For example, research highlights as to how little control women have over resources; none at all in case of land and only limited control over food crops for example in Uganda (FAO, 2008). The situation in India is not be any better in this regard since the rules of asset ownership is governed by complicated patriarchic system of inheritance and also because women move over husband’s place of co-residence after marriage . In its first ever gender gap study covering 58 nations, the World Economic Forum (http://www.weforum.org/) ranked India a lowly 53. Titled 'The Women's Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap', the report measures the gap between women and men in five critical areas namely economic participation, economic opportunity, political empowerment, access to education and access to reproductive health care.

Since the gender dimensions are far too many and condition of women varies according to different social, economic and political settings, it is not ordinarily possible to standardize the number and type of variables, measurements and framework of analysis to be used. The UNDP methodology of international comparisons chose variables that are easy to collect and but at high levels of aggregation such as a country. Although many countries are adopting the UNDP method to create disaggregated measures at lower geographic units, it is argued in this paper that these efforts do not adequately capture the socio-cultural context of the gender empowerment within a nation. Any adaptation therefore should take the conceptual relevance and application inherent in choice of variables and its national level appropriateness in to account.

The framework of analysis and choice of variables in this paper are guided by the evolving ideas on gender deprivation over time (more below) as well as availability of dependable data to empirically estimate gender empowerment at the level of the states. The six gender dimensions identified broadly conform to the generalized gender empowerment framework for India enunciated below. The choice of variables and measures are compatible for similar estimation even at lower levels of geographic/ administrative units such as the districts within a state in India. In this regard it is important to state that since the UNDP considers elected representatives in the parliamentary and assembly levels as the proxy for gender empowerment, these indicators are not suitable benchmarks if one is considering disaggregated level analysis. In the Indian case, appropriate indicator is intensity of participation of women in local level institutions such as the panchayats and nagrpalikas; and since over 17 years of democratic decentralization through the 73rd and 74th Indian Constitutional amendments, such data are available to academic use. Since August 2009 it is mandatory to compulsorily elect women for fifty per cent of the panchayat membership posts in India. Unlike all other variables in this paper which are extracted from unit level records, information on political participation is accessed from relevant departments of the government of India.

Alternative Analytical Frameworks

A number of analytical frameworks are in vogue for undertaking a gender enriched analysis; the prominent are identified below . The frameworks are not mutually exclusive and there is ample scope for academics to formulate new analytical models so as to contextualize the country specificity and / or incorporate socio-culturally relevant new data. The following listing is arranged in a broad chronological order although the refinements in the concepts and frameworks are a continuous process.

UNDP’s Gender Empowerment Measure: Assessments and measures to evaluate bias based on sex of individual was in vogue in research amongst the applied economists, sociologists and demographers since long, yet what made the gender discrimination prominent knowledge was the UNDP’s human development index which brought sex-differentials to fore in parameters such as literacy and health outcomes through the Human Development Reports, the first of its kind published in 1991. Subsequently in 1995 the UNDP formalized the gender dimension by computing a separate ‘gender adjusted index’ and expanded the scope not only to understand gender bias in common parameters but also to assess ‘gender empowerment’ using the political, economic and societal factors of highest order. But the UNDP’s choice of variables capture empowerment at a high level of geographic aggregation and less conducive for disaggregated measures at states, districts and other social and economic criteria.

Gender Roles Framework: An analytical framework developed by the Harvard Institute of Development, is a grid for collecting data at the micro-level, mapping the productive and reproductive work of men and women in a community, and highlighting the differences between them. This approach utilizes a number of tools such as, an activity profile, an access and control profile of resources and benefits, and lists influencing factors. This framework :-
• argues for an economic case for allocating resources to women as well as men, what is known as the efficiency approach to gender and development;
• resources, not power relations, are central to this approach;
• adapts well to an analysis of agriculture or other rural production systems; and
• relies on micro-level analysis and data collection at the household/individual level.

Gender Planning Framework: Developed by Moser (1994) this framework links the examination of women’s roles to the larger development process and questions the assumption that planning is a purely technical task. It employs three main concepts; women’s triple role of productive, reproductive, and community work; and practical and strategic gender needs. This approach:-
• disaggregates control of resources and decision-making within the household;
• uses concept of triple role and analyzes linkages between them; and
• conceptually focus on emancipation of women from their subordination.

Social Relations Approach: Developed by Kabeer (1994), this approach uses concepts instead of tools to concentrate on the relationships between people, their relationship to resources and activities, and how these are re-worked through the institutions of state, market, community, and family. More recently the institutional linkages for gender empowerment are well argues in global context for example in Roy et. al., (2008). one finds The framework helps to examine social institutional parameters that explain how gender inequality is formed and reproduced at the individual level leading to inequalities. This approach utilizes qualitative and contextual information which is often difficult to quantify.
• The framework concentrates on institutions and challenges the ideological neutrality and independence of institutions;
• links institutional analysis at all levels;
• views development as a process for increasing human well-being; and
• employs a holistic analysis of poverty, recognizing the cross-cutting inequalities of class, race, ethnicity and so on.

Gender Analysis Matrix: Developed by Parker (1998), this method attempts to determine the differential impact development interventions have on women and men, by providing a community-based technique for identifying and analyzing gender differences. It supports -
• participatory approach/fosters bottom-up analysis and qualitative in nature;
• use community for self-identification of problems and solutions;
• excludes macro-and institutional analysis; and
• capture change over time but through repetition of the analysis.

Since the UNDP’s efforts to sensitize the gender issues has been commendable and also the one with very high reach and visibility, it is quite normal to benchmark any further work on it. However, this present paper is aligned more with the other frameworks enunciated above, since it focus on empirical measurements within in social and economic contexts, and suitability of variables for disaggregated assessment.

The UNDP spearheaded the concept of human development and undertook gender oriented empirical adjustments to create a parallel index known as Gender-related Development Index (GDI) (HDR 1991). Further, in 1995 it also gave a methodology to compute a ‘gender empowerment measure’ (GEM). The GEM uses a set of variables namely, (1) seats in parliament held by women (% of total), (2) female legislators, senior officials and managers (% of total), (3) female professional and technical workers (% of total), (4) estimated earned income of women, and (5) women’s share of population (Human Development Report, 2004). Thus GEM attempts to capture women’s participation in higher political office (political empowerment), employment in high offices (economic empowerment), and macro-economic participation. Both the GDI and GEM indices, therefore, fail to capture socially and culturally sensitive factors which are relevant to assess gender empowerment amongst the masses in India. In fact the UN is unable to compute the GEM even for the all India level let alone for its many states due to want of appropriate data (HDR,????). The adaptation and recasting of the India GEM methodology undertaken by the ‘ministry of woman and child development’, Government of India could not eliminate these deficiencies in spite of efforts to rationalize the variables and data inputs in computation of GEM (GOI, 2009).

There are other critiques of the UNDP’s GEM as well. For example, Beteta (2006) argues that the UNDP concept do not account non-economic dimensions of decision-making and appear to measure empowerment only of the better-offs. Another critique argues that while normally the GDI & GEM are being used to highlight gender discrimination, but these measures do not reflect discrimination per se (Schuler, 2006), rather the GDI measures only the objective gender inequality when compared with the HDI. The GDI is not an independent and stand alone measure as it has to be interpreted always in conjunction of the HDI. There are also methodological issues relating to the estimations as found in Bhardan and Klasen (2000).

At the India level the report of the ministry of woman and child welfare, (GOI, 2009) do not isolate the socio-culturally sensitive factors that ideally measure woman’s empowerment amongst the Indian population. Rather it carries forwarded the UNDP suggested variables which are rather topical in nature and only captures very high and idealistic level of empowerment. Further the measures do not reflect the status linked to a specified state, for example, in India the national level services such as the IAS, IPS, the Judges and so on do not generally belong to the state of birth as matter of policy. Similarly, due to skewed prevalence of educational infrastructure, the professional women need not necessary belong to the state of their birth for practicing their services, rather they move over to places of higher demand and to megacities.

III: GENDER RELAVANCE IN THE INDIAN GROWTH CONTEXT

Establishing interlinks between economic growth, reduction of poverty and profiling livelihood opportunities is topical given the progressive context of ongoing economic reforms and global integration of economies. Drawing a gender perspective is essential as women stand at the cross road of economic growth and human development burdened with multiple activities in both reproductive and remunerative roles. Gender poverty is far bigger a challenge that confronts developing societies as much as the issues of equity. It is essential to recognize that although women and men are born equal, the changing social and agrarian structure, development policies and growth trajectories impact them differently. The socio economic dynamics reveal that while impact of growth processes have not been completely gender neutral, that of poverty and its deepening has had its worst impact upon women. It is well documented and acknowledged that women suffer most in conditions of deepening poverty and unless existing inequalities in opportunities, capabilities and differential rights are eliminated, the agenda of poverty reduction cannot be achieved. Female disadvantage reflected in unequal access to household resources, economic opportunities, household decision-making power and lack of control over reproduction or child care have large perpetuating intergenerational implications.

It is, therefore, essential to discuss gender disadvantage in a holistic framework, tracing the various facets of inequality and how poverty renders women doubly disadvantaged and vulnerable to economic shocks and adjustments. Refer to a diagrammatic presentation (Figure 1) of a ‘generalized framework’ explaining the factors which render women poor and the manifestation of it. These linkages may have substantial variation depending upon which state or region one lives in. It is well understood that inequalities originate from the household at very early stages of lifecycle continues to reflect in several social and economic spheres. The discussion therefore should revolve around the multiple dimensions of inequality and how poverty worsens the situation from a gender disaggregated perspective.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Normally, since men being the sole breadwinners of the household had to go out and earn their living; they also have control over all resources and assets and the right to better nutrition, healthcare and education. Men, therefore, both at the household and community at large emerged as the decision makers and exhibit strong bargaining powers, favoring their own interests. Gradually this logical following of things matured and because of males’ supreme command over assets, particularly land and other economic resources resulted in increasing gender inequality. Women all along derived their identity through their kinship and household relationships. There is a vicious circle where things originated and went wrong because of the influence of socio cultural stereotypes and poverty has had a compounding impact.

With the passage of time, when women increasingly took to education and economic activities, such participation stood in conflict with the dominant socio cultural practices. Subsequently, all growth and adjustment processes have neglected the issue of gender or rather touched upon marginally and failed to recognize women as potential partners. Whereby, in conditions of inequality and deepening poverty, women have had to bear the brunt of it, balancing both reproductive and remunerative activities. Gradually what was considered a way of living took different forms and some of these inequalities; unequal access to food, nutrition, healthcare, market seclusion and voicelessness of women has become resilient to change.

Household and Market Gender Relationships: In examining the gender relationships at the household level, it is observed that nutrition biases are in favor of men and boys in the family. This pattern is aggravated in conditions of scarcity arising out of cyclical seasonal effects and differential entitlements wherein women and girls eat less and last as a coping devise. Although women are responsible for ensuring food security of the family, they themselves are the most food insecure. This results in under nourishment of women in their reproductive age and young girls. For women, poor nutrition, severe anemia levels and poor quality or nonexistent reproductive health services contribute to high maternal mortality and low child survival.

Such biases are observed in healthcare systems as well. Women have lesser access to healthcare services. They rarely seek health services during sickness or ill health compared to men. This is yet another expenditure saving mechanism. Health seeking behavior of females is also guided by their educational levels whereby they are informed and understand the necessity to be healthy. Women in rural areas are more vulnerable to respiratory disease owing to their prolonged exposure to harmful and toxic fuels and gases. Women are at greater risk of disease and morbidity living in unhygienic conditions, which lack sanitation and access to pure drinking water, as observed in growing urban slums.

There has been a lot of advocacy in ensuring female education and employment is considered critical means of liberation. Although reducing female illiteracy has been part of every development agenda, there exist strong biases against female education and more so continuation in school. It is also true that although girls are sent to school at an early age, their continuation rates are poor compared to boys. Often it is the poor penetration of schools in rural areas that deter parents from sending their daughters to schools at far off distance. Again given the restricted opportunities in the labor market, the alternative is better to save upon the resources spent in educating a girl for marriage. When poverty strikes, girls are withdrawn from school such that their male siblings can continue. Also in families where the mother is engaged is some wage work to eke out a living, young girls are kept at home to take care and nurse their younger sibling or else join their mothers to contribute to the family pot.

Division of labor is highly skewed to the disadvantage of female and more so poor women are caught in a double whammy; balancing both reproductive and productive activities. Although globalization had broadened employment opportunities in most of the developing countries, it has set in trends of informalisation and women have been increasingly a part of it. Although women form a large part of the labor force, most of them are tied to the lower rungs. There is an increasing trend of feminisation of informalisation of the labor force. The informal sector is characterized by low wages, no contract and no fixed workplace. Women who are not educated enough and lack skills form part of this informal workforce. This has added to their workload, the returns from which are not at all remunerative. Often it is the economic distress that compels them to join the labor force and does not help them in enhancing their well being. As found in rural agrarian communities, women work either as unpaid family laborers or agricultural laborers as opposed to men who enjoy ownership rights. Despite the fact that the agrarian structure is undergoing enormous diversification and the role of women in dairying, fishing, horticulture can be improved; the efforts lack the appropriate gender sensitiveness. Although empirical evidences suggest that women through self help groups and community management approaches can lead in some of these spheres, the progress is too slow.

It is common practice that women have less access to ownership of land, credit and other productive resources. The law of inheritance in a south Asia study found men’s supreme command over land rights. Women derive their land rights by virtue of their relationship with men and have barely any role in using it as a resource. In agricultural communities, men are the landlords and own the assets as well as revenue accruing from land based activities. Women mostly work as wage or family labor and do not enjoy entrepreneurial rights. Differential access to credit has its roots in land ownership, wherein land is used as a mortgage for loans and it is only men who have the benefit of using it to access credit facilities. Hence women have very little access to credit which impedes their participation in any kind of technological innovation critical for agricultural growth. The self-help group approach to micro credit has mixed results in India unlike its roaring success in Bangladesh. Unequal access to resources has resulted in limited and restricted participation of women in both farm and non-farm activities.

Gender gaps in education, health care and employment opportunities have resulted in the voiceless of women in decision making and bargaining for a better livelihood. This has rendered women poorer and more vulnerable to shocks and adjustment processes. Inequality and poverty are two reinforcing elements and is seen as aggravating one another. In other words, unequal access to resources and opportunities is the major obstacle to women’s economic liberation and opportunity to break free from the poverty trap. Similarly, poverty aggravates inequality wherein female in early stages of their life cycle adopt expenditure saving mechanisms such as eat less, drop out of schools and live unhealthily life and as women take to income earning measures by taking up any low paid insecure odd jobs.

Modern economic reforms and associated dynamics with respect to work and income earning mechanisms are promoting empowerment of women even in rural areas of India. Besides remittances promote participation of women in agriculture which in turn improves agriculture productivity and household income. The new evidence suggests considerable increase in rural income from remittances (Shariff, 2009) due to an increase in rural-rural and rural-rural migration within India (WDR, 2009). Gender empowerment has received strong empirical support across the globe since it further enhances investments in education, health and nutrition that build stock of physical capital formation, thereby yielding durable poverty alleviating effects. Therefore, it is important to bring to fore the fact, that even in India the formative abilities of women are being enhanced due to higher education, participation in workforce, democratic participation and learning from programs such as micro-credit and national rural employment guarantee scheme. It is imperative, therefore, that women demand a rightful place in household and societal level decision making. Figure 2 below provides a pictorial depiction of gender empowered economy in India.

IV: GENDER EMPOWERING CHARACTERISTICS AND MEASURES

After an understanding of the multi-dimensional general framework within which one need to understand gender issues and a number of approaches that are in vogue enunciated above; in the following we identify selected measurable characteristics which all together will form a comprehensive and wholesome ‘gender empowerment measure’. Since these entire variable set are empirically measurable, an index derived out of them is described as ‘gender empowerment index’, which will be a useful policy instrument to governments and civil society alike. Note that this index is a mix of the gender adjustment which UNDP’s GDI performs as well the gender empowerment measure; and conceptually measures empowerment of masses as opposed to a measure of higher order which is inherent in UNDP’s gender empowerment measure.

Conceptually the selected indicators measure empowerment within the contemporary Indian socio-economic outlook and compatible with the debate on mechanisms to reduce gender bias in society and political decision making. Note that the dimensions and factors used in this paper are very different from those identified by the Government of India (2009) which is aligned with the UNDP concept but weak data support of suspicious quality.

An empowered Indian woman is the one who is literate, works (often outside home) and contributes measurable household income, independently decides for example, as to what kind of food needs to prepared and ingredients to be purchased; do not wait for husband to seek paid care for a sick child, owns some property by herself and also manages a bank account. Above all she decides as to how many children she can bear as well as ensure full immunization of all her children. She executes her right to vote and also participates in local panchayats and committees.

Compare this with a concept in which she is an IAS/IPS officer or a judge in a High Court, or can also be doctor or an engineer, or someone who can borrow at least Rs. 2 lakhs from a bank, or an MP, MLA or a Panchayat president, have immovable property and so on. In such a measure the focus is on individual instead of societal achievements and therefore can be aggregated only at national level. On the other hand the multi-dimensional attributes can be created at lower geographic levels and they reflect empowerment of all women in specified locales.

There are also serious data problems in case of the UNDP linked GOI approach; for example, in India the top level services including judiciary have national relevance. At the level of the state, a women born and education elsewhere will normally be posted in a specified state, thus her empowerment do not reflect empowerment of women of that state. Similarly, a large number of professional for example get education in states where educational infrastructure is better and often begin to reside and work in that state. Under such circumstance the gender measures will over estimate the true level of empowerment and may go inimical to women in that state/district. Another measurement issue is that all the measures are to be accessed from secondary sources often of poor and questionable quality. On the other hand the alternative variables proposed are extracted from unit level records of large household surveys which are known to be dependable data for measurements of societal dynamics at least in India. Further the proposed concepts and method can estimate a ‘gender empowerment value/index’ at any level of disaggregation even upto a village level and also estimated can be separately provided for the rural and urban areas separately. The data occurrence and coverage of the universe is almost all women in a defined areas in case of the alternative set of variables; where as in case of the GOI recasted method only a miniscule proportion of women may be covered, for example, even at the state level women in top level services, judiciary and polity can be only a handful countable in single digits and s on.
Statement 1

Measuring Gender Employment in a Socio-Cultural Framework:
Multi-Dimensions and Variable Measures

Choice of Dimensions and Variable measurements
Dimensions Measures Source and Quality of Variables
Human Capital Adult (7+) literacy Estimated from a nationally representative survey of 41,554 households namely the Human Development (HDPI) 2004-05, undertaken by NCAER New Delhi.
Gender gap in literacy
Work Participation Work Participation Rate (15‐64 Year) Estimated from a nationally representative survey of 1,24,680 households namely the National Sample Survey (NSSO) of Employment and Unemployment, 2004-05.
Gender gap in WPR
Household Decision Making Capacity to decide matters alone relating to daily household purchases Estimated from a nationally representative survey of 1,09,041 households namely National Family health Survey (NFHS)–3 of 2005-06.
Capacity to independently undertake the decision for own health care NFHS- 3 (2005-06)
Eco. Resources /Assets Individual/shared ownership of immovable assets HDPI (2004-05)
Manage independent bank accounts NFHS-3 (2005-06)
Earned Cash wages as a regular salaried/wage employee NSS (2004-05)
Gender gap in wages as a regular salaried/wage employee
Earned Cash wages as a casual wage labor NSS (2004-05)
Gender gap in wages as a casual wage labor
Reproduction and Child Care Use of modern contraceptives NFHS-3 (2005-06)
Women having fully immunized children in ages 12-23 months NFHS-3 (2005-06)
Political Participation Cast their vote in the last general election Statistical Report on General Elections, 2004 (14th Lok Sabha) – Vol. I, Election Commission of India.
Gender Gap in the vote casting
Panchayat members Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India: Number of women elected representatives in the three tiers of panchayats as on 31.03.2008 are available in the Annexure 1(A).

Thus, in the Indian context a comprehensive measure of gender advantage needs to incorporate indicators that capture culture-specific dimensions of agency and control over resources, through measures having relevance at the level of individual, household and society. Since aspects of gender empowerment are complex and multidimensional the variables and data needs are diverse and needs to be debated as to their appropriateness. Ideally the variables that measure a social situation and dimension should have the following qualities – (a) robust outcome indicators are the best; but since such indicators are difficult to gather and also as they change slowly, indicators highlighting the process and proximate to the concept of the index measure, in this case ‘gender empowerment’ can be used; (b) that the indicators are easy to collect and that they are collected from independent survey data rather than from service statistics which often lack quality; (c) easy to update frequently such as annually or at the most once in two years, for example, the NSSO undertake annual surveys and required data can therefore be collected, and (d) as much possible relevant to whole or majority of population.

We have identified six dimensions of which five dimensions extracts data directly from large sample surveys using the primary unit level records at the level of individual and households. A gender empowering dimension namely ‘political participation’ uses data from the government records since sample surveys so far have not collected information on these issues. All dimensions are aggregates of multiple measures and wherever appropriate incorporates gender gaps as well. The national sample surveys (NSS), national family health surveys (NFHS) and human development Surveys of the national council of applied economic research (NCAER) are well known data source in India.

(i) Human Capital (Education): Most commonly used human capital indicator, along with its gender gap captures human capital formation, namely, literacy. Absolute measures of female literacy amongst the population ages 7 years and above in percentage and the gender gap ratio are used to capture this dimension. Data from the human development survey of NCAER for reference year 2004-5 supplies data to measure literacy.

(ii) Female work participation: Female work participation rate and associated gender gap for adults 15-64 year was assessed using the ‘usual principal activity status’ (UPS) over a reference period of one year. Further the gender gap in work participation is also incorporated into the computation. A woman is classified as a participant in labor force, if she had been either working or looking for work during a longer part of 365 days preceding the survey. The UPS measure excludes from the labor force all those female who are unemployed and employed for a period of less than six months. The data are drawn from the 61st round employment and unemployment survey of the NSSO for the reference year 2004-05.

(iii) Household Decision Making: This is an aggregation of two variables namely, (a) women’s capacity of ‘making purchases for daily household needs’ and (b) women's participation in decision making for own health care, both extracted from NFHS-3 survey 2005-06 (www.measuredhs.com). The variables together measure women’s participation in decision making; those who usually make specified decisions on their own or independently. Those reporting joint decision making along with men or husbands are excluded from these measures. These variables selected to reflect woman’s capacity for independent decision making in the domain of household are well recognized even in studies undertaken in other developing economies around the world.

(iv) Economic Resources and Assets: Aggregates of two variables namely, women’s ownership of (a) immovable assets and (b) bank account are used to reflect her control over resources. The first variable is measured as the proportion of women who have their name on immovable properties owned or rented. Normally such names are incorporated on to the contract or registered property documents. For the first time such data have become available for all India and many states from the NCAER’s Human Development Survey -2004-5. Women having a bank / savings account are drawn from the NFHS-3 data set. Give that these data have longer-term relevance and are important aspects of households, both individually owned and jointly owned (along with husbands/other household members) are considered appropriate to reflect control of respective resources.

It is useful to state both these variables have become prominent in the Indian context in reflecting the independent nature of women and their empowerment. Besides a number of states in India have passed laws which favor joint (registration) ownership of land or properties which are rented. Often properties jointly owned are given tax concessions by law. So far as the ownership of bank accounts we bring the attention of the readers to the fact that the microfinance programs in India are over two decades old and upto 25 million households are enrolled into such program through the self-help group formations; and they are in a way enrolled in to a informal banking scheme. Further since about a year millions of bank accounts are opened in the names of women across India through a wage employment program known as ‘national employment guarantee scheme’. Thus there is a revolution of sorts which is enabling women even in rural areas to open and operate their own bank account. However the data used to assess these variable have the reference year 2004-5, and conditions during recent years are expected to more women friendly. Given this background these variables are India specific and they capture a dominant part of women’s empowerment.

(v) Reproduction and Care: This dimension is an aggregation of two variables, (a) one reflecting women’s capacity to choose and use a modern contraceptive method which is a reflection of control over reproduction; and (b) her capacity to ensure that her own children are completed with all essential dozes of immunizations. This second variable is constructed linking all children aged 12-36 months with the respondent women and identifying the completeness of all immunizations.

(vi) Political Participation: Participation of women in political sphere is indeed a dominant evidence of empowerment. For example, Indian historically has been in the forefront in this benchmark as it has had considerable world recognition when Mrs. Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India. Contemporary situation has enabled Smt. Pratibha Patel to be the President of India, and another high position of the ‘Speaker’ of the Loksabha (lower house of parliament) is occupied by a woman. The list of world’s powerful women contains many more entries from India. In spite of such feat one finds the condition of women in India is deplorable, mostly due to strong patriarchy and men favoring social and public policies. Therefore, we believe what is relevant to capture the political empowerment of women in India is their participation in Indian democratic system. We capture these traits by using two variables whose data are available from government sources. Percentage of women exercising franchise during the last general election is one variable used and dependable data are available from the Election Commission of India. Another positive woman favoring policy in India has been the democratic decentralization of governance to a third tier identified as the Panchayats in rural areas and nagar palikas (municipalities) in urban areas. Percentage of women members in the panchayat councils is used to represent political participation in this indexing exercise.

V: GENDER EMPOWERMENT INDEX: Values and Rankings

This is an exercise to cumulate the multi-dimensionality of gender empowerment inherent in the six identified dimensions enunciated in the previous section and create an index at the level of the Indian states, economic standing and social identities, and place of residence. All six dimensions are considered equally important; for example literacy and work are two equally important attributes expressing pedagogy and economic independence. Similarly, control over physical assets, using banking services, independently taking routine household decisions as well as control over her own reproduction and take decision about child care are all equally important in expressing the power a women exercise so as to change her immediate environment to benefit her own welfare, and the derived welfare of the household. So is the ability of women to participate in political system especially in the modern context of decentralized democratization process especially in India. Therefore, we believe assigning equal weights to each of the six dimensions should be noncontroversial, also because one expects systematic improvements occurring concurrently across all these dimensions over a period of time. The variables chosen to reflect the above aspects of empowerment are carefully selected from across the multiple sources of data, and wherever necessary gender differentials are also factored in the computations. Normally the index values and rankings are created for over the time comparisons; it should not matter much as to what the definitions, measurements and weights (implied) are so far as they remain constant over time. Even assign equal weights, however, care must be taken by making all variables and dimensions scale free so that the level difference between selected variables do no influence the values and subsequent rankings. A comprehensive discussion about the scaling, normalization, weighing and indexing in the Indian context can be found in Kundu et. al (2007).

Gender Empowerment Index for Major Indian States:
The gender empowerment values/index and associated ranks for all six identified components/dimensions according to major sates of India can be found in Table 1 and the last column assigns a GEI ranking.. The upper and lower benchmarks for comparisons are taken from within the state distributions and therefore the absolute values are not comparable with other international benchmarks. Measuring empowerment requires country specific qualitative variables as described above and therefore no effort is made to undertake international comparisons although such indices can be crafter should a situation demands.

The GEI index values reflect the levels of achievement to the maximum possible of 1 and the least value being 0. Thus if a state takes the maximum value of 1 in six dimensions then the aggregated index value will be 1 which is the perfectly women empowered situation and if it is 0 then it is the worst scenario. At the All India level the overall GEI value has worked out to be 0.424 which is less than even the half of the level mark, and in the inter-state comparisons show the bottom most value is 0.238 recorded in Uttar Pradesh and the top most value is 0.646 for Kerala. We have categorized states in four segments taking the mean of all states as the first dividing line and further the mean of each segment as the other dividing line to distribute states in all four segments. This method of ordering states in segments provides useful analytical advantage. One can find that states with relatively better or ‘high GEI’ besides Kerala are Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka in that order, followed by Gujarat, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana and West Bengal which can be considered as states with ‘moderate GEI’. States which have ‘low’ index are Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh; followed by the ‘very low GEI’ states namely, Jharkhand, Assam, Rajasthan, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (refer Table 1). Refer also to a composite map (Map 1) and six other maps one each of the specified dimensions of empowerment identified in this empirical exercise (Maps 2- 7).

TABLE 1, 2 AND MAPS ABOUT HERE

In case of Gujarat while it ranks as low as 8th in human capital formation, it is on the top on ‘control over assets, and second on ‘capacity for household decision making’; but it ranks too low at 16th of the 17 states in political participation. On the other hand Kerala which is on top on human capital formation, but as low as 8th in household decision making as well as woman’s work participation and 6th in political participation.

Gender Empowerment Index according to Socio-Economic Categories:
The type of the data used allows estimating the GEI using the first five dimensions, since disaggregated data for woman’s political participation is not available, according to place of residence (rural or urban residence), socio-religious categories and economic groups based on per capita income quintiles (Table 2). It is surprising to note lack of GEI differential according to place of residence, namely the rural and urban areas; although we are aware that there are noteworthy gender differentials if only an absolute level of a particular variable is evaluated. Thus while there may be huge level differentials in the measurement of variables in absolute terms, when one takes the relative gender differentials it does not matter whether one resides in rural or urban areas, the gender bias seems as strong. This is a very important empirical finding.

Further the values and rankings are evaluated for economic classification and socio-religious groups and one notices some perfect association. The GEI index has a perfect match with the per capita income quintiles in such a way that relative economic prosperity indeed promotes gender empowerment. The only dimension which has inverse relationship from within the six considered is women’s work participation suggesting that poorer women work relatively more so as to supplement household income; yet overall economic prosperity promotes ‘gender empowerment’.

The data bases used, namely the national sample surveys, the NCAER’s human development survey and the national family health surveys contain variables that are amenable to create exclusive socio-religious categories which are generally so identified in day-to-day discourses in India. One finds considerable variations in the GEI according to the socio-religious categories as well. For example, it is residual others (minority religions other than Muslims but less than 5 % of population) category which has the highest value of 0.763 followed by the high caste Hindus with 0.675 and these two communities are class apart and reflect large inequity in society. The subsequent values are far too low at 0.410 for OBCs, 0.366 for SCs, 0.281 for the STs and least for Muslims at 0.276. There is a notion that the tribal communities offer fairly egalitarian social system which, but such common understanding and does not stand the empirical test, thus making ST women extremely vulnerable as well along with the SCs and the Muslims. The socio-religious exercise provides excellent leads for public policy formulation in the area of effecting group-equity in India.

VI: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It is common knowledge that the UNDP promoted the concept of human development index which is now widely used all over India. One finds that many states in India have brought out human development reports highlighting district level variations as well. We consider it useful to compare the state HDI ranks with the GEI estimated by us (see Table 3). There are a few unexpected relationships between the two in a few states. For example Assam and Uttar Pradesh have recorded relatively better HDI ranking compared with the GEI which are far too low. Other states with higher ranking differentials and having lower GEIs are Bihar, Haryana and Punjab. On the other hand state which have improved over their HDI rankings considerably are Maharashtra, Karnataka, Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. However, it will be instructive to know as to what factors have pulled the state of Assam and Uttar Pradesh considerably low in the GEI measures.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

The correlation between the GHI and HDI rankings has worked out to be only 0.58 suggesting that HDI do not reflect the true gender vulnerability and therefore it is essential to create a separate series of data that reflect women’s empowerment. As mentioned earlier, we have used six dimensions and associated measures for which dependable data are available from sample surveys and government records. Although we believe that dimensions and variables chosen for this exercise are excettent and effecnint in capturing empowerment of women in India, one can add other concepts provided quality data are available so as to contextualize indexing to local situation and needs. Tt is most appropriate to create the gender indices as the level of districts, and according to socio-religions communities within the state for a better understanding of the problem of gender discrimination.

A number of policy implications will emerge from this research and a few of them are listed below:

• Enable policy makers to understand the process that facilitate empowerment of women.
• This research will enable recognition of the significant role gender empowerment play in improving incomes especially in rural areas and thereby poverty alleviation.
• Help formulate policy support to sustain empowerment of women, for example, through strategies to establish and sustain ownership rights, enhance participation in local governance and undertake market based activities.
• Promote fiscal and financial products which suits formation of household capital, assets and insurance against risks in rural areas of India.
• Effective policies can be designed to so that economic resources transferred through micro-credit programs can promote micro-enterprises and local markets.
• Promotes regionally balanced economic growth through wage and labor market effects especially factoring increased female participation in labor force.

We believe that this paper raises a major issue of appropriateness of the factors and measures that reflect gender empowerment and hope that the methodology presented will help generate an informed debate on the topic in India and other developing societies.

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What can we learn from India’s Mass Employment Scheme?

2009-09-05T13:11:00.000+05:30

I. Introduction
Countries with large rural populations that include high shares of landless laborers typically require formal safety nets to reduce vulnerability and sustain people’s livelihoods. India already has several large, universal safety net programs, including the Public Distribution System (PDS) for food and the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme, and in 2006, it launched another. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) emanated from India’s commitment to a legal right to work. Adopted in the wake of persistent public demand, the NREGS is a mass ‘public works program’ (PWP) based on the country’s experience in reducing human distress in recent decades in rural Maharashtra state. It promises to sustain the incomes of rural people while creating physical infrastructure that will benefit the country in the long run. Although the program is relatively new and thus has not been subject to a comprehensive assessment, early indicators point to areas of success and failure, highlighting where improvements can be made and lessons learned in a public employment program of this size.

II. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act/Scheme (NREGA/S)
The ‘right to work’ is a ‘directive principle’ in Indian Constitution which was formalized through the enactment of NREGA (2005) . It is seen as a mechanism of income transfer, infrastructure development and promoting rural production and consumption markets - a multifarious strategy indeed. NREGA has found priority policy attention in India’s 11th five year plan (2007-12) under a broader objective of ‘Bharat Nirman’ aiming for resurgence in rural areas. Some consider nrega a natural response to non-inclusive growth that occurred during reforms process of last about two decades. The format of nrega and its nationwide implementation was a result of persistence by civil society and activists which is a common mechanism to influence policy in India. NREGS is unique, being large in size , intended to cover long periods, disburse huge funds and be dynamically responsive to climatic and rainfall conditions and above all open to any adult intending to work for wages often lower than local causal wages. Since self-targeting is inherent to scheme, besides chronic poverty manifest for example in food inadequacy, it also intends to mitigate idiosyncratic risks and shocks faced by households due to being differently-abled or death of earning member. NREGS can attract the unemployed or underemployed rural youth; because of immediate cash availability and 100 days of assured work which functions as a short-term relief objective. Indian policy appears confident that nregs can be important normally, even in the absence of price or income shocks and that it can smoothen seasonal fluctuations in labor demand and, therefore, wage rates in rural areas where rainfall patterns and insufficient irrigation preclude year-round crop cultivation (see also Barrett, et. al, 2004). Other objectives include, generation of productive assets, empowering rural women, reducing rural-urban migration, fostering social equity and environmental protection. Box 1 summarized the multiple nrega goals which can be categorized as protective, preventive and promotive in nature.

Multiple Goals of NREGS

Protective : assistance ensuring consumption smoothening and immediate welfare

Preventive : insurance facilitating risk taking such as investment in agriculture

Promotive : economic stimulus, through cash accumulation, local production and enhancing markets
- harmonize labor market, promote rural nonfarm employment (RNFE) and equalize wage rates;
- create durable physical assets impacting local eco-system and climate change;
- facilitate human capital formation through skill development; and
- alleviate poverty, effect equity, reduce distress migration and empower women.

The listed issues, however, are yet to be thoroughly investigated in the context of nrega.

How was the NREGS formulated: The format of nrega/s draws upon positive experiences of reducing human distress by Maharashtra ‘employment guarantee scheme’ (MEGS). The MEGS was first of its kind effort in India, to address high levels of rural distress caused by a severe drought in 1973-74. The MEGS created 3,597 million person days of work on minor irrigation, soil and water conservation, reforestation and local roads since inception until 2004. In its peak year in 1980 about one fifth of capital spending of Maharashtra was spent on EGS. MEGS thus became a model of sorts in which all aspects of governance, political commitment, bureaucratic efficiency, equity objective and concerns to sustain local environment and so on came into play, although at the heart of the issues was clearly the push and pulls of electoral politics. This scheme had central focus on drought proofing activities that led to measurable tangible results. Land holders were direct beneficiaries and the scheme also established a participatory process in the local governance (Moore and Jadhav 2006).

While the MEGS was a prototype and used as a benchmark, before the launch of nrega a plethora of PWPs were tried out all over India. National rural employment program (NREP) was initiated in 1980 followed by rural landless employment guarantee program (RLEGP), and in 1989 they were merged to form Jawahar rozgar youjana (JRY) with a focus on unemployed and creating rural assets. Employment assurance scheme (EAS) introduced in 1993 became universal by 1997-98. Jawahar gram samridhi yojana (JGSY) introduced in 1999 restructured the JRY and made it a central scheme. Sampoorna grameen rozgar yojana (SGRY) was launched in 2001 and in 2002 EAS and JGSY were also merged, aiming at providing rural wage employment as a mechanism to ensure food security, along with the creation of durable community, social and economic assets. The ‘national rural employment guarantee act (NREGA)’ thus is the most resent version of PWP, which for the first time has a legal sanctity inbuilt into the scheme.

Coverage of the program: The national level rural development ministry and associated departments are responsible for implementing nrega across the whole country. They also appropriate financial allocations from national budgetary mechanism and facilitate states to draw respective shares to execute work projects. The nrega coverage during first year of implementation (2006-7) was only to 200 poorest districts, followed by an additional 130 district during 2007-8; and by 2008-9 all the 610 districts across India were brought under nrega. A review of data published biannually through official website suggests that in the year 2007-8 , overall 33.7 million households were provided with 1.43 billion man days of nrega employment and distributed close to Rs. 86 billion. These absolute numbers which account for about 45% of all rural households, suggest a vibrant and highly efficient program implementation and matches with the stated policy and the targets.

Budgetary allocations: Before formalizing the Act, government agencies estimated that full coverage of nregs will cost Rs. 400 billion (about US$ 9-10 billion) which was about 1% of GDP. Some empirical assessments suggest that nrega could help reduce rural poverty to 23 per cent during lean season, at annual cost of 1.7 per cent of GDP (Murgai and Ravallion 2005). Others based on simple average minimum wage aggregates of all states estimated the national annual cost to be 1.3% of GDP; and a case was made that nrega will be sensitive to prevailing minimum wages in respective states (Shariff, 2004).

The allocation and expenditure on nregs during first two years of implementation were low due to staggered implementation; yet even after covering all 610 districts in 2008-9, only Rs. 160 billion (0.37% GDP) were allocated. The allocation for the year 2009-10 is Rs. 780 billion or 0.66 % of GDP, but the actual expenditure is expected to much less. NREGA expenditure for 2007-8 although 0.23 % of GDP compares well with other national programs namely targeted ‘public distribution system (PDS)’ of food products (0.13% GDP) and ICDS (0.10% GDP) respectively. However, a cost-benefit estimate for erstwhile MEGS compared with PDS suggested a ratio of 21.6 % for the former and meager 11.2% for the latter (Parikh et. al. 2007). Although there are substantial improvements lately, the relative efficiency differentials are likely to prevail. The Indian safety net programs appear huge in terms of allocations and coverage but reach a small proportion of poor and only nominal benefits are received by them.

Given both low allocation and under-utilization of funds, further financial expansion of nrega are not expected to impact national level fiscal deficits adversely even if no additional tax or levy is imposed; nor does one expect that nregs proceeds would cause inflation in the local economy. An increased cash flow amongst wage workers will pushup local demand and prices, but a simultaneous accelerating effect on local product market associated with broad based income growth will dampen the inflationary impact. However, nregs appear good in reducing risks and vulnerability, but not sufficient to eliminate poverty in India.

III. Strong Performance in Some States

Given a vast expanse one expects interstate differentials in nrega performance, some due to staggered and lagged universalization others because of administrative bottlenecks unique to each state (CAG, 2007). Corruption, leakage and dominance of private agents are other notable hurdles which are insurmountable where panchayats are nonexistent. Some appreciate self-targeting strategy inherent in nrega, but cautions social welfare losses caused by miss-targeting (Banerjee, 2008). Overall all, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh stand out as better performing states. The relative coverage of households is better and average wage accruals are reasonable due to better provisioning of employment days. Given relatively higher poverty it is reasonable to assume that relatively vulnerable households do benefit in these states.

In case of Rajasthan, there are satisfactory assessments as to who benefits from nregs. Wage accruals have helped smoothening of household income (Scandizzo, et al., 2007) and there are large favorable gender impacts (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2009). A silver lining thus has emerged from state of Rajasthan (Shivakumar 2006, Dreze, et al. 2007) which indeed provide much needed confidence to strive for improvement and continuity of nregs. Although vibrant panchayat raj administration is essential, but it is not a sufficient condition for better nrega; for example, Kerala with well developed panchayats is suffering from high leakage of funds. The success story of Rajasthan is due to a fair balance between functioning of panchayats and other enabling factors such as open and transparent monitoring and public audit mechanisms.

IV. Poor Performance in Most States

States which host large number of the poor but doing poorly in nrega are Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Other states utilizing meager expenditures are Haryana, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra and West Bengal. Another backward state, Jharkhand suffers from absence of panchayat institutions (Bhatia and Dreze 2006). Orissa’s problem is attributed to systemic bureaucratic failure to put in place transparent implementation of nregs. Large scale leakages and corruption are rampant due to absence of documentation system amenable for crosschecks for accuracy of record keeping (Dreze, et al. 2007), and the situation in Bihar is not encouraging either (Pankaj or Sharma 2006).

While nregs suffers from large exclusion errors due to poor coverage, one finds some hope due to greater access that it gives to women, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2009). A recent field study of vulnerable rural households in seven north Indian states (Shariff, 2008) suggests that community participation; information sharing and formulation of an opinion of program stand out as dominating factors that enhance maximization of receipts from nrega. Such attributes are normally prevalent amongst ‘rural middle class’ and therefore poorest of the poor within a micro locality are most likely to face entry barrier to nregs. Mechanisms to overcome such anomalies are available, for example, beneficiary participation and partnerships with local civil society and NGOs are known to have helped in ensuring transparency, equity, timeliness, financial prudence and quality assurance in delivery of public services. Such partnership also strengthens institutional capacity at the grassroots. The future reforms or nregs-course correction must address such anomalies, lest the program is held ransom to middle class values.

V. What determines access to NREGA and maximization of employment days?

A perceptions survey of 3200 poor households about government’s safety net programs in sixteen selected most deprived districts in northern parts of India provides some rare data that are amenable for econometric analysis in identifying factors supporting access and use of the nregs. These data evaluates both nregs accessibility/enrollment and number of days of employment received per household form such employment. Qualitative information on participation of households in village level institutions (of local governance), frequency and transparency of panchayat meetings are also available. The data were subjected to the ‘correction for the selectivity bias econometric model’; which assessed in its first stage, determinants of enrolment and factored a computed lambda value in the second stage to find out characteristics supporting maximization of the number of days of employment from amongst those enrolled. The survey was conducted across seven states in north India, the results do present a close to accurate status of the nregs of this region and the main findings are highlighted below .

Accessing NREGS: The econometric analysis suggests that social variables have influence nrega enrollment in expected direction, for example the casual labor and illiterate households have easy enrollment into the scheme. However, the scheme is accessible to households belonging to all caste and religious communities suggesting the fact that the scheme is adequately broad-based although one expects the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes to show greater access. Important is that fact that governance variables such as participation in panchayat meetings and having an opinion about transparency in nrega meeting have favorable impact on choice of nrega work. View on ‘transparency’ was categorized as yes, no and no opinion. Both divergent views - that nrega meetings were ‘transparent’ and that they were ‘not-transparent’- show a large and significant positive effect on nregs as opposed to those households who did not have a opinion at all or the fact that they were truly not interested in having a view on local panchayat meetings. Given this strong and important relationship additional tests were performed using interactive terms with transparency but did not find significant additional advantage. This analysis suggests that program information and having-a-view on institutions that promote participation are important to determine enrolments. This finding provides a strong signal to program managers that to enhance reach and efficacy of nregs and similar other programs people’s participation is essential irrespective of whether such participants approve or disapprove of a program. There are a few studies which have discovered the importance of participation for example, Krishna (2006, 2001); Weinberger (2000); and Cohen and Norman (1980) in promoting access to program in developing economies and in rural areas.

To understand whether the scheme is accessible to the poor a comprehensive index (using a combination of productive assets such as animals, implements and durables) which captured economic standing was used in the model. It was puzzling to find that relatively better-offs have high accessibility to the scheme; and the evidence challenge the program expectation that nregs is designed to benefit the poorest of the poor through self targeting mechanism. Since nregs-wage in a number of states is higher than local wage rates the beneficiaries are the regular wage workers, and not necessary those abject poor whose reservation wages can be low. Although, by law all those who approach for work must be provided with jobs, there are many constrains that limits creation of all the desired / demanded / needed employment days. Such limits emerge from limited supply of funds, seasonal factors, non-availability of useful projects and local level idiosyncratic factors as well. Given such limitations, many nregs jobs will be appropriated by those who have a better bargaining capacity (can also be the better off within the group), thus inhibiting the poorest of the poor benefiting from the program.

Maximizing Days of Employment: The selection bias correction model used evacuated the mean number of days of employment conditional upon a household getting enrolled. Information on ownership and size of land was used as distinguishing variable which also reflect relative economic condition of the household. Limited numbers of variables show significant effects; for example, even after controlling for land asset variable with no impact, the ownership of pukka (good quality) house shows independent positive impact at less than 5% level. That is labor force living in pukka homes maximize netting nregs employment days. Another dominant effect emerge from a community level factor namely, institutional participation of woman in the village; followed by significant (less than 5%) and unexpected effect from those reporting fair food adequacy. Finally, households having a migrant family member show high degree of incapacity to maximize nregs employment days, although as we found above they were successful in enrolling into the program, however.

It appears that the inner story of who gets to work more number of employment days depends upon one crucial fact that shows little influence on whether one gets to work or not; but once one gets enrolled in to the scheme derives maximum benefit. This crucial fact is women’s formal participation (from within households or own community) in local self governance such as the panchayat, school committees, mahila mandlas and so on which has shown the most dominant impact suggesting the fact that household gets its employment days maximized when a woman from the household or even from own community participates in the panchayati raj linked village level institutions. Strategies to improve program efficiency must be undertaken jointly and concurrently by strengthening local self governance with clear distinctions made between political, administrative and fiscal decentralization (von Braun and Grote, 2002). Best results can accrue if political and administrative decentralization precede the financial but it appears that in case of nregs this step wise transition has not taken a clear shape yet. This finding is highly significant both to the national goal of democratic decentralization on the one hand and favorable implementation of nregs on the other.

An unexpected finding is that even households reporting fair food adequacy have recorded a large positive effect that gives credence to the fact, that even those households who do not feel the pinch of food inadequacy make efforts to hang on to nregs employment for maximum number of days and this effect is prominent even after controlling for other social and economic factors makes it puzzling . Given a vast array of mechanisms through which leakages and discrimination works, it appears that those who manage to show endurance can hang on to more employment through various partnerships that may develop with the managers of muster rolls and payments in this program. In case of the migrant households, what appeared to be a reflection of distress while seeking work turns out to be worse as they are not able to maximize upon wage receipts through higher number of days of employment. In fact such people seem to get penalized and factors that lead to such a situation are not yet clearly documented.

VI. Policy Implications

India’s experience so far suggests lessons for its own implementation of the NREGS as well as for other countries that implement large-scale employment schemes and a few are summarized below:

Lesson 1. Be sure that local institutions exist that are capable of implementing large PWPs. This Indian model depends entirely on the 3rd tier of government identified as the local panchayats which are in principal locally elected bodies reflecting not only people’s participation but also people’s interaction with such institutions on a daily basis. However, panchayat system is essential but not sufficient condition for the success of nregs.

Lesson 2. Make implementation transparent to all stakeholders. Transparency is a trait which is not well factored in program implementation in India. Number of welfare programs therefore suffers from lack of scope for monitoring and mid-course correction if necessary. In built monitoring through a transparent documentation and audit mechanism enables reductions in leakages, better targeting and cost efficient delivery. NREGA has responded well when there is transparency in implementation.

Lesson 3. Monitoring through social audits can help ensure accountability. A social audit is a process in which the people work with the government to monitor and evaluate the planning and implementation of a scheme or indeed of a policy. NREGA social audit can examine local records such as the muster roles, work requisitions and monetary transactions, by nregs-workers and civil society. Such social audits will benefit from use of modern information technology (IT) and banking networks. NREGA has immensely benefitted both by the IT, and the banking and post office networks across India resulting in reduction in corruption, leakage and improvements in timely payments to the enrolled participants.

Lesson 4. Reducing ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ errors; the former being highly anti-poor and the latter reflecting program inefficiency are essential to register success for such a large scheme. It is ideal, therefore, that political and administrative decentralization precedes the financial one so as to enhance coverage and make nregs inclusive. Sustaining nregs-wages below the minimum wage seems essential so as to eliminate the crowing-out effect adversely impacting self-targeting, thereby causing exclusion.

Lesson 5. A larger policy issue relates to nregs promoting labor market distortions and impacting upon the natural process of migration (see also World Bank 2009). NREGS can inhibit rural to urban and rural to rural migration affecting employment and wages in both place of origin and place of destination across the country. Such a possibility arises when the nregs wage is arbitrarily fixed higher than the reservation wage of the poorest amongst the rural communities. Higher wages will deepen the exclusionary and wrong inclusionary process thus defeating the very purpose of large PWPs. Besides, if nregs create basic public service infrastructure in rural areas it may in fact inhibit migration of the poor in search of such services.

In conclusions it is useful to emphasize, that future of nregs, which is a legal entitlement for the deprived living in rural areas, is securely tied with functioning of the panchayati raj institutions in India. To some this scheme is a consolidation of democratic process and appears revolutionary. But test of the success of such a large scheme is in its ability to carry vulnerable and the poor on board and keep them there for extended period of time. Further mechanism for an exit from nregs is a useful policy to think about. Due to deepening effects on farming and increase in land productivity the household incomes can rise above poverty line or at a level when reservation-wage will be more than nregs-wage, in which case many marginal and small farmers, may not further nregs work. This aspect is not recognized and no policy guide lines exist as ‘exit strategy’. It is useful to document the processes which provide leads to nregs’s relevance for poverty alleviation through improvement in agriculture.

In spite of powerful demands from the monitoring agencies, academics and activists, one finds lack of coordinated government level initiative, innovation and interventions to improve the program. In the end it must be stated that nregs has potential to provide social security to the masses only if its implementation is efficient and synergies are exploited. India should not miss another opportunity to demonstrate that world’s largest democracy also cares for its people especially the deprived and vulnerable, and that it truly is marching ahead to become a welfare state.

Budget 2009-10 : Will Bharat Smile while India waits for non-budgetary incentives

2009-07-06T15:12:00.000+05:30

Annual Budget is an exercise of stock taking therefore highly contextual; yet the balancing act it has to perform is not only in terms of revenue and expenditure, but need to address a number of dualisms that confronts Indian economy - for example, short and long term goals, rural and urban economy, agriculture and industrial (service) sectors, dualism of labor markets where 90% of labor force is in informal or unorganized sector, government versus private sector initiatives and not the least - Social Sector - so called people’s sector versus other formal sectors of the economy. Thus it is not a simple balancing line crossing, rather a number of such lines which are not parallel and the multiple crisscrossing in the web called National budget is not easy to confront with.

The contextual reality is that India is facing the heat of global economic downturn; and it would be futile to take solace in still positive growth of 6.3% in 2008-9 compared to near zero or a marginal global growth. What is important is not the level of GDP growth, but what incremental growth is achieved during the previous year; and a growth deceleration of about 3.0 % or so, does translates in to innumerable formal and informal shocks the corporate as well as general public is facing. One sure consequence is a broad based increase in unemployment but more specifically retrenchment of skill labor employed in selected export led industrial/services sectors where migrant and women labor has suffered.

The Budget 2009-10 presented this morning in many ways is a carried forward of the interim budget, but not much is added in terms of the ‘big bang’ second generation reforms nor strategy to plug a very high fiscal deficit of 6.8% which alone is 40 % of the total budgetary allocation and note that this amount is not on hand yet that spending will take effect immediately. Often upto one-third of allocations is never actually appropriated and spent thus the effecting need of fiscal deficit will be much smaller. Although the tax to GDP ratio is declared at 11.5%, the proceeds are far too inadequate to ease the interest payment worth 4% of GDP and the inevitable expenditure on defense worth another 2.5% of GDP.

This is budget with high fiscal deficit with no indication of from where this money will be brought in, limited direct tax incentives, no indication that domestic demand will be fired through fiscal and monitory incentives and there is no roadmap of disinvestment targets. However, while more details are awaited, what can be stated from the presentation of the finance minister is a focus on Bharat – meaning a focus on the common man beginning from a resolve to make agricultural sector rebound to a 4% growth; and there is also an emphasis on a number of infrastructural investments which can push both employment generation and augment rural markets. A 45% increase in allocation to projects under Bharat Nirman are noteworthy; further Rs. 325,000 cr or 5.45% of GDP worth funds are promised to be made available mostly from banking channels for agricultural credit at about 7% rate of interest. The farmers loan waver scheme is also extend further.

There is an emphasis on infrastructural development beginning from power development to development of rural roads and housing in both rural and urban areas especially through the Indira Ahwas yojana and JNNURM linked projects. The biggest gainer in this budget is the NREGA which has an allocation of Rs. 39,100 crores yet measures up to only 0.66% of GDP. This amount if fully spent will comfort millions of households especially by promoting employment of women. But since the NREGA wages are increased to Rs. 100/- nationally, a number of wage labor households may in fact net lower than expected annual income through wages since they may not migrate to urban or high wage rate areas due to availability of NREGA work. Thus the NREGA is a double edge apparatus, while on the one side it feels cool and nice on the other it can harm innovation and risk taking behavior.

Allocation to education programs including SSA and mid-day meals appear on the expected direction, but what is important is to ensure improving the quality of public education especially at the primary and elementary level which is not forthcoming in the budgetary allocations. The age old PDS is at its first year of getting redundant through a new program of providing 25 kg cereals at Rs.3 per kg for the BPL families. This program can only succeed if the BPL families are intelligently and correctly identified, and there is nothing which suggests that such a situation is achievable given over four decades of unsuccessful implementation of PDS. Whether ‘universal ID’ scheme can be put in place is yet to be seen and I am not yet hopeful on this innovation.

On the whole, agricultural and social sectors soaps are subject to implementation efficiencies and partnerships of the states; both are in the danger zone, therefore not much can be built upon these announcements yet. Besides, roads, markets and communications are drivers of the Indian economy but what has to be remembered is all this investment will be of no use if there are no users, for example what will you do by building mega infrastructural structures if there are no users and cost recovery. Having said that, the Indian growth story is going ‘ga-ga’ about the role of domestic demand; and given the global recession, it is indeed that capacity of the Indian citizen both in rural and urban areas to ‘fire the market’ so to speak that is the key for growth for the year 2009-10, but there is a week indication of this happening in the current budget.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crores of Rs. % GDP
Total Plan Exp 325,000 5.45
Fiscal Deficit 6.80
Revenue Deficit 4.80
Tax-GDP ratio 11.50
Interest payment 236,000 4.0
Defense expenditure 141,702 2.38
Selected social sector allocations 105,079 1.76
Total Budgetary allocation 1.020,838 17.1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2009-06-17T12:39:00.000+05:30

Labor Market Response in South Asia to the Global Recession

Key characteristics of the economic downturn / recession

Economic downturn/recession being experience during 2008-9 and still continuing has a global spread and most developed and many developing countries affected; in fact it all began from the USA, UK and Europe. Recession affected ability to sustain domestic demand mostly due to failure to sustain mortgages which triggered a banking crisis affecting investments, stalling large businesses especially those dependent upon global, multilateral and bilateral cross country production and distribution anchored on international trade. The global production slumped by 20% in the fourth quarter of 2008 (The World Bank, 2009). The average citizens across the developed economies especially, the USA which accounts for over a quarter of global business followed by many nations in Europe (eastern), experienced a decline in real income, postponed and/or squeezed household expenditures. This affected investments, production and trade in countries far and wide who supplied consumer goods and services to the developed world. Asia, especially countries which were dependent upon external trade for growth suffered most such as Japan, China, Korea, and India and so on.

By the time this contagion was taking place there were multiple channels through which the depression affected the households and labor markets. Noteworthy are sudden retrenchments and possibly wage cuts. However, almost the same time (and it is not co-incidental) that during the early period of the downturn oil prices touched the new high crossing USD 100/- and proceed further topping $140/-, unusually large increase in food price without major shortages in food stocks, increase in real rate of interest mostly in developing economies and tightening of credit and commodity markets. Economic slowdown can also be associated with falling prices known as deflation due to lack of demand of products. Again, it could be the result of inflation or a combination of increasing prices and stagnant economic growth in the west.

Although none of the countries in South Asia have recorded negative rates of growth yet, they indeed have experienced a steep decline in rate of growth. For example, India recorded a GDP growth of 6.7% in 2008-9 (CSO, quarterly estimates) lower than 8.7% growth of 2007-8 (Economic Survey, 2007-8)and a considerably low growth compared with the projected growth of 9-10%. The following occurrences in South Asia seem to be due to the impact of global reaction in South Asia:

1. Financial conditions deteriorated in developing countries, also reduced liquidity in the respective economies (India - some banking crunch, a few corporate postponed primary issues and joint ventures). Sharp decline in stock market and frozen real estate market

2. Sharp decline aggregate domestic demand and weak international demand for goods and services; reduction in industrial output

3. Reduced job opportunities, retrenchments and wage cuts (all countries in South Asia). India alone was estimated to have shed more that 500 thousand organized sectors employment during 2008, which is miniscule in terms of its share in the total labor market. Small and medium enterprise sector to suffer most. Increase in poverty and loss of gains in MDG goals likely.

4. In spite of declining commodity prices globally, country level inflationary tendencies, and food price increase (food price especially high in Pakistan and Bangladesh).

5. Drastic fall in global trade, Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey experience a decline of over 20%, India experience a 15 % decline in exports last year after a phenomenal 35% growth achieved previous years (World Bank, 2009). China and other Southeast Asia affected by a drastic fall in exports although not reached the negative side yet.

6. Overall decline in GDP (India recorded a lower 5.8% growth during last quarter of FY 2008-9 and the expected growth for the following quarters is also low).

7. Reports have begun to appear about steep increase in number of people affected by food vulnerability and hunger (UNICEF, 2009).

8. The internal and international economic migrations streams to stall and even reversed especially the rural-urban migration. It is likely that the laid-off nonfarm workforce returns to their respective rural areas and try to work on original occupations especially in agriculture causing serious labor market distortions and reduction in agricultural wages.

South Asian economies are experiencing a differentiated impact of the downturn; and the extent of impact depends upon the structure of the economy such as the extent of dependence on exports, whether it is a single or multiple commodity exporting country and the extent to which the country is dependent on imported capital inputs (FDI & FII) to manufacture exportable goods and intensity of labor used in manufacturing and so on. Consider, India whose export to the United States (which is under serious downturn) account for just over 3% of GDP and India has a healthy trade surplus with the United States. Yet India being a multi-commodity exporter, a number of sectors got adversely affected such as a total collapse of diamond and ornaments industry; steep reduction in textiles, garments and leather products which were exported in large quantities and many others. There has been a decline in overall export proceeds due to a 15% decline of exports in October 2008 and 19 % in February, 2009 (UNDP, 2009?). Industries have to build up now only on the strength of domestic demand and with steep reductions in market prices, which is not easy. The net result is high degree of unemployment of the labor engaged in manufacturing, and especially the migrant labor, mostly from rural areas but also from other urban locations working in a number of urban manufacturing growth centers. Yet only a fraction of Indian labor force is employed in the organized manufacturing sector (NCEUS, 2009; see also Table 1), since overwhelming proportion and size of labor is self employed and occupied in unorganized vocations both in rural and urban areas which are not integrated with the markets especially the global ones. This sector also gets affected albeit indirectly. The case of Pakistan is much more alarming as its economy is most vulnerable due to high fiscal and current account deficits, runaway inflation, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, a very weak currency and above all considerable internal security issues.

Linkage between Recession and Labor Markets

Long term effects on unemployment: In the absence of dependable data on employment and unemployment in south Asia, one is forced to review studies on the impact of recession on unemployment in developed economy such as the USA. Historically recessions have left traces of drastic fall in employment, a considerable size of addition to the unemployed during the medium term - upto 5 years. Schmitt and Baker (2008) estimate such impacts for the USA during the previous three recessions (of 1980-82, 1990-1991 and 2001) and also project impacts subsequent to 2008-9/10 recession under different scenarios. Accordingly, the rate of unemployment for example after the 1980-82 recession in the USA increased to 7.1%, 7.6, 9.7, 9.6 and 7.5 % during the five successive years from the peak year just before the recession when the rate was only 5.8. Similarly, the 2001 (March to November) recession pushed unemployment from only 4% to 4.7, 5.8, 6.0, 5.5 and 5.1 % respectively during the flowing five years. Further they provide the structure of unemployment according to gender, age and race to identify most vulnerable groups that suffer during the recessions, for example the teen and black-teen experienced higher unemployment rates of over 8% during the 2001 recession. Their projections for the 2008-9/10 recession in unemployment rates are as high as around 20% for the teen, 35-40% for black-teen, and 7-8% for Hispanics, even under the mild to moderate recession impact.

What is instructive from the above is the long term effect of recession on unemployment which lingers on for many years after the recession is over, and such impacts can be severe and longer in less developed economics such as those in South Asia. There are fewer studies assessing the impact of economic downturn or recession in the South Asian region.

The World Bank (2009) states, that the current economic crisis has increased poverty by 46 million by the end of 2008 itself (P.9). The UNCEF (2009) estimates just about 100 million more number of people in south Asia have become hungry and food vulnerable (P.2). The effect is transmitted to the poor through unemployment and wage effects. But vulnerability can further get accentuated through a number of indirect mechanisms operating though markets and contraction of consumer demand. Besides, in South Asia, the problem of vulnerability, food insecurity and poverty has exacerbated by country specific violent happenings of extreme order such as in Western parts of Pakistan, Northern Sri Lanka and in Nepal; and natural calamity in Bangladesh and parts (Bihar) of India. Period of recession is now setting in which is not yet well recognized in South Asia. Sectors having local markets are not suffering and in spite of a ‘sense of optimism’ and hope both amongst the poor and others, yet poor are getting affected. Some sectors that have suffered and also affect the poor are, the diamond industry (fully collapsed), recycling business has reduced to half (rag pickers deeply affected), and employment in construction industry has stood still. More micro occupations can be listed from all over south Asia.

Dualism in South Asian (labor) markets complicates the issues further: Broadly, South Asian economies are characteristic of dualism in growth and structure and in labor markets. For example the economy is split in to rural and urban areas with a heavy bias towards the latter. Similarly, large agricultural sector is entirely managed by individual farmers compared to industrial and modern services which are entirely organized and constantly infused with capital and technological inputs promoting unprecedented productivity growth. Similarly, the labor market is structured with informal and unorganized compared with formal and organized sectors. Even the so called organized sector in India employs almost one half of its workforce on casual informal basis (refer Table 1below) thus exposing them to the vagaries of recession. Such casual labor even while working in factory sector does not get coverage of the social security schemes meant for industrial workers.

In an effort to catch up with the west, so to speak, the south Asian economies especially, India and Pakistan have pursued heavy industrialization and modern services development which favor the urban and organized sectors, and mostly at the expense of rural and agricultural sectors. Even public investments are extremely low in rural agricultural sectors where the largest share and number of people are occupied. As a proportion or share, the poor concentrate in rural, agricultural and unorganized sectors where the policy focus is little if at all present.

The entire attention of the public policy, private finance and regulatory mechanism during the downturn has reprogrammed to address problems of the organized manufacturing and service sectors and mostly relevant for urban areas which already have high concentration of both physical and social infrastructure. The recession which has caused job losses in India too (World Bank, 2009) especially in the organized sector which was populated by the migrant labor, on their return to place of origin cause catastrophe in the local labor and wage market. In the absence of any social security for the displaced workers they are under extreme stress and suffering. This in turn has disturbed the labor wage market on the one side while demand for products produced in the rural, agricultural and unorganized sectors have declined due to the direct impact of recession in the first place. Thus the rural economy is now subjected to a kind of double whammy.

Table 1:
Relationship between Sector of Economy and Type of Employment
All Workers 1999-2000 and 2004-05

Formal/Informal Sector Total Employment (in percentage)
Informal/ Unorganized Worker Formal/ Organized Worker Total
2004-05
Informal/ Unorganized sector 99.6 0.4 86.3 (393.2)
Formal/Organized Sector 46.2 53.8 13.7 (62.6)
Total 92.3 7.7 100.0 (455.7)
1999-2000
Informal/ Unorganized sector 99.5 0.5 86.2 (341.5)
Formal/Organized Sector 42.1 57.9 13.8 (54.9)
Total 91.5 8.5 100.0 (396.4)
Note: Estimates based on the usual principle and subsidiary status of workers developed by the National Sample Survey Organization. Figures in parenthesis are in millions of workers.
Source: National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) (2009). The Challenge of Employment in India: An Informal Economy Perspective, Table 2.3, page no. 13. New Delhi. (Calculated by NCEUS using NSSO 55th and 61st Round Employment and Unemployment Survey).

Characteristics of labor markets in South Asia

People in populous economies typically depend for a living upon the rural and agricultural occupations. No other region compared to South Asia characterizes this scenario especially during the second half of the last century. Since about decade and half the south Asia especially India is identified as an emerging economy, where the role of rural occupations and farming is fast declining; while contributions from off-farm sectors such as manufacturing, trade and services has increase manifolds. What is less known is, the absence of concomitant shifts in labor force from the rural-traditional and less efficient occupations to urban oriented off-farm and apparently more productive occupations. Further the south Asian economies have a high growth of workforce which is more than 2% per annum. As mentioned earlier, most of the workforce is informal and they are also either illiterate or barely educated, and under skilled. There is also a general tendency to deny work opportunities to women seeking work.

India is characteristic of dualism in it labor market. But low growth of employment is not because of rigidities in labor market (NCEUS, 2009). Lately there has been a decline in overall employment, decline in wages and low growth of formal employment. Disconnect, between growth and employment appear a long lasting problem. There is also no expectation of growth of employment in formal sector employment even when the GDP growth remain high, in fact the Indian planning model did not put foundation of growth on formal sector, instead on small scale industries and micro-enterprises. New employment is capital intensive and not labor intensive in formal sector. There may be growing inequality which can be termed as the ‘latin americanization’ of India. Therefore, policy approach should favor massive investments in informal sectors - may be a shift in investment from formal sector necessary. Public and private sector issues are relevant in this context.

One also notice a slow movement of labor from agriculture to RNFE, yet the nonfarm sector is not able to provide high productivity employment in India, although relative to agriculture these sectors have registered high productivity growth (see Table 2). There is also feminization of agricultural and manual labor (NCEUS, 2008 –Report No2, Shariff, 2009), while the policy emphasis on non existing micro-enterprises (survey of enterprises). Lack of education amongst young labor force is alarming which threaten the very foundation for future GDP growth in the region.

Table 2
Shares of income and labor, and productivity ratios in Rural India

Share of
Income Share of
Labor Income/Labor ratios
%ge Change in
ratios
(1994) (2005) (1994) (2005) (1994) (2005)
Self employed 12 12.9 12.7 8.8 0.95 1.5 58.0
Salaried 16.5 20.4 10.4 9 1.6 2.3 44.0
Manual worker 6.3 12.8 9.8 15.8 0.64 0.81 27.0
Cultivator 55 33.1 43.7 42.3 1.26 0.78 -38.0
Ag Labor 7.9 12 23.5 24.1 0.34 0.5 47.0
Other residual* 2.4 8.8 --- --- --- --- ---
*Other residual is a source of income category but not an occupation
Source: Shariff (2009)

How does the crisis affect the informal economy?

It is estimated that during 2004-05, 420 million or 92 percent of labor force was engaged in informal economy; and only about 8 percent were occupied in the formal sectors in India. The informal workers are the self-employed including the cultivating farmers, casual wage laborers, street vendors to those who operate micro enterprises with less than ten workers, and those regular workers in the formal sector who are without any employment or social security and so on. Eighty-four percent of cultivators are marginal and small farmers operating not more than 2 hectares of land. Agricultural laborers, the bottom layer of the occupational structure, include a majority of workers from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and constitute around 89 million in the total labor force. This is also the poorest segment in the Indian economy from an occupational point of view.

It needs to be recognized that the impact of the crisis is not restricted to the larger, organized segments of industry and is indeed of a much more serious nature among those engaged in the informal economy. Consumption estimates, during the period of growth (1993-94 / 2004-05), suggest a rapid expansion roughly in the top two deciles, fuelling the growth, but the benefits of this growth principally bypassed the vast majority of the population (about 77%) who remained vulnerable with an average per capita daily consumption below Rs. 20. However, during the current slowdown, it is precisely these people, the poor and vulnerable, engaged in informal sector enterprises or informally employed by the formal sector, who will be affected the most adversely:

- the informal workers in the organized sector losing employment – in manufacturing, construction and tradetinal services sectors.

- Small producers who contribute more than 30% of exports and traders have suffered in sectors such as in handlooms, textiles, apparel, leather products, gems and jewellery, metal products, carpets, and various types of agricultural products such as spices, and marine fishery.

- Unorganized sector manufactures with investment below Rs. 5 lakh in ‘plant and machinery’ gets less than 2 percent of net bank credit, yet they are getting liquidated due to the economic downturn.

- Casual workers, the urban self-employed, and rural producers in the unorganized sector, including marginal farmers who are net buyers of food grains, have been affected in the recent months by the sharp upturn in the prices of food grains and the rate of inflation, depressing their real income.

The combined impact on the informal economy would be an increase in livelihood insecurity, decline in income and intensification in the conditions of poverty and vulnerability.

Pakistan has seen unusually large increase in food and every day commodities' prices coupled with the high fuel prices. Stock markets have suffered banks sans deposits and Pakistan rupee has seen a large downward trend. Pakistan gets most of its FDI from the west which has dried down. Pakistani exports are steeply reduced due to slowdown in the west. But so far Pakistan has escaped the recent economic turmoil emerging from the US and engulfing the developed European economies. But as the financial analysts go, it has created a situation loaded with immense possibilities for Pakistan. Top bankers are expecting a lot of eastward investment in the near future as options are drying out swiftly in the developed countries' markets. So far as the rural and informal economy is concerned the impact in Pakistan has been on the similar lines described for India.

Bangladesh has also seen considerable increase in food prices and it is only in April-May 2009 that India lifted the ban on rice export which will help reduce food price inflation in Bangladesh which imports rice from India. Bangladesh which was building up its economy through the value added export projects such as garments has got adversely affected due to downturn.

Nepal is one of the countries which have seen migration as an opportunity since long; the labor market is characteristic of long distance and often international (mostly to India) migration. A neighborly county good gesture of India is that labor migration from Nepal can happen without any restrictions generally imposed by rules of international travel such as restriction due to visa and permit requirements. But an adverse impact of recession in India is being felt in Nepal as many migrant workers will be returning back to Nepal. This will put unprecedented pressure in Nepal as well. Nepal which is experiencing political instability exacerbates the problem of dwindling economic fortunes.

Research Gaps in the area of Labor markets

Understanding the Push and the Pull Factors are important: The prevailing spatial market and non-market characteristics exert pull and push forces to both the capital and labor shifting from the inefficient to efficient sectors of the economy. In this regard the role of rural to urban migration is important. Besides the current trend of development of growth centers either in the form of ‘development corridors’, ‘urban peripheries’ or even the growth of medium and small towns which are promoting nonfarm employment and higher incomes are important to be explored. There could also be reverse association in the form of commutation, backward and forward market linkages in goods and services; and income from remittances from the urban to rural areas that will add richness to this analysis. Reverse migration may have taken a clear shape due to the impact of economic downturn which need to be studied.

Increasing role of remittances: Remittances are now a major source of household income both in rural and urban areas. Data on remittances has for the first time become available from the NSSO 64th round and also from NCAER-IHDS surveys, which can be analyzed.

Restructuring the production sectors due to declining role of land as productive asset: Another area worth exploring relates to the asset ownership profile of farmers, agricultural laborers, artisans and tradesmen in the agriculturally progressive versus marginal areas in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Given a long history of feudalism in the region, it would be appropriate to document changes in land ownership pattern after the Independence, subsequently after the green revolution period and in the contemporary context of consolidation of land both due to cultural factors and modern markets based on contract farming. While cultivable land appear to be the dominant asset, both productive as well as contractual in nature; many human capital enhancing assets such as formal education, skills and access to working capital would be denting the importance of land assets. Besides the breakdown of the jajmani system in the region seems to have released a large number of wage workers and artisan from the bondage; but could well have pushed them in penury due to the breakdown of traditional support systems; which then get linked with institutions supporting evolution of safety net mechanisms.

Productivity versus Safety Nets: Why growth in employment is low, what is it which is holding back employment generation, which formal sector not growing needs a study? Beside it is useful to focus on policies which aim for productivity growth versus and provisioning of safety nets. The institutional mechanisms, emanating either from public programs and/or market orientation cushion favorable changes in movement of labor, generate higher income or sustain welfare effects at the household level. One of the challenges in Asia is to accurately trace labor market mobility and associated income changes during fast pace of economic growth . Given that a good proportion of work force is employed in rural-agricultural vocations, it is imperative to understand the dynamics of rural life and survival strategies that people resort to. Further, labor market reforms in developing societies should be aimed to ensure fair distribution of income from out of expanding domestic product. This demands mechanisms that not only enhance household income but also enables food and nutrition adequacy and improves basic human capital such as levels of literacy; disease free enhancement of life expectancy and socio-culturally peaceful living.

Migration, Labor flexibility and Poverty in South Asia

Physical movement of labor, manifest in migration mostly from rural to urban; but also the other three identifiable streams including international has not been studied in-depth. Recent evidence suggests closer to 10% of Nepal’s population out migrated, mostly to (India) international destinations, contributing (Rs. 102.1billion 2006-7) over 14% to the GDP , and enabling 11% decline in poverty between 1994 and 2004 . Similarly, remittance from aboard is the largest foreign exchange earner which constitute over 8% of GDP in Bangladesh, and reduced poverty by 6 per cent . India, during 2006-7 received a net of US$ 27.8 billion in remittances which is over 10% of India’s foreign exchange reserve. The remittance for the year 2005-6 was 25.2 billion dollars and for two earlier years it averaged about US$ 22 billion in India. This suggests a substantial role that migration can play in building national economies as well as household welfare. On the similar lines, if one identifies the economic role of internal migration it becomes clear as to how important migration is in the growth process of economics in south Asia. Besides the economic benefits, concurrently there are a number of household level positive changes in attitudes, perceptions and livelihood strategies that take place due to migration. The subject matter of this study is to document the role of migration mostly (internal) in sustaining and improving rural livelihoods and reducing poverty.

Migration, an opportunity or distress: Migration a source to sustain income and consumption but can be at the cost of a decline in a number of human capital formation outcomes such as reduced schooling and literacy, increase vulnerability to sickness, family splits leading to emotional discard and increase in vulnerability. Yet migration has been seen as an opportunity especially by the land less labors, and surprisingly both the educated and illiterate from the rural areas. Concentration of economic activities in urban and semi-urban areas and higher casual wage rates in urban sectors of the economy probably provide the necessary motivating pull, but the push factors in the rural parts which can be due to both natural cause such as declining land productivity, increase pressure of population growth; and also policy neglect and low investment in agriculture.

Migration a bridge between Rural and Urban Economies: Rural and urban livelihoods are interconnected economically, financially, and socially. From a rural perspective, most farmers depend on urban markets to secure their livelihoods such as sale of agricultural produce often on a daily basis such as supply of milk, fruits, vegetables, poultry and so on. Rural households generally depend on cities and towns to access various institutional services such as from hospitals, schools and colleges, banks, and government offices) and for the provision of various private and public goods. The rural households also benefits from remittances sent by family members who migrated to urban areas on employment.

Urban areas are similarly linked to the rural sector, for example, various large businesses and enterprises depend on rural demand for their goods and services (bicycles, ratdios, TVs, FMGC products, seeds and fertilizer, IT enabled communications and so on). Urban areas also rely on rural areas for the supply of raw materials. Urban consumers, on the other hand, benefit from sustained food supply from rural areas. Many poor urban households partly depend on rural activities (e.g., farming) for their livelihoods. The rural sector can also act as a buffer from the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the urban economy. Links between the rural and urban sectors also include flows of information, such as markets and employment opportunities, as well as flows of people moving between rural and urban centers on a temporary or permanent basis

Policies that strengthen or weaken migration

• Inhibiting trade been districts, states, and rural and urban areas by using taxation policies or outright ban.

• Agricultural policies protect urban households, e.g., from high food prices, can indirectly stymie agricultural investment. Low commodity prices discourage farmers from continuing and expanding production, not only affecting the desirability to allocate capital into agriculture, but also potentially creating food shortages

• State policies can discourage people from moving freely between regions, historically there are barriers to labor mobility. Differences emerging from cultural and linguistic differences and variations in life style factors such as food habits and so on can inhibit migration. Besides local politics seeking favors especially jobs, permits and so on only for local population, often referred to as ‘sons of the soil’ policies discourage interstate as well as rural to urban migration.

• Limiting provisions such as housing, water, electricity, roads to living localities populated by migrants

• Limiting social services such as education, health and nutrition/ food access to migrant families. Rural out-migrants usually are unable to claim state benefits in urban areas of India and China (Deshingkar, 2006).

Refined Understanding of Links between Migration and Poverty

The dynamics of migration differs considerably by its type. The characterization of migration streams is not very well documented in economic literature, especially in south Asia, due mostly to want of data and definitional issues. Distinctions, for example, between rural-to-urban and rural-to-rural, just to name two of the four major streams is important. Similarly, distinction between internal and international migration is another useful characterization. Another way is to identify life time versus circular migration which carry very different dynamics; and the intermediating ‘step-wise’ migration in which a migrant cautiously moves over to the final destination after taking a number of shorter and smaller migration moves over time. A recent research , for example, has found that the impact of household welfare especially on gender specific child schooling and health differed substantially depending upon whether the economic migration was within ‘district’, ‘within state but out of district’ and ‘out of state’ migration.

The available data from surveys do not capture many of the variations in migration enunciated above especially the short term and circular migration. Migration is an intermediating process which generally breaks a household, often leaving women, children, the old and infirm vulnerable. Yet this same vulnerability may turn out to be a factor leading to empowerment of women in the rural areas. One such evidence has been feminization of Indian agriculture, the skeptics use this as an evidence of distress but one can look at this phenomenon as empowerment of women instead. Women’s control over resources generally leads to better human capital output indicator such as better education and health conditions of children.

Migration in the south Asian context is considered a sign of distress. A historical assessment of migration since the partition provides credence to such a hypothesis. Often the migrants originating from rural areas belong to asset less households such as the landless, small / marginal farmers (for example, migrant agricultural labour to Indian Punjab from Bihar and Eastern Uttar Pradesh), low castes such as the dalits, tribal groups (for example, migration from high lands and mountains to tarai regions in Nepal) and minorities (for example, Muslims in India and Hindus in Bangladesh). Such high propensity migration often leads to permanent or life time migration as well. This dynamics of migration has immense relevance to the future of social cohesion and peaceful living within a country or region. Further migrating adult male members leave behind dependents who can get into distress and penury. The proposed study intends to document and empirically measure various aspects of class and caste hierarchies, power structures, gender relations, social cohesion and historical factors that have a bearing on migration of people / households and relative impact on livelihoods.

Firstly there is a need to assess migration streams using data from large scale sample survey of households in Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan Longitudinal datasets are useful in understanding change over time in critical variables at the household level such as occupations, assets, poverty/wealth status. A number of qualitative studies needs to be launched so as to get complementary information to substantiate the quantitative data analysis. Qualitative study and in depth interviews will highlight village level processes and individual life trajectories in response to wider changes (environmental, market and policy).

Hypotheses - Migration, labor mobility and poverty:

• What are the patterns of labor migration in each of the countries? Is there evidence of large-scale movement of labor from low-productivity regions to high-productivity regions?

• To what extent has the shift from farm to nonfarm income sources occurred via migration? In other words, has income diversification taken place through migration of some family members to urban areas?

• Remittances now form a large share of household income both in rural and urban areas of South Asia. Even in India, its importance has increased. New data available from NSSO 63rd round data and data from NCAER’s IHDS can be analyzed to find out the poverty reducing impact of migration linked remittances.

• What types of occupations (using the three-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations) have seen growth, and which occupations have seen a decline, over the last two decades in each of the seven countries?

The frame of analysis of ‘migration and its impact’ must begin with analyzing the economic structure and labor market imperfections followed by the process and mechanisms that in turn determine impact and outcomes. The outcomes in this research are to be identified at the levels of household and community. The set of questions which will be used in both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches are listed below:

a) Economic structure, migration and market imperfections

• Economic structure and income/GDP profiling by source with a focus on rural urban differentials.
• What type of labor market imperfections are promoting migration flows. Is it linked with rural - urban or interregional wage differences?
• What kind of strategy is adopted by migrants to enhance income and savings leading to remittances?
• Role of migration in sustaining household income and impact of remittances on poverty.
• Identify uninsured risks that need to be addressed by public policy?

b) Societal factors and household level social process

• What are the social drivers of migration at the intra-household level and at the village level (e.g. historical connections with certain destinations) and how these vary by social groups?
• The relationship between income and occupation, education, skills; which social groups are excluded from well paid jobs and for what reasons?
• Migration as a response to differential needs – (short versus long term).
• The impact of migration on assets, durables, education, social standing, creditworthiness and how this differs by caste and gender.

c) Gender response and outcomes

Gendered response will be investigated in four different perspectives: (a) implications for the individual woman, (b) implications for the household, (c) implications for the society, and (d) implications for agriculture. The expectation is that while woman assumes a greater role in household decision making as a consequence of migration of a male household member; and over a period of time it generate a number of women empowering effects which will operate through her own self, human capital formation of children, through a number of public and social goods and even improvements in agricultural productivity.

Bibliography and References:
Mujahid, G. B. S (2007). Rural-urban migration, urban underemployment and earnings differentials in Pakistan, Review of World Economics, 111(3):585-598.

Schmitt, J and Dean Baker 2008. ‘What we’re in for: Projected Economic Impact of the next recession’, a paper of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington DC. (www.cepr.nt).

Admes H Richard Jr and Jane J. He (1995) Source of income inequality and poverty in rural Pakistan, Report No. 102, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Muller, Valerie and A. Shariff, 2008. ‘Can Migration Improve Living Standards in Developing Countries? Internal Migration and Welfare in India’, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, (December).

World Bank 2009. ‘Swimming against the tide: How developing countries are coping with the global crisis’. Background paper prepared by the World Bank Staff for the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting, Horsham, the UK, March 13-14.

Behrman, Jere, R (1988). ‘The impact of economic adjustment programs’ in Bell, David E and Michael R. Reich (eds.) Health, Nutrition, and Economic Crisis: Approaches to Policy in the third World, Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Co.

UNICEF (2009). A Matter of Magnitude: The Impact of the economic crisis on women and children in south Asia. Katmandu: Unicef Regional Office.

BBC Link

2009-04-21T11:30:00.000+05:30

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7998819.stm